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ABSTRACT
Caught in the Immigration Cross-Fire: The Changing Dynamics of Congressional
Support for Skilled Worker Visas
By
Maryam Tanhaee Stevenson
Dr. David Damore, Examination Committee Chair
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This project examines the congressional politics associated with legislation on
skilled foreign workers, specifically the H-1B visa which was created by the Immigration
Act of 1990. It attempts to explain why legislative policies were successful on a small
scale between 1998 and 2004 and completely unsuccessful after 2004.
Specifically, this study is a longitudinal qualitative analysis that uses Krehbiel’s
pivotal politics model (1998), Cox and McCubbins’ party politics models (2005; 2007),
Sinclair’s (2007) unorthodox lawmaking theory, and Gilmour’s (1995) strategic
disagreement model to explain four key periods of H-1B legislation: (1) the passage of
the Immigration Act of 1990; (2) passage of stand-alone legislation from 1998 through
2002; (3) passage of legislation through the use of riders from 1998 through 2002: and
(4) complete stalemate after 2004. Using polarization as the main independent variable to
explain shifts in congressional behavior, this study attempts to explain why congressional
behavior dramatically shifted from 1990 to date. It concludes with a comparison of
similar policies in Canada and Australia in order to ascertain whether their legislative
experiences on foreign skilled workers coincide or differ from that in the United States
and attempt to understand why.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Various scholars have studied Congress as an institution and its individual
members as policymakers. As a result, the literature on Congress and congressional
behavior is extensive. It includes studies on elections and campaigns, bill adoption,
partisanship, bipartisanship, polarization, budgeting, bureaucracy, campaign finance,
committees, the filibuster, separation of powers, constituencies, decision making,
redistricting, lobbying, agenda setting, and the media 1.
There is also a fair amount of research on immigration policy. As a policy area
that Congress constitutionally maintains exclusive control over, scholars have found it an
interesting area to study. These studies typically focus on one specific policy area as
outlined below.
Immigration policy was delineated into two main realms in the Immigration Act
of 1952: immigrant and nonimmigrant. Nonimmigrant visas are visas that provide
authority to stay and/or work2 for a temporary period only, and immigrant visas provide
legal permanent residence status3. Both include categories for family and employment
based immigration and within employment based immigration, categories exist for both
skilled and unskilled labor.
Most studies on the politics of skilled worker immigration focus their scope on
the immigrant category and policy on immigrant visas because it grants permanent
resident status. Within these studies, scholars have examined congressional behavior on

1

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all of the congressional literature, but an illustration of the
various issues studied.
2
Employment is not a requirement or even permissible for some nonimmigrant visas.
3
Throughout this study, the terms legal permanent residence and green card will be used interchangeably.
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both family based and employment based immigrant visas, including skilled worker
immigration. Yet the majority of immigrants to the United States that enter legally enter
the country on a nonimmigrant visa first and then go through the process of permanent
residence.
Additionally, the H-1B visa is the only visa category generally4 for U.S.
employers to obtain foreign skilled workers in a relatively short period of time 5. As a
result, a study of congressional behavior on immigrant visas is premature without also
looking at congressional behavior on nonimmigrant visas as well. Therefore, this study
will attempt to fill that gap in the literature and attempt to understand congressional
behavior on the H-1B visa.
Proposed Scope of Study
As stated, the H-1B visa is the only nonimmigrant visa available exclusively to
skilled workers. It requires the applicant have a sponsoring United States employer, and
that the position require at least a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in work experience.
The visa was created by the Immigration Act of 1990 and was capped at 65,000. Since
the cap was hit for the first time in 1997, Congress has debated various ways to increase
the cap and/or alter the visa program in most years. Congress was successful in
addressing the cap through legislation successfully between 1998 through 2004. After
that, legislation was attempted between 2006 and 2008 as stand-alone legislation only
and all failed. Post 2008, no legislation has been introduced. This study will attempt to
4

There are other nonimmigrant visa categories that can be used for foreign skilled workers but require
some other showing, such as proof the alien is of extraordinary ability, a managerial type position, the alien
is a national of Canada or Mexico, etc. The H-1B, however, is the only general visa available across the
board for skilled workers without any additional showing (although in some cases if an additional obstacle
to work exists, such as a license, proof of that is also required).
5
Employers can file green card applications on behalf of a foreign skilled worker(s), but this process is
lengthy and expensive and can take many years before the worker can come to the U.S. to work.
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explain the change in congressional behavior on the H-1B visa in order to understand
why Congress was proactive on the issue through 2004 and then averse to touching the
issue amid constituent demands for change.
In a relatively short period of time, policy on the H-1B visa went from being
relatively noncontroversial with bipartisan support to complete stalemate. This analysis
will attempt to explain what changed. Briefly, while Congress is a well bound institution,
it is also not impervious to the external macro environment. One major shift over time
and during this time period has been the increase in polarization both in the broader
political environment and within Congress as a result of ideological sorting coupled with
economic and social changes. What we are left with is legislation that was once routine
can now only be passed through unorthodox methods, if at all.
Consequently, I will look at H-1B policymaking within the context of these
broader trends in American politics. And while the timeframe is short, the forces shaping
the internal and external environment accelerated a great deal during this period. As a
result, no one model of congressional decision making can explain congressional
behavior on the H-1B during this time. Therefore, it is necessary to use a variety of
congressional models, including pivotal politics, party models, unorthodox lawmaking,
and stalemate game theory models in order to explain policymaking (or the lack thereof)
on the H-1B visa.
Additionally, this analysis will seek to ascertain whether similar congressional
trends in the U.S. have occurred in Canada and Australia in order to provide a

3

comparative analysis 6. I chose this comparison because all three countries share similar
colonial histories, similar needs to populate their countries with immigrants, and similar
ethnic restrictive policies throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. Since then, both
Canada and Australia have recently held similar types of relatively open immigration
policies as the United States and as a result, these three countries have over time been the
largest immigrant receiving countries in the world. Because of this, there are a number of
studies comparing and contrasting the various political and social phenomena between
and among the United States, Canada, and Australia.
Therefore, my qualitative analysis will attempt to answer the following research
questions:
1) What factors explain congressional policy making within the context of skilled
worker (H-1B) immigration?
2) Why did Congress stop using alternative methods (i.e. riders) to pass H-1B
legislation?
3) Why did even minor changes to the H-1B program that were successful as
stand-alone pieces of legislation pre-2004 fail after 2004?
4) Is the U.S. experience unique? How does it compare to legislation in Canada
and Australia?
Essentially, I seek to explain a non event; specifically why Congress was not able
to pass legislation just a few years after there was bipartisan support for it. Prior studies
on congressional behavior use roll call votes to conduct quantitative analyses on
individual members in order to explain shifts in support. While I would have liked to
6

While the selection of Canada and Australia may leave this study open to selection bias, I am not
attempting to make a true comparative analysis but rather ascertain whether other countries with a similar
history of immigration policy have experienced the same level of difficulty in passing similar legislation.
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have conducted such an analysis, the data was not available for the legislation I examine
in this study. In fact, roll call votes only exist for five pieces of legislation out of a total
36 bills. Because I am unable to examine individual members’ voting patterns, I will need
to make an assessment of how and why Congress as a body changed their support for this
type of legislation. Therefore, with the exception of some descriptive statistics, my
approach is largely qualitative. The body of the study is as follows.
Chapter two provides a broad overview of congressional policy goals on
immigration generally and the H-1B visa specifically over time. It will begin by
providing a history of general immigration law and immigration policymaking in the
United States. The second part of the chapter will include an overview and detailed
legislative history on the H-1B visa.
Chapter three presents a literature review where I highlight the theoretical
underpinnings of congressional behavior. Specifically, I will outline the theories and
policy models that are relevant to this discussion. As the most extensively studied
institution in the world, theory on Congress and congressional behavior is numerous and
has been well debated, but has also grown muddled over time. Additionally, because the
macro environment was constantly changing over the period I examine, one model
cannot accurately explain legislative behavior over this period of time. Therefore, an
analysis of legislation over time will need to use a variety of different theories and
models to explain congressional behavior. It will begin with a review of the literature,
followed by an review of the main congressional models, and examine the traditional
cues and influences utilized and felt by members of Congress in both a general sense and
more specifically when dealing with immigration legislation.

5

Chapter four outlines and develops my hypotheses. It also provides a discussion
of my methodology for the remaining analysis.
Chapters five through eight are the main analysis chapters. They are broken down
into the various periods in which Congress dealt with H-1B policy and will analyze the
context in which legislation was either successful or unsuccessful and attempt to explain
why.
Chapters five and six will illustrate how the more traditional models of
congressional behavior can be used to explain legislative behavior on the H-1B visa and
why legislation either was or was not successful. Chapter five will examine the
Immigration Act of 1990, the original piece of legislation that created the H-1B skilled
worker visa within the context of pivotal politics. Chapter six will look at the legislation
that was passed individually between 1998 and 2004 through party models.
Chapters seven and eight will delve into the lesser known and more niche models
of congressional behavior, including unorthodox legislation and strategic disagreement.
Chapter seven will explain how the institutional nature of Congress has changed and how
this change affected the success and failure of legislation in the context of unorthodox
legislation. Chapter eight will use strategic disagreement game theory to explain the
failure of all H-1B related legislation that was introduced between 2006 and 2008 and the
lack of any legislation after 2008 to date.
Finally, chapter nine will compare skilled immigration visa policies among the
U.S., Canada, and Australia. It will attempt to ascertain whether Canada and Australia’s
legislatures have had similar experiences passing or failing to pass skilled worker

6

immigration during the same time period throughout the 2000s within the context of both
similar and different macro conditions.
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CHAPTER 2
TRACING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND THE H-1B VISA
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of congressional policy
goals on immigration generally and the H-1B visa specifically over time. It will begin by
discussing the history of general immigration law and immigration policymaking in the
United States. These policy goals have ranged from being both restrictive and open. In
the early years of the Republic, racial and ethnic differences were Congress’s main
source of consideration, followed by a period of post industrialization when cheap labor
was key, only to return full circle by a post-9/11 period of security concerns that resulted
in racial concerns and implications, and accentuated by the economic crises of the mid to
late 2000s.
After providing a general historical view of immigration policy in the United
States, I will then move on to examine the H-1B visa specifically. The second part of this
chapter will include an overview and detailed legislative history on the H-1B visa, the
only type of visa specifically reserved for skilled workers. In later chapters I will attempt
to reconcile these policy goals with actual legislation (or lack thereof) on the H-1B visa.
A History of Immigration Law and Policymaking7
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution granted to the
United States Congress the power to “…establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”
Pursuant to that power, Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790 which

7

This is not intended to be an exhaustive legislative history on immigration policy in the United States (for
such a discussion see Gimpel and Edwards (1999) or Zolberg (2006)). In fact, many key pieces of
immigration will not be discussed. This chapter is designed to overview the important policy decisions
leading up to current policy on skilled workers and the H-1B visa.
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established the requirements and grounds for naturalization. While naturalization refers
only to the process of becoming a citizen of a country one was not born in, since the Act
of 1790 Congress has maintained exclusive jurisdiction over not only naturalization but
over all immigration policymaking dealing with admission and naturalization.
Following the 1790 Act, immigration was not a salient issue during the early
years of the Republic. Throughout the 1800s, Congress remained relatively absent in
immigration policymaking and its exclusive jurisdiction was exercised very little by early
policymakers. The basic policy kept American borders open to immigrants from western
European countries in order to maintain ethnic homogeneity while closed to others,
resulting in the vast majority of immigrants to the United States being of western
European descent (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Timmer and Williams 1998; Mann 1953).
As a result, early American borders were considerably closed when compared to today.
By the late 1800s, however, various groups began lobbying their anti-immigration
interests to Congress. These groups included: (1) both unorganized and organized labor,
represented by the American Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor; (2) owners of
capital, represented by the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Board of
Trade, and local boards of trade and chambers of commerce; (3) immigrants; and (4)
rural America, represented by Northern agriculturalists and the South (which was
originally pro-immigration but became anti-immigration by the 1890s (Goldin 1994).
Goldin (1994) lists several hypotheses to explain this shift in support. First, the South
became adverse to immigration due to its own race problem and did not want to add an
additional problem demographic. Second, because Southern manufacturing was not
unionized, Southerners were able to benefit from paying their workers much lower wages

9

than their northern counterparts. Increased immigration would allow their Northern
competitors these same benefits. Finally, the increase in immigration in the North had
resulted in increased Northern control of the House. Thus, by the 1890s, these four
groups created a united force to Congress staunchly opposing unrestricted immigration.
Congress was largely responsive to this lobby and in 1882 passed the Chinese
Exclusion Act. The Act essentially marked a second era of exclusionary immigration
practices which lasted through the 1940s, despite congressional efforts to reverse some of
these policies (described below). In an effort to exclude Chinese immigrants, Congress
created an immigration bureaucracy for the first time with the Chinese Exclusion Act.
Over time, this bureaucracy has evolved and grown. Today it is used to not only keep out
and remove undocumented immigrants, but also regulate the visa processes of those that
are documented.
During this same period, however, many members of Congress began advocating
for a more open immigration policy. As a result, Congress became divided on this issue
throughout the late 1890s and there were no shifts or changes in immigration policy. By
the 1900s, however, many groups who were previously against immigration, such as
owners of capital, shifted their stance in favor of open immigration (Goldin 1994). In
response, Congress began passing a variety of laws dealing with immigration, effectively
steadily increasing the number of visas available across the board. The new debate among
policymakers became not whether immigration policy should be open or closed, but
rather whether immigrants should be granted access based on a first come first served
policy or through some sort of preference rank order.

10

Beginning in 1921, Congress finally opted for a preference rank order under the
Emergency Quota Act. The preference rank order system consisted of a strict per country
preference system with annual quotas where national origin/ancestry determined
admission to the United States. It created both numerical limits on immigration from
Europe and a quota system to establish those numerical limits.
Several factors likely played a part in the 1921 Act limiting immigration from
various regions (Fischer 2005; Scharf 1999; Cohen 1995; Goldin 1994). While the 1920s
were largely a period of economic growth and industrialization in the United States, this
period was also marred by an economic recession beginning in 1920 that lasted through
1921. Additionally, the end of the First World War in 1918 was still fresh in the minds of
many and the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917 resulted in nationalistic
sentiments and a fear of foreign radicalism and/or anarchy. These fears, combined with
the addition of 800,000 immigrants from southern, eastern, and central Europe to the
United States in 1920 resulted in a strong public sentiment against immigration that
manifested itself in policy (Goldin 1994).
While the 1921 Act brought about some change in immigration policy, it still
favored immigrants from Europe. Between 1951 and 1960, for example, 53 percent of all
immigrants were from Europe, 28 percent were from North America, and only the
remaining 19 percent from Asia, the Caribbean, South America, Central America, and
Africa (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).
Congress amended the annual quota numbers in 1924, but the law still largely
favored European immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1924 established quotas of two
percent of a country’s population with 1890 as the base year which granted Europeans a

11

higher quota. Additionally, effective in 1927 it created a ceiling of 150,000 total new
immigrants to be calculated with the 1920 national origin proportions.
Immigration law and policy didn’t change dramatically again until the mid 1950s
with the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) of 1952 8 over
President Truman’s veto9. Immigration policy as it exists today finds its roots the INA.
The INA established the current system of family and employment based
immigration, as well as refugee admission. It created the first system of visa
preferences10, which continues today. It also created a per country quota in an attempt to
rectify prior discriminatory policy and cap the number of western Europeans granted
admission. It also gave the government increased powers to deport legal immigrants in
the United States suspected of having Communist sympathies.
The INA was likely partly a product of the Cold War and fears of communism, as
well as a need for labor. The end of the Second World War resulted in a period of
economic prosperity from 1945 to 1973 and technological advancements and growth in
labor resulted in a shift from low income farm work to higher paying work in industry,
resulting in a shortage of low paid farm workers11.
Between 1924 to 1965 (and during the INA debates), liberal politicians led by
Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), Warren Magnusun (D-WA), and Herbert H. Lehman (DNY) rallied the charge for more liberal and less discriminatory immigration policy
(Gimpel and Edwards 1999). They argued that the United States’s anti-Communist

8

To date the legislation is referred to as the INA.
Truman preferred a greater departure from past policy and felt the INA was just an extension of the 1921
law.
10
Visa preference refers to giving preference to certain classes of immigrants with certain family
relationships or certain employment skills.
11
This resulted in the creation of the Bracero program in 1942, which continued until 1959.
9
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foreign policy needed to be softened and combined with an open immigration policy
(Reimers 1992). Additionally, after passage of the INA in 1952, liberal pressure from
religious organizations (such as Protestants, Catholics, and Jewish groups), liberal groups
such as the ACLU, and from business interests (including the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Associated General Contractors, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and
the National Industrial Conference Board) to liberalize immigration policy generally and
refugee policy specifically resulted in the passage of 32 laws between 1953 and 1964 to
modify the national-origins policy (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; LeMay 1987; Bennett
1963).
Additionally, existing support by Democrats combined with new support for
immigration reform by the Republican Party led by Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater in
the 1960s resulted in bipartisan support for policy reform. In addition, both the
Republican and Democratic parties made open immigration policy a part of their
platforms in the 1960 elections.
As a result, in 1965, Congress amended the INA to abolish the per country quotas
that were instituted in 1921 and amended in 1924. This new amendment instituted a
170,000 annual quota on all persons in the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 in the
Western Hemisphere with a limit of 20,000 for any one nation. Since 1965, Congress has
regularly changed the annual quotas on family and employment based immigrant visas.
While Congress has delegated much of its general policymaking abilities to
various agencies (Lowi 1979), Congress has maintained its exclusive jurisdiction on
immigration policymaking as granted to them by Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.
While various agencies (such as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, the
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Departments of State, Labor, and Homeland Security, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement) have been created by Congress to implement and enforce congressional
policy through regulation, Congress has maintained its exclusive jurisdiction over actual
policymaking.
Through this jurisdiction, Congress has been active in not only making and
passing legislation on the various immigration categories but also on setting quotas on the
number of immigrants granted entry in each category. Specifically, Congress has
exclusively set quota limits on the various immigration categories several times since
1965 (See Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Various Immigration Categories
and Congressional Quota Changes Over
Time
Year
1965

1978
1980
1990

Category
E. Hemisphere
W. Hemisphere
Per Country
Total
Per Country
Total
Total
Employment Based
Diversity Visa

New Quota12
170,000
120,000
20,000
290,000
20,000
270,00013
700,00014
140,000
40,000-55,000

Source: USCIS

12

Excluding those immigrants that obtain visas in categories without numerical limits, such as spouses of
U.S. citizens.
13
Excluding refugees.
14
Excluding refugees. This quota was to be in effect for three years and then decrease to 675,000 for each
subsequent year.
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More recently, Congress delineated the regulation and admission of immigration
policy into various categories, including asylum, enforcement, diversity lottery, family
based immigration, and employment based immigration in the Homeland Security Act of
2002. While these immigration categories already existed, the 2002 Act simply
delineated them into clear categories and established a clear chain of command. It put the
implementation of immigration policy in the hands of the newly created United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)15, an agency within the new Department of
Homeland Security. USCIS was charged with crafting and implementing regulation to
administer congressional policy within the areas of asylum, family based immigration,
and employment based immigration16. As a result, the Act was simply a change in
bureaucracy rather than a shift in policy or practice.
Categories for Admission to the United States
Since the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, the two most common
methods of admission17 into the United States are through immigrant visas and
nonimmigrant visas. Nonimmigrant visas are visas that provide authority to stay and/or
work18 for a temporary period only, and immigrant visas provide legal permanent
residence status. These nonimmigrant and immigrant visas are issued through a variety of
categories that were created by Congress for admission to the United States, including
family based and employment based immigration (both created by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952), and the diversity visa lottery (created by the Immigration

15

USCIS was immediately preceded by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
16
Enforcement was handled by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) rather than USCIS.
17
There are a variety of other types of admission, including asylum, deferred admission, visa waiver,
Temporary Protected Status (TPS), etc.
18
Employment is not a requirement or even permissible for some nonimmigrant visas.
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Act of 1990). Potential immigrants must obtain approval from USCIS and/or the
Department of State19 and carry the burden of proof that they are admissible as
immigrants based on both admissibility requirements set forth by Congress and various
agencies, and the requirements of the visa they seek before obtaining authorization to
enter the United States.
The asylum, diversity visa, and family based categories and the requirements for
admission under each category will be briefly discussed below in an attempt to provide
some background and context for the skilled worker visa category this study will focus
on. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to employment based immigration and the H1B visa specifically.
United States asylum policy is consistent with international laws on asylum,
which were made a part of international law through the United Nations 1951 Refugee
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. As a signatory and
drafter of these agreements, the United States is obligated to accept any person who
would otherwise face persecution if they were forced to return to the country they
emigrated from. These agreements were codified in the United States with the Refugee
Act of 1980. The United States is one of many states throughout the world that accepts
asylees and allows them to become legal permanent residents upon establishment of
asylee status.
The diversity visa lottery was established by the Immigration Act of 1990. As its
name indicates, it is a lottery system that provides legal permanent resident status to

19

Applicants outside the United States typically must obtain a visa from a United States consulate, which
falls under the purview of the United States Department of State rather than USCIS.
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applicants who apply and whose lottery numbers are selected by the annual lottery20.
There is a per country quota on the number of diversity visas issued per year.
Family based immigration refers to immigration on the basis of a family
relationship and is rooted in the humanitarian concept of family reunification.
Historically, immigration policy in the United States has centered and focused on family
reunification efforts. According to a study by the Brookings Institution 21, approximately
three quarters of immigrants to the United States has previously been and currently is
admitted on the basis of family reunification. Family based immigration is typically
authorized on a legal permanent resident basis through the grant of an immigrant visa 22.
Congress has further delineated various categories of family based immigration.
Some categories, such as spouses and unmarried children of United States citizens, are
considered immediate, which means that these individuals are immediately 23 eligible for
admission to the United States. Other individuals, such as married children, siblings, and
parents of United States citizens and spouses and children of United States legal
permanent residents, are granted admission based on a preference ordering of these
categories. See Table 2.2 for a list of each of the above listed immigrant categories and
the current annual cap for each.
Employment based immigration in the United States refers to immigration on the
basis of employment in the United States, specifically employment with a United States
employer in the United States or employment with a foreign company located in the
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Provided that all other requirements for legal permanent residence are met.
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/01_immigration_west.aspx
22
Nonimmigrant visas are also available for fiancées of United States citizens for the sole purpose of
entering the United States in order to conduct a legal marriage.
23
As long as they are able to meet other requirements for eligibility for admission, such as security
clearances, medical exam, etc.
21
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United States. Within the context of employment based immigration, Congress has
further delineated nonimmigrant visas (visas that provide authority to stay and work for a
temporary period only), and immigrant visas (visas that provide legal permanent
residence status).
As with family based immigration, within the category of immigrant visas,
Congress has created an annual quota of available immigrant visas. As mentioned above,
immigrant visas are available for both family based and employment based immigration.
Employment based immigrant visas have been delineated into five categories. The first
category is available for immigrants of international renown (which does not necessarily
require a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent), the second category for immigrants
holding at least a Master’s Degree or its equivalent, the third category for skilled,
professional, or unskilled workers, the fourth for religious workers, and the fifth for
investors investing a significant amount of money in a business that will employ
American workers.
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the current visa numbers that are available per
fiscal year in each of these categories. As Table 2.2 indicates, the largest majority of
immigrant visas are issued in the family categories (FB). A total of 226,000 family based
immigrants can be admitted each fiscal year, compared to just 139,800 employment
based immigrants. Comparatively, the first three employment based (EB) visa categories,
which include both skilled and some unskilled workers, are only available for about
120,000 workers.
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Table 2.2 Annual Immigrant Visa Cap Numbers
Visa Type

2012 Annual Cap

Family
FB 1 Unmarried Children of USCs
FB 2 Spouses / Minor Children / Unmarried
Adult Children of LPRs
FB 3 Married Children of USCs

23,400 + any unused FB 4 numbers
114,200 + any unused FB 1 numbers
23,400 + any unused FB 1 and 2 numbers

FB 4 Siblings of Adult USCs

65,000 + any unused FB 1, 2, and 3 numbers

Employment
EB 1 Priority Workers
EB 2 Advanced Degree / Exceptional Ability
EB 3 Skilled / Professional / Other Workers
EB 4 Certain Special Immigrants

40,040 + any unused EB 4 and 5 numbers
40,040 + any unused EB 1 numbers
40,040 + any unused EB 1 and 2 numbers
9,940

EB 5 Entrepreneurs / Job Creation

9,940

Source: U.S. Department of State Visa Bulletin

The first category is available to those who can prove they are aliens of
international or exceptional renown (skilled or not). The second category is available for
those with advanced degrees (at least a Master’s). The third category is available for
those with either no degree or a Bachelor’s Degree. The fourth is for those in religious
occupations (skilled or not). As such, because none of these categories encompass all
skilled workers exclusively (either in their entirety or without the addition of other
workers), analysis of immigrant visas in the United States will not be made in this study.
Aside from the above mentioned immigrant visas available for family and
employment purposes, nonimmigrant visas are also available for applicants who wish to
enter the United States for a temporary period of time for work or pleasure. Within the
19

category of nonimmigrant visas, Congress has delineated a variety of visas, known by
practitioners in the field as an “alphabet soup”, that are available to a host of various
candidates. These visas are alphabetically and numerically assigned from the letters A
through V, and within many of these categories there is further numerical delineation,
such as A-1 and A-2, for various subcategories of visas for a total of 82 in all. Applicants
for most nonimmigrant visas must justify to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the
time of the visa application that they do not have any intention of immigrating to the
United States permanently24.
There are some nonimmigrant visas25 that individuals with a Bachelor’s Degree
utilize, but none that specifically are reserved for skilled workers. For example, while the
O-1 visa is available for those foreign nationals who can provide evidence that they are of
extraordinary renown, it is available for both skilled and unskilled workers. It typically
encompasses researchers, as well as actors, performers, and sports personalities. In real
world terms, British soccer player David Beckham and Spanish and L.A. Laker
basketball player Pau Gasol both likely entered the United States on an O-1 visa. Of all of
the nonimmigrant visas, only one, the H-1B visa, is available exclusively to skilled
workers. Together with the O-1, the H-1B comprises the all stars of all potential
immigrants. Because the H-1B is the only visa exclusive to skilled workers, however,
congressional action on only the H-1B visa will be the exclusive focus of study in this
paper.
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There are three exceptions to this requirement. The H-1B, E, and L visas and in some cases the O-1 are
known as dual intent visas and allow the applicant to have the intention to permanently immigrate to the
United States. This will be discussed in more detail below.
25
For example, the L-1, E-1 or E-2, TN, and O-1 visas.
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The H-1B Visa
The original H-1 visa was created by the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. It
was available to foreign nationals who were “of distinguished merit and ability and who
[were] coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services of an
exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability.” In 1970, Congress removed the
requirement that the stay be “temporary”, making the H-1 and later the H-1B a dual intent
visa. In 1989, Congress bifurcated the H-1 into the H-1A and H-1B categories, with the
H-1A solely for nurses and the H-1B for all other specialty occupations.
The H-1B visa as it exists today was created by the Immigration Act of 1990. The
prior H-1B visa category, as mentioned above, was reserved for applicants with
distinguished merit and/or ability. Prior to the 1990 Act, there was no nonimmigrant visa
category available exclusively for skilled workers. At that time the information
technology (IT) industry was emerging, shortages in the healthcare fields were beginning
to emerge for the first time, and Congress was suddenly faced with a new lobby in
support of some type of visa to accommodate these shortages with qualified foreign
workers. The Act redefined the H-1B as a category for “specialty occupation” workers as
those with a minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in work experience. As
such, the evaluation of the H-1B visa and legislation on the H-1B visa in this study will
begin in 1990 and continue to the present.
Currently, the H-1B visa is available to foreign skilled workers with a minimum
of a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent and a sponsoring United States employer for
work in a skilled occupation. It is employer specific and is only valid as long as the
foreign national is employed by the sponsoring employer. It is the most popular method
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for employment based immigration into the United States. The H-1B visa is available for
an initial period of up to three years and is renewable for an additional period of three
years, for a total of six years of eligibility26. As mentioned above, nonimmigrant visas are
available only for a temporary period and the applicant must provide evidence to the
consular officer issuing the visa that the applicant does not have the intention to
permanently immigrate to the United States. The H-1B visa, however, is a dual intent
visa27. As a dual intent visa, it is one of only three nonimmigrant visas that allow the
foreign worker to have the intention at the onset of the application process of immigrating
permanently to the United States. As such, applicants for the H-1B visa do not bear the
burden of proving their intention to remain in the United States on a temporary basis.
Additionally, H-1B visa holders can safely file applications for legal permanent status
while traveling abroad and/or filing for extensions of their current H-1B status.
Arguments in favor of skilled immigration include the fact that skilled immigrants
promote economic growth and American stature in the international market for science,
research, and technology (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Additionally, as skilled workers
they typically are paid wages sufficient to pay taxes in the middle and higher tax
brackets, and as a result, they typically do not seek governmental assistance (Gimpel and
Edwards 1999).
Others however, argue that foreign workers create the effect of displacing
American workers by providing cheap labor. The framework for this research, created by
Harry Johnson’s (1967) work on the effects of immigrants on the native population, put
forth the gains from trade argument that if immigrants provide an aggregate bundle of
26

There are some exceptions that allow for eligibility beyond the six year maximum. These exceptions will
be discussed later in the chapter.
27
The dual intent nature of the H-1B visa was established in the Immigration Act of 1990.
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labor and capital that differs from the labor and capital that the native population
possesses, then the native population will benefit and gain from the inflow of immigrants.
Since Johnson’s (1967) argument, studies have largely shown that that there is
very little evidence that immigration affects the wages of American workers (Bean et al.
1988; Borjas 1990; Borjas 1994; Butcher and Card 1991; Simon 1989; Sorensen et al.
1992). Additionally, the H-1B visa has a requirement that the employer attest to pay the
foreign employee at least the prevailing wage as set forth by the United States
Department of Labor. The prevailing wage is the average wage paid to United States
citizens in a particular county for any particular job position. Employers found violating
this requirement can be fined heavily by the Department of Labor and may be banned
from hiring foreign workers in the future. In practice, the Department of Labor has
steadily increased their audits of H-1B sponsoring employers since the mid 2000s.
In addition to contributing to the American economy, immigrants in some highly
skilled sectors have also been instrumental in filling desperately needed shortages in the
U.S. labor market, particularly in the engineering and health care fields (Rumbaut 1994).
Specifically, physicians and nurses have filled shortages in Health Professional Shortage
Areas (HPSAs) and Medically Underserved Areas (MUAs) as designed by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services by providing much needed medical
care to uninsured, poor, and Medicare/Medicaid populations in rural and inner-city
hospitals.
The Process of Immigrating to the U.S. and Obtaining an H-1B Visa
As mentioned previously, there are two main methods of legal entry into the
United States, either through a nonimmigrant or immigrant visa. To enter the United
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States for the first time, applicants must apply outside of the United States at a United
States consulate for either a temporary or permanent visa. If they are granted a permanent
visa, or an immigrant visa, they are allowed entry into the United States as legal
permanent residents. If they are granted a temporary visa, or a nonimmigrant visa, they
will eventually need an immigrant visa in order to remain in the United States
permanently. On a practical level, for many, the ultimate goal is United States
citizenship28. Regardless of method of entry, applicants must typically 29 hold legal
permanent resident status for at least five years plus meet a six month residency
requirement prior to filing an application for citizenship.
The H-1B is a nonimmigrant visa. The process of obtaining an H-1B visa is far
from easy. Let us follow the experiences of Dr. Singh30, a cardiovascular surgeon and
researcher from India, in order to illustrate the process. Dr. Singh wishes to immigrate to
the United States to practice medicine because he believes he will be able to maximize on
the research and medical facilities in the United States and further his own research on a
new noninvasive surgical method for treating heart disease. Dr. Singh contacts an
immigration attorney in the United States and learns that in order to practice patient care
in the United States, he must first complete a residency or fellowship program in the
United States31.
Dr. Singh completes all of the requirements set forth by the Educational
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG), the organization that assesses
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The terms citizenship and naturalization are used interchangeably in this study.
An exception is made for spouses of United States citizens, who must hold legal permanent resident
status for two years before being eligible for citizenship.
30
Dr. Singh is a fictional person. His story is a combination of the real life experiences of several actual
personal former clients. Any resemblance to any one specific individual is purely coincidental.
31
An exception does exist for physicians of extreme renown who will be employed at a public university.
29
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whether foreign medical graduates are ready to enter residency or fellowship programs
and certifies their credentials. He obtains ECFMG certification and applies for the
National Residency Match Program. He is matched in an excellent surgery residency at
the University of Miami. Dr. Singh applies for and is granted a J-1 visa32 to complete his
residency and moves to Miami. He completes one year of the program and applies for a
cardiovascular surgery fellowship at Johns Hopkins. Because of his credentials, talent,
and experience, Dr. Singh is accepted into the program and moves to Maryland.
In his last year of fellowship, Dr. Singh calls his immigration attorney to let her
know that he is interested in practicing medicine in the United States upon completion of
his fellowship. She tells Dr. Singh that he will need to find an employer who is willing to
sponsor him for a J-1 waiver and an H-1B visa33. As it is his last year in his fellowship
program, Dr. Singh is constantly being contacted by physician recruiters. Upon the
advice of his attorney, he begins asking if the companies will sponsor a J-1 waiver and H1B visa. Due to a severe physician shortage in the United States, most potential
employers will sponsor and H-1B. Dr. Singh secures an employment agreement with a
private physician’s group in Boston, Massachusetts and the employer contacts their
immigration attorney to begin the H-1B paperwork.

32

There are two visas available for foreign medical graduates to complete a residency/fellowship training
program in the United States, the J-1, which requires a two year home residency requirement upon
completion, or the H-1B which requires that the applicant have completed all three steps of the USMLE
exam. Like nearly half of all foreign medical graduates, Dr. Singh has not completed step 3 of USMLE,
and as such, must complete his program on the J-1 visa.
33
The J-1 visa carries with it a two year home residency requirement for foreign medical graduates who
complete a residency/fellowship. Congress created a waiver of this requirement for physicians who agree to
work and receive approval to work in a facility located in a medical shortage area as designated by the
United States Department of Health and Human Services. The waiver does not provide any legal status.
Upon approval of the waiver, Dr. Singh can apply for an H-1B visa to actually give him legal status to stay
and work.

25

Dr. Singh was able to secure a sponsoring employer because he was regularly
courted by head hunters searching for employees with his qualifications. Some H-1B
applicants may be intercompany transfers from a United States’ company office abroad.
Others are students in the United States in either undergraduate or graduate programs that
are able to secure jobs through campus career centers or through their own post
graduation internships34.
Upon approval of the J-1 waiver, the first step of the H-1B application process
requires Dr. Singh’s potential employer to file a Labor Condition Application with the
United States Department of Labor, attesting to pay the foreign employee at least the
prevailing wage (discussed above), that the foreign worker will not adversely affect the
working conditions of employees similarly employed, that there is not a strike, lockout,
or work stoppage in the course of a labor dispute at the time the application is filed, and
that notice of the filing will be given to current employees through a bargaining
representative or physical posting at the work site.
Upon the Department of Labor’s certification, the employer will need to file an
application for H-1B status with USCIS. All costs associated with the H-1B application
must be paid by the employer, including both government filing fees and legal fees. Upon
approval, Dr. Singh may either apply for a visa at a United States consulate abroad, or
since he is currently in the United States on a different status, he may request that USCIS
change his status to H-1B.
Upon securing H-1B status, the process is far from over for Dr. Singh. Since he
wants to remain in the United States permanently, he will need to begin the process for
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The F-1 student visa allows one year of Optional Practical Training (OPT) with a U.S. employer
following graduation of an undergraduate or graduate program in the U.S.
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legal permanent residence, which is extremely time consuming and costly. Depending on
the type of application he decides to pursue, his employer will likely have to sponsor his
green card application and pay all costs (government and legal) associated with the
application. In the best case scenario, Dr. Singh will be looking at least at an additional
four to five years35 and several thousand dollars before he actually has his green card in
hand. Once he is awarded the green card, he will have another five year wait before he
can file an application for naturalization.
This lack of efficacy and efficiency of this process to permanent residence makes
it exceedingly difficult, time consuming, and expensive for both the foreign national and
the potential employer. Without permanent residence status, foreign nationals are not
eligible for various programs, including federal grant money, home mortgages, and
business travel outside the United States in certain circumstances. As such, without grant
funding, Dr. Singh’s plans to patent a new noninvasive surgical method for treating heart
disease are likely to be on hold for another five years until he can secure a green card.
Change of Status to H-1B from Another Visa Category
Foreign nationals can either obtain an H-1B visa at a United States consulate
abroad, or, if they are already in the United States on a different visa category, they can
change status from their previous visa category to the H-1B as our friend Dr. Singh did.
The data in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide a good illustration of the number of applications
received for H-1Bs, including new petitions for a change of status inside the United
States, new petitions for consular processing, and extension applications. As Tables 2.3
and 2.4 illustrate, approximately 260,000 applications were filed on average each year

35

Because Dr. Singh has obtained a waiver, he must wait three years before he is eligible to apply for
permanent residence. Applicants on H-1B without the waiver can apply at any time.
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between 2001 and 2009. Approximately 120,000 of these applications were for new
employment, and for these, nearly 63,000 or over one half of all new applications filed
were for a change of status from a different visa category to the H-1B.

Table 2.3 Percentage H-1B Petitions Approved by Type, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009

Total
Initial
Employme
nt
FN
outside
U.S.
FN inside
U.S.
Extension

FY
2001
100

FY
2002
100

FY
2003
100

FY
2004
100

FY
2005
100

FY
2006
100

FY
2007
100

FY
2008
100

FY Aver
2009 age
100

61

52

48

45

44

40

43

40

40

35

18

19

21

20

21

22

20

16

26

34

29

24

23

19

21

19

25

39

48

52

55

56

60

57

60

60

45.8
9
21.3
3
24.4
4
54.1
1

Source: USCIS Characteristics of Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B): Fiscal Years
2004, 2008, 2009
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Table 2.4 Total Number of H-1B Petitions Approved by Type, Fiscal Years 2001 to
2009

Total
Initial
Employme
nt
FN
outside
U.S.
FN inside
U.S.
Extension

FY
2001
331,
206

FY
2002
197,
537

FY
2003
217,
340

FY
2004
287,
418

FY
2005
267,
131

FY
2006
270,
981

FY
2007
281,
444

FY
2008
276,
252

FY Aver
2009 age
214, 260,
271
398

201,
079

103,
584

105,
314

130,
497

116,
927

109,
614

120,
031

109,
335

86,3
00

120,
298

115,
759
85,3
20
130,
127

36,4
94
67,0
90
93,9
53

41,8
95
63,4
19
112,
026

60,2
71
70,2
26
156,
921

54,6
35
62,2
92
150,
204

57,2
64
52,3
50
161,
367

60,7
85
59,2
46
161,
413

55,8
93
53,4
42
166,
917

33,2
83
53,0
17
127,
971

57,3
64
62,9
34
140,
100

Source: USCIS Characteristics of Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B): Fiscal Years
2004, 2008, 2009

While USCIS does not keep data on the types of visas that foreign nationals have
changed status from, some inferences about the prior visa status of H-1B applicants can
be made. According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Characteristics of
Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B) Fiscal Year 2004 Report, in fiscal years 2003 and
2004, applicants in four occupational categories comprised 66 percent of all initial
applications. These four categories included computer related occupations, occupations in
architecture, engineering, and surveying, occupations in education, and occupations in
administrative specializations. Foreign nationals in these occupational categories do not
have an alternative employment category available to them. As such, it can be inferred
that if these applicants were already in the United States at the time of their application,
they were likely here on either a student visa (F-1) or a visitor visa (B-1). However,
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because visitor visas are only valid for a period of up to six months at a time and a visitor
wanting to change status to the H-1B category would need to find an employer and go
through all of the H-1B application steps prior to their visitor visa expiring, it is unlikely
that many applicants are changing status from a visitor visa. As such, it can be logically
assumed that the majority of H-1B applicants change status from student visas (F-1).
Congressional Changes to the H-1B Visa: Passed Legislation
As mentioned above, the H-1B visa as it exists today was created by the
Immigration Act of 1990. The new H-1B visa was designed for applicants in a “specialty
occupation”, which was defined as an occupation requiring “theoretical and practical
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor’s or
higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the
occupation in the United States”36. It has a six year period of total eligibility and a
requirement for approval of a Labor Condition Application by the United States
Department of Labor (discussed above).
Congress also set an annual cap of 65,000 on the number of H-1B visas available
each fiscal year with the Immigration Act of 1990. Since then, Congress has over the
years increased and decreased the annual cap through various pieces of legislation (See
Table 2.5).

36

INA Section 205(c)(2)
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Table 2.5 Timeline of H-1B Legislation
Year
1990

Legislation
S.358
Immigration Act of 1990

1998

H.R.4328
ACWIA / Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999

Provisions
Created the current H-1B visa.
Created an annual cap of 65,000 on H-1B visas.
Requirement that employer obtain LCA certification from
U.S. Dept. of Labor.
Increased the cap to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, to 107,500
in 2001, and back to 65,000 in 2002.
Created new filing fee of $500 for initial applications to be
earmarked for job training, low-income scholarships, grants
for mathematics, engineering, and/or science enrichment
courses.

2000
2000

New requirements for employers who become H-1B
dependent.
Provisions to protect U.S. workers from layoffs.
Changes in enforcement and penalties.
Increased the $500 filing fee to $1000.
Increased the cap to 195,000 for 2001-2003.

H.R.5362 / Pub. L. 106-311
S.2045
AC-21 / Kids 2000 Act

Created extensions beyond the 6 year period of eligibility for
applicants with a filed immigrant visa application but no
available visa number.

2000
2002

2004

Allowed for portability.
Created cap exemptions for higher education and research
institutions and their affiliates.
Created exemption from filing an amendment application
when the employer engages in corporate restructuring.
Created additional extensions beyond the 6 year period for
applicants who have filed a labor certification application
365 days prior to the end of their 6 year H-1B eligibility.

H.R.3767
Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act
H.R.2215
21st Century DOJ Appropriations Authorization Act

H.R.4818
H-1B Visa Reform Act / Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2005

Banned displacement of U.S. workers.
Established prevailing wage requirement for employers.
Set new compliance standards.
Created a new anti-fraud filing fee of $500.
Reinstated and increased the previously sunset job training
and scholarship fee to $1500 for employers with at least 25
employees and $750 for fewer than 25 employees.
Created an additional new cap of 20,000 for applicants with
a Master's degree from a U.S. educational institution.

2004

Instituted procedures for a Dept. of Labor audit
investigation.
Changed the fee structure for job training, low income
scholarships, and grants.
Created cap exemption for physicians with an approved J-1
waiver who agree to work in a federally designated medical
shortage area for 3 years through the Conrad 30 program.

S.2302
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The 1990 cap of 65,000 was not actually reached until 1997 when it was hit for
the first time since its creation. When the cap was reached, various pieces of H-1B related
legislation were introduced and passed by the United States Congress to either increase or
decrease the annual cap between 1998 until 2004. In 1998, Congress passed the
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA). Among
other things, the Act increased the annual cap of 65,000 on the number of H-1B
nonimmigrant visas available per fiscal year that was passed in the Immigration Act of
1990 to 115,000 available visas for the fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The cap would then
decrease to 107,500 in 2001 and decrease again in 2002 by reverting to the original
65,000.
ACWIA also created a new filing fee of $500 for initial applications to be
earmarked for job training, low-income scholarships, grants for mathematics,
engineering, or science enrichment courses. It created provisions to protect U.S. workers
from layoff and for employers who become H-1B dependent. ACWIA also made changes
in enforcement and penalties for employers who violate the law. This legislation was
extremely important because the 65,000 cap was hit for the first time prior to the end of
the 1997 fiscal year and in 1998, the cap was hit within the first two months, according to
a report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)37. As a result, employers
were unable to get the amount of skilled workers they needed in order to successfully run
their businesses. It was passed in an attempt to remedy the shortcomings of the
immigration system at the time and allow businesses and corporations to hire more
skilled foreign employees.

37

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03883.pdf
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In 2000, three pieces legislation were passed by Congress. First, Congress passed
a single bill to increase the previous $500 filing fee for job training and scholarships to
$1000. Another minor act, the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, included a provision
that created an exemption from filing an amendment application when the employer
engages in corporate restructuring.
Congress also passed during this period the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC-21). AC-21 was introduced and passed by the
Senate as a reaction to the business sector’s need for more H-1B nonimmigrant visa
numbers. The Act retroactively increased the previously apportioned cap numbers
allocated in ACWIA to the number of H-1B visas that was actually issued the prior 2000
fiscal year 38 and prospectively increased the cap to 195,000 in fiscal years 2001, 2002,
and 2003.
AC-21 also created exemptions from the annual cap for institutions of higher
education as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1001(a)), nonprofit entities related to or affiliated with a nonprofit educational entity as
defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), and
nonprofit or governmental research organizations as defined by 8 CFR 214(h)(19)(iii)(C).
It also allowed for H-1B extensions beyond the six year maximum mentioned above for
foreign nationals with a pending immigrant visa application who cannot file an
adjustment of status application for a green card due to a lack of immigrant visa
availability when the annual immigrant visa quota had been met. AC-21 also provided
portability provisions allowing H-1B employees wanting to change employers to be

38

In 2000, USCIS actually issued more H-1B visas than Congress had allotted. As a result, Congress
retroactively passed AC-21 to cover the visas that were issued beyond the cap.
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eligible to port and change employers once an application is filed with USCIS, rather
than having to wait several months for an approval. It also instituted new government
filing fees to be paid by the sponsoring employer to go towards public programs,
including educational grants, low income scholarships, programs to provide technical
training skills, crime prevention, and computer education.
As mentioned above, the H-1B visa was available for a maximum of six years.
Congress created an exception in AC-21 for foreign nationals who were unable to obtain
a green card due to the annual per country quota. Attached as a short rider to the 21 st
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act of 2002, H.R. 2215
extended H-1B status beyond the previously apportioned six year maximum for foreign
nationals who had filed either an application for labor certification (the first of a series of
applications for legal permanent residence) at least 365 days prior to the end of the six
year period, or an application for an immigrant visa. This extension was available even
for foreign nationals with a visa number available because the annual immigrant visa
quota for their home country had not been met. Essentially, this exception allowed for
indefinite visa extensions without requiring a foreign national to become a legal
permanent resident. Additionally, it established the prevailing wage requirement for
employers and banned the displacement of United States workers for H-1B foreign
nationals.
The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 (H.R. 4818) was attached as an amendment
to the Omnibus Spending Bill passed by the House. The significance of H.R. 4818 was
that it set forth compliance standards for the H-1B visa, reinstituted the previously sunset
filing fee for job training and scholarships to $1500, created a new $500 Fraud
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Prevention and Detection fee for initial applications filed by employers per foreign
worker, and more importantly created a second cap and exemption from the annual
65,000 cap for up to 20,000 foreign nations who have obtained at least a Master’s Degree
from an educational institution in the United States. In effect, this cleared 20,000 from
the annual cap and raised the cap to 85,000.
Finally, S.2302 was the last piece of successful H-1B legislation passed during
this era. It was created to supplement the previously approved Conrad 30 program (aptly
named after bill drafter Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND)) which allowed physicians who
entered the United States on a J-1 waiver to complete a medical residency/fellowship
training program with a two year home residency requirement to obtain a waiver if they
agree to work in a federally designated medical shortage area for a period of three years
(as our friend Dr. Singh did). The Conrad 30 program requires that the physician obtain
an H-1B visa in order to complete this three year obligation. S.2302 (also introduced by
Senator Conrad) created a cap exemption for these physicians.
Failed Legislation
From 2005 to 2008, USCIS saw more applications for H-1B visas than ever
before. The federal fiscal year begins on October 1 each year and per USCIS regulation,
applications for H-1B visas can be filed up to 180 days prior to the employee’s start date.
Because the fiscal year begins on October 1, this is the earliest an employee’s start date
can be. As such, applications for H-1B visas can be filed as early as April 1 for each
fiscal year (180 days before October 1). Beginning in 2004 through 2009, the annual cap
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was hit earlier and earlier until 2007 when the 2008 fiscal year cap was actually hit on the
first day applications were accepted39 (See Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 The H-1B Cap

FY
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Date H-1B Cap Was
Reached
October 1, 2004
August 10, 2005
May 26, 2006
April 3, 2007
April 7, 2008
December 21, 2009
January 26, 2011
November 23, 2011
June 11, 2012

Source: USCIS

During this period, twenty nine pieces of H-1B legislation were introduced in the
House and the Senate. Each one would have increased the annual H-1B cap in order to
remedy the severe shortage felt by the business sector. Every single one of these bills
failed. This sustained failure was extraordinary considering that salience among the
business sector was extremely high during this period with Congress hearing testimony
from the likes of Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates and other large Fortune 100 CEOs
urging Congress to either increase or remove the H-1B cap entirely.

39

Per USCIS regulation, if USCIS receives a sufficient number of applications to reach the H-1B cap on
the first business day applications can be filed, applications will be received for two consecutive business
days and a random lottery will select the appropriate number of applications to fulfill the annual cap. As
such, the annual cap was actually hit on the first day in both the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years.
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Interestingly, each of these 29 bills was introduced as stand-alone pieces of H-1B
legislation or part of a larger immigration related bill. Not a single provision was
introduced as a rider to a non-immigration related bill as was the primary method of
success in the prior period of 1998 to 2004. The large majority of these bills died in the
Senate Judiciary Committee and in the House Judiciary Committee, Immigration and
Claims Subcommittee, and the Immigration, Citizenship, Refugee, Border Security, and
International Law Subcommittee.
During this period, from 2006 to 2007, the Republicans were in control of the
House and Senate, and in 2008, the Democrats were in control of the House and Senate.
From 2006 to 2007, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee was James
Sensenbrenner (a Republican) and the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee was
Arlen Specter (a Republican). Of the bills that were introduced, there was a split in
introductions from both members of the Republican and Democratic Parties. With this
bipartisan split in introductions, it is unusual that not a single bill was able to be
compromised on and passed. This lack of congressional support will be further discussed
in the analysis chapters.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided a brief historical overview of congressional
policymaking on immigration generally in order to provide a context for understanding
legislation on the H-1B visa. Early immigration policy was relatively closed with a
preference for white Europeans. Throughout the twentieth century, policy gradually
became more liberal as Congress opened immigration across the board to various areas of
the world, and created a variety of different visa categories.
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I also outlined the requirements for the H-1B visa and congressional changes to it
since its creation in 1990. I then provided a brief overview of some of the legislation that
was attempted and failed. Chapter six will examine these specific congressional
phenomena in more detail in order to understand why the wave of H-1B cap policy was
abruptly over. In the next chapter, I will examine some of these issues and highlight the
theoretical underpinnings of congressional behavior. I will begin with a review of the
literature, followed by an review of the main congressional models, and examine the
traditional cues and influences utilized and felt by members of Congress in both a general
sense and more specifically when dealing with immigration legislation.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
In chapter two, I gave a brief introduction into the politics associated with H-1B
visa legislation in Congress. Here, I will outline the theories and policy models that are
relevant to this discussion. As the most extensively studied institution in the world,
theory on Congress and congressional behavior is numerous and has been well debated,
but has also grown muddled over time. Additionally, because the macro environment is
constantly changing, one model cannot accurately explain legislative behavior over a
period of time. Therefore, a longitudinal analysis of legislation over time will need to use
a variety of different theories and models to explain congressional behavior.
The ensuing analysis will attempt to explain congressional behavior on the H-1B
visa since 1990. The theories and models relevant to this analysis include the following:
the macro political environment (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988); member goals
(Mayhew 1974; Sulkin 2005; Sinclair 2007); policy substance (Sulkin 2005; Carmines
and Stimson 1980; 1989); polarization (McCarthy; Poole; and Rosenthal 2006); pivotal
politics (Krehbiel 1998); party politics (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007); unorthodox
lawmaking (Sinclair 2007); and bargaining failure (Gilmour 1995).
While these are just a snapshot of all of the congressional models, they still
encompass a wide range of models and theories for one policy issue. This is the case
largely because while the issue of skilled worker immigration has remained the same, the
politics both within and outside of Congress have changed dramatically in the past twenty
years since the H-1B visa has been in existence.
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The Substance of the Analysis
Congress was last successful with comprehensive immigration reform with the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Passed by a Republican controlled Senate
and Democratic controlled House and signed into law by Republican President Reagan,
the bill signaled the last true comprehensive immigration related bipartisan compromise.
Four years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 was introduced by Democratic
Senator Edward Kennedy and was passed by a Democratic controlled Senate and House
and signed by Republican President George H.W. Bush. While not a true comprehensive
bill in the traditional sense 40, the bill made significant changes to immigration policy,
changing both the number and type of immigrants granted entry into the United States.
The Immigration Act of 1990 had several functions. First, it created the Diversity
Visa Lottery Program, which is essentially a lottery system that allows up to a
predetermined number of “winners” per country to be eligible for legal permanent
residency in the United States. It was designed to grant legal permanent residence to
foreign nationals from countries that historically have a small percentage of emigrants to
the United States through other, more traditional legal means.
The Act also created the current preference system in place for employment based
immigrant visas, and increased the number of immigrant visas issued per year in both the
family and employment categories. Congress has established an annual quota for the
number of immigrant visas/legal permanent resident applications granted each year per
country. When and if that quota is reached each fiscal year, all additional applications are
rolled over and are adjudicated first in the next fiscal year. The quota is updated each

40

The bill focuses on nonimmigrant and immigrant visa categories and some enforcement issues but does
not address illegal immigration.
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month by the Department of State in their monthly visa bulletin. As an example, in the
May 2012 Department of State Visa Bulletin, categories for foreign nationals with
applications pending based on employment requiring at least a Bachelor’s Degree or its
equivalent in work experience were backlogged to 2007 for nationals of India and China.
What this essentially means is that there were more applications filed than the annual
fiscal cap of visa numbers available so the numbers have simply rolled forward for five
years (2007 to 2012). Each month, the Department of State assesses how many
applications are approved (based on how many immigrant visas are issued) and issues a
new priority date.
The Act also created several new nonimmigrant visa categories, including the H1B (which we now know are for skilled workers), O-1 (for aliens with extraordinary
ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics), P (for athletes or
entertainers), Q (for international cultural exchange programs), and R (for aliens in
religious occupations) visas. Additionally, it set forth a series of new administrative
requirements for naturalization, changed some enforcement provisions for criminal
aliens, and revised the grounds for exclusion and deportation, as well as a number of
other miscellaneous immigration related provisions.
The 1986 and 1990 Acts mark the beginnings of the effect that polarization had
on immigration related (and particularly for H-1B related) legislation within Congress.
As we will see, 1990 was the last major immigration success story for Congress. With
regard to legislation on the H-1B visa (the focus of this study) after 1990, we had a series
of bills that for the most part failed when introduced on their own unless they were
narrow in scope or passed through the use of riders until 2004, followed by a stalemate
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period between 2006 and 2008 when legislation was introduced but failed at every
instance, culminating in a lack of any legislation introduced post-2008. So while
Congress attempted to change the H-1B process, their efforts were stymied by a series of
initial failures, which were overcome by some unorthodox lawmaking practices for a
short period, only to be followed by a period where risk adverse members resisted even
those previously successful unorthodox practices. Why was Congress successful (to some
degree) pre-2004 and not after? This chapter will lay the theoretical framework for the
ensuing analysis.
Previous Literature
While there are a myriad of policy models and theories attempting to understand
Congress and congressional behavior, this discussion will be confined to the literature
that is relevant to the analysis at hand, specifically those studies dealing with: the macro
political environment (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988); member goals (Mayhew 1974;
Sulkin 2005; Sinclair 2007); policy substance (Sulkin 2005; Carmines and Stimson 1980;
1989); polarization (McCarthy; Poole; and Rosenthal 2006); pivotal politics (Krehbiel
1998); party politics (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007); unorthodox lawmaking (Sinclair
2007); and bargaining failure (Gilmour 1995).
The Macro Environment
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) argue that legislators are impacted by the
larger macro political environment. Their theoretical framework, the advocacy coalition
model of policy change, resulted out of a need for an alternative to the stages approach
and incorporates the role of external forces on the policy process. It begins with three
“foundation stones:” a macro-level assumption that specialists create policy within a
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policy subsystem and are influenced by the broader political and socioeconomic system;
a micro-level individual model; and a meso-level where actors are aggregated into
advocacy coalitions based on their expertise and areas of specialization. The model
assumes that actors will form advocacy coalitions with others with similar policy core
beliefs to achieve common policy objectives.
With regard to this aggregate level, Jacobson (2004) argues that the economy,
presidential approval rating, and partisan control in Congress are the most important
macro-level factors in explaining the macro political environment. As a result,
congressional performance is dependent upon how members win their seats and how they
maintain their seats. Therefore, because Congress is internally affected by the macro
political climate, when policies become unattractive, legislators become risk averse to
signing on to such legislation.
Member and Constituent Preferences
The classical early rational choice applications of Congress including Mayhew
(1974) and Fenno (1978), examine various congressional goals. According to Mayhew
(1974), congressional members are first and foremost concerned with reelection. To
achieve reelection, a member should engage in advertising, credit claiming, and position
taking. These actions are easily attainable through the organization of Congress,
including congressional offices, the committee structure, and parties.
Building on Mayhew’s (1974) research, Fenno (1978) and others outline a variety
of congressional goals, but argue that reelection is of foremost importance for members
because it is necessary for legislators to attain any other goals. To attain these additional
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goals, according to Fenno (1978), legislators must first cultivate trust among their
constituencies. That trust in turn allows them to justify their congressional decisions.
These other congressional goals can include constituent preferences and
individual member goals. Yet because, as we learned above, Congress is internally
affected by the macro political climate, when policies become unattractive, legislators
become risk averse to signing on to such legislation. When this occurs, members can use
unorthodox practices to circumnavigate the traditional legislative process to realize some
of their individual or constituent policy goals. In certain cases and at certain times, some
legislation becomes too risky and legislators become completely risk averse, preferring
not to have their names attached to certain types of legislation.
More recently, following the reelection camp, Sulkin’s (2005) uptake theory is
based on strategic motivation theory and posits that legislators adjust their legislative
agenda based on criticisms of their own legislative history from their previous election
challenger. She looks at how past electoral experiences influence congressional behavior
and her theory is that winning legislators regularly take up their previous challenger’s
priority issues from previous campaigns and act on them during their new term.
This essentially follows Zaller’s (1992) logic that voter decisions are made from
the most recent information available to a particular voter. Because legislators are
concerned with achieving their individual policy goals and achieving influence in
Congress (Fenno 1974), they are primarily concerned with reelection because without
reelection, those goals cannot be realized (Mayhew 1974). As a result, legislators must
constantly be forward thinkers (Arnold 1990) and engage in uptake in order to, at the
very least, create the appearance that have shifted their policy attention to issues the
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public may be concerned with. As a result, constituents may recognize and reward this
responsive behavior in a future election (Fiorina 1981).
Sulkin (2005) also argues that the substance of the policy is also increasingly
important for reelection goals. Mayhew (2004) and Fenno (1978) found that legislators
behave differently when issues are either nationally or locally salient to their constituents.
A highly salient issue/policy is “one that affects a large number of people in a significant
way” (Gormley 1986: 598). Issues can be highly salient within a particular member’s
constituency, but perhaps not necessarily salient to the public at large (Gormley 1986).
Therefore, H-1B legislation that increases the number of skilled H-1B workers
could be highly salient to the business sector needing to employ foreign skilled workers,
but low in salience or even hostile by the general public who are not concerned with the
number of foreign skilled workers. Further, issue salience can change and become more
or less salient if an underlying problem within the issue worsens or improves. For
example, immigration as a general matter can also be salient to the general public during
times of high unemployment and/or national security. The more salient an issue,
therefore, the more involved Congress will likely be (Mayhew 2004; Fenno 1978).
Additionally, Carmines and Stimson (1989; 1980) stress the distinction between
“easy” and “hard” issues. “Easy” issues are those that tend to generate a visceral gut
reaction on the part of the public. They tend to be symbolic rather than technical, address
policy ends rather than means, and are issues that have been on the policy agenda for an
extended period of time. The public tends to be familiar with these types of issues. A
common easy issue is crime. Hard issues, on the other hand, are more complex and
nuanced and require a much higher level of political sophistication and sophisticated
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decision making. Examples include social security and government sponsored health
care.
The public has largely been introduced to immigration as an easy issue in the
context of border security and illegal immigration issues through the media and other
outlets. As a result, immigration generally has become an emotional and easy issue that
the public over time has become largely adverse to. On the other hand, the H-1B visa is a
very complex issue with so many nuances that it requires very sophisticated knowledge
of both the policies and the economic reasons underlying it. As a result, we have this
complex hard issue trapped within a larger easy issue that carries with it high level of
negative public opinion.
Having established this relatively odd juxtaposition between immigration policy
generally and the H-1B visa specifically, I turn back to the issue of salience. Because
immigration has been presented to the public as a border security type issue over time, as
a relatively small segment of immigration policy, it is highly unlikely that most members
of Congress, much less the general public, are very familiar with the relatively complex
regulations that regulate the H-1B visa.
However, because the business and corporate sector, which is a large portion of
the United States economy, does rely on H-1B skilled workers to keep their businesses
both operational and successful, it can be said that when H-1B visa numbers are no
longer available and the corporate sector suddenly is faced with decreased production, the
issue of H-1B numbers suddenly becomes extremely salient with both the business sector
and consequently with Congress. As a result, it seems clear that as an increase in demand
for skilled foreign workers in a particular year occurs, the issue of H-1B legislation
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becomes more salient and the more involved Congress, and particularly the Republican
members of Congress, is likely to be. On the flip side, a decrease in demand for foreign
workers should make the issue of H-1B legislation less salient and Congress less
involved.
In sum, salience helps define the stakeholders and the incentives facing
legislators. If an issue is highly salient, then Congress will likely take the time to
understand the issue and make careful decisions. If an issue is highly technical or
complex and low in salience, then there should logically be less incentive to spend lots of
energy on the matter, based on rational choice theory. As a result, high salience can
compensate for low information or technical settings.
Additionally, the complexity of congressional processes allows policy makers to
manipulate rules and procedures to their advantage to pass legislation that may be
inconsistent with the broader political environment. As such, if the political environment,
as is hypothesized here, is such that members are unlikely to vote in favor of any
immigration related bill, policy goals of individual members may still be achieved by less
orthodox ways.
Polarization
Earlier analyses on congressional behavior focused on a time when ideology
across party lines did not diverge to the degree that they do today. As a result, a relatively
new literature has emerged dealing with the issue of partisanship and the increased
polarization of the parties. As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there are a
variety of models and theories explaining congressional behavior, yet each only captures

47

a snap shot of behavior within a broader longitudinal dynamic that consists of a polarized
Congress with very few median members.
According to McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006: 1), “in the middle of the
twentieth century, the Democrats and the Republicans danced almost cheek to cheek in
their courtship of the political middle”. Since the 1970s, however, McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal (2006: 1) argue that “the parties have deserted the center of the floor in favor
of the wings” and that politics have become more divisive. They define polarization as “a
separation of politics into liberal and conservative camps” and note two consecutive
polarizing phenomena: the vanishing moderates and the fact that the two parties have
pulled apart and clustered as conservatives or liberals (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal
2006: 3).
Analyzing individual roll call voting patterns of members in the House and
Senate, they found that the median legislative position of each party has diverged sharply
since the mid 1970s (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).
Said differently, they showed that that in both chambers Republicans and Democrats
have become either more conservative or more liberal and moderates have slowly begun
to vanish since in the 1970s. Additionally, they showed that while members are becoming
more partisan, the parties themselves are becoming more homogenous.
McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) attribute this change largely to economic
and social changes. They argue that polarization occurred because Republicans in the
North and South moved sharply to the right after realignment in the 1960s and in
response, the remaining Northern Democrats moved further to the left than Democrats
had been in the 1960s. As a result, individual members have become increasingly more
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liberal or conservative within their respective parties. Additionally, they also argue that
income inequality has worked hand in hand in the increase in polarization, Essentially,
they claim that as income inequality has increased, people at the top devote more time
and money to supporting the party that does not emphasize redistribution. This party,
which has become the Republican Party, over time generates policies that either increases
inequality or blocks policies that would increase redistribution. Over time, this works to
divide the two parties further apart.
While McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) found that income inequality was
one of the root causes of polarization, Galston and Nivola (2006) point to four root causes
of polarization: historical transformations, the changing role of religion, the media, and
the electoral nature of the national legislative branch. First, regional realignment of the
parties in the 1960s as a consequence of the civil rights movement and particularly the
1965 Voting Rights Act which mobilized black voters and sent scores of white
conservatives into the arms of the Republican Party resulted in a dramatic change in
politics. The Republican Party became the white, conservative party throughout the South
and West. The Democratic Party lost their conservative southern base, and as a result,
were forced to turn to an alternate constituency – the Northeast and later California
(Black and Black 2002). After realignment, a series of political events further delineated
party divisions, including Roe v. Wade (1973), the Vietnam War, and East-West tensions
during the Cold War (Galston 2004; Sinclair 2006).
With regard to religion, observance and political preference have been found to be
correlated. The more one attends church, the more likely they are to identify with
conservatives. Additionally, the media has also intensified partisanship by focusing on
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feuds between players in order to maintain viewership (Galson and Nivola 2006;
Hamilton 2006).
Finally, with regard to congressional elections, competitive districts have over
time diminished. As a result, on a national level, because districts have become one party
districts, candidates have no incentive to appeal to voters outside of their party.
It cannot be stressed enough how much of an impact polarization has had on the
legislative branch. Although Congress is a well-bound institution, it is still a permeable
institution and is often affected by external events and forces. Thus, polarization has
changed congressional behavior in a number of ways. According to McCarthy, Poole,
and Rosenthal (2006), polarization increases gridlock, and major legislation is successful
less frequently (a finding Sinclair also makes in her unorthodox lawmaking argument –
see below). While they examine legislation within the context of income redistribution,
the ensuing analysis will attempt to explain how polarization has affected policymaking
on the H-1B visa specifically.
This brings us full circle. Congress was able to use less orthodox ways
successfully for a period of time until a series of macro-level factors made members risk
averse to even using riders to realize their policy goals. Meanwhile, all of this was
occurring within the context of increased party polarization. The following chapters will
attempt to understand how polarization affected legislation and what changes in the
macro environment occurred to make legislators so adverse to even introducing this type
of legislation in order to attempt to explain this shift in legislative support for H-1B visas.
This will be done using four of the above mentioned congressional models: pivotal
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politics, party models, unorthodox policymaking, and stalemate. The literature on each
will be outlined in turn below.
Pivotal Politics – The Median Voter
Krehbiel’s (1998) pivot politics model goes beyond the traditional divided
government argument to explain why gridlock occurs in Congress and how legislation
can pass over gridlock. Krehbiel (1998) argues that gridlock occurs for a variety of
reasons, including moderate status quo policies, supermajority procedures, heterogeneous
preferences, and partisanship. Therefore, in order for policy change to occur, both
moderate policy proposals and moderate members are needed. As a result, policy change
is incremental and passed only through the use of supermajorities.
The argument is Senate centric and while legislation must pass both chambers to
be successful, the same institutional constraints do not exist in the House. As a result,
Krehbiel shows us why successful legislation has become so difficult in the Senate (and
consequently in Congress) as successful legislation must have more than a just a
minimum winning coalition of a majority.
The argument is also an institutional one in that Krehbiel argues that institutions
matter in a way that can undermine democratic norms such as majority rule. This follows
Riker’s (1980: 445) classic argument that the political system in which institutions
operate lack equilibria, and as a result, outcomes result not only from institutions and
individual tastes, but also from legislative “political skill and artistry… in order to exploit
the disequilibrium of tastes for their own advantage”.
Returning to the claim that supermajorities are needed to pass legislation, prior to
Rule 22, any member within the Senate could file a motion for extended debate, or
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filibuster. Since the Senate’s adoption of Rule 22 in 1917, the filibuster can be terminated
and the motion at hand brought to a vote through the use of cloture. To invoke cloture, a
senator must file a cloture petition while a filibuster motion is pending, which requires
the signatures of 16 other senators. In two days, a cloture vote will be brought before the
full Senate. It requires a supermajority, or 3/5 of the Senate in order to be invoked. Once
cloture is invoked, the original pending motion will be brought to a vote after the time
stipulated in the cloture motion.
The effect of cloture is this. While the original motion may require only a simple
majority, in order to overcome filibuster in the Senate a supermajority is necessary. This
means the pivotal player becomes the filibuster pivot rather than the median voter.
Looking at the relationship between cloture and roll call votes, Binder and Smith
(1997) found that votes on cloture were votes on the actual legislation on which cloture
was being sought, rather than procedural votes on the length of debate. Within the context
of pivotal politics, when cloture makes it more difficult for senators to change
unattractive policies relative to alternative policies, they will “lash out” against the
filibuster (Krehbiel 1998: 96).
If there are enough moderates to refuse cloture, then these moderates have the
power to water the proposal down and over towards their side of the policy space. Using
a specific example, if there are enough Republicans in the Senate to refuse to invoke
cloture, then Democrats will need to move their policy more towards the right to create a
more moderate policy that Republicans will be happy with or fear gridlock (which would
also occur in the absence of moderates).
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Party Models
The traditional theory on responsible party government (Schattschneider 1942)
holds that the various parties have both different and well-defined platforms. Citizens
elect a unified government, the majority party attempts to enact and implement policies
within their platforms, and policy preferences are realized. This model proved to be
insufficient in explaining legislative politics in the postwar era and the conditional party
government theory was born (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995), which requires a homogenous
majority that is distinct from the minority party (Aldrich 1991; Rohde 1995).
The theory on conditional party government (Rohde 1991) is more concerned
with individual member preferences. Specifically, party responsibility exists when
member preferences are homogenous within the party, meaning party leaders will support
the legislation amid widespread agreement within the majority party. Rohde’s (1991)
argument was that party leadership in the House is strongest with the presence of three
interdependent factors: (1) homogenous party membership; (2) institutional leverage; and
(3) a strong leader.
Rohde argued that institutional reforms in the House in the 1970s and increased
partisanship in the 1980s are related and the variation in intraparty homogeneity and
interparty heterogeneity shapes the level of influence that party leaders have. When
parties are unified internally and there is a gap between the party medians (or the medians
have disappeared as they do by the 2000s), members suddenly have agreement on the
party agenda and this empowers party leaders. When these conditions are not present,
party leaders are not extended the same degree of authority, and policy making power
tends to shift to the committees.
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Party theories generally argue that legislators play two games simultaneously:
lawmaking within the legislature and reelection within their constituencies (Key 1964;
Sorauf 1964; Cox and McCubbins 2007; and Aldrich 1995). These two games have been
linked together within the concepts of brand names (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) and
collective dilemmas (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2007; Rohde
1991; Aldrich 1995).
The literature on brand names theorizes that parties are organized in order to
provide information to the electorate. The party becomes akin to a brand name, and the
reputation of one actor of the brand (or party) spills over to the whole brand line (party).
The voter, in turn, can gauge the characteristics of a lesser known actor of a brand/party
simply by knowing which brand/party it belongs to. With regard to collective dilemmas,
Cox and McCubbins’s (2007) cartel theory tells us that parties are designed to solve the
collective action problems faced by individual members who cannot obtain their policy
goals on their own.
Recent literature has also indicated that parties have become increasingly
important in sorting ideologies and providing cues for legislators (Cox and McCubbins
2007; Rohde 1991). Additionally, parties provide individual voters with cues that help
legislators in their reelection goals. Over time, the role of parties has become more
important and parties serve an even greater role in agenda setting and organizing
committees (Kingdon 1984; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007). Essentially, this literature
has found an inverse relationship between parties and committees.
Immigration policy, as discussed in chapter two, has largely been made on the
congressional level and Congress has been active in maintaining their exclusive
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jurisdiction over immigration policymaking. Therefore, in order to make policy,
legislators are required to amass and understand a great deal of information about current
immigration law and the needs of various interests. Since the average legislator would
have to invest a tremendous amount of time in understanding the complicated nuances of
immigration law and policy (and every other subject area they legislate on), studies have
shown that legislators instead turn to parties to provide them with “cues” on how to vote
(Campbell et al. 1980).
At the level of implementation, however, immigration has become an extremely
complicated policy area with overlap among agencies, a myriad of complex visa
categories, and the distinction between enforcement and entry. As such, following the
logic of Campbell et al. (1980), it can be expected that the average legislator does not
understand the nuances of every piece of immigration policy that comes through the
floor, particularly a niche segment of immigration policy such as skilled worker
nonimmigrant visa policy. Therefore, parties are necessary to not only provide cues but to
organize parties as well.
The importance of party organization is the thesis of Cox and McCubbins’ (2005;
2007) works on the House of Representatives. Following in the tradition of Rohde
(1991), they provide the seminal work on parties through their work studying the House.
They argue that lawmaking in the House is predicated by collective efforts that are
difficult due to individual member and constituent policy goals. As a result, parties
organize the House in order to solve these collective action problems on the part of
individual members. Essentially, parties act as market cartels, organizing individual
members in an attempt to create collective benefits for the party as a whole. Additionally,
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the majority party has the ability to control the policy agenda, allowing a greater
likelihood of bill passage for the policy goals of individual members. These institutional
arrangements have become more constricting for legislators over time, and as a result, we
have seen legislators utilize some unorthodox practices (Sinclair 2007) which will be
described in the next section.
While their findings are important, a major shortcoming to this, and many of the
congressional studies, is that they focus on explaining decision making within the
House41. Yet as Krehbiel (1998) shows us, policy making in the Senate is vastly different,
particularly due to institutional systems in place such as filibuster and cloture. As
legislation is not produced in just one chamber but requires identical versions of the same
bill to pass both chambers in order to become law, a study of both chambers is necessary
in order to fully explain congressional behavior. As a result, these studies miss the mark
to some degree in explaining policymaking and congressional behavior.
That said, these studies still have an important place in the literature as they do
show us, as we have seen, that parties are important in Congress. They are able to
organize members, provide them with cues, and make the leadership’s job easier. As a
consequence, since the 1970s, party polarization has been increasing in both chambers
(see Figure 5.2). This has resulted in an increase in gridlock and a steady decrease in
bipartisan legislation (McCarthy; Poole; and Rosenthal 2006). The movement within
Congress began with the modern conservative movement that shifted the Republican
Party to the right (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Micklethwait and Wooldridge
2004). This, followed by a change in income distribution among the voting population,
polarized campaign contributions by economic elites, and polarization among the
41

Other studies focus solely on the Senate.
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electorate42 along economic lines (the higher income voters are more likely to align with
Republicans while the lower income groups are less likely to participate in voting due to
immigration levels and incarceration) which has resulted in a decreased demand for
income redistribution. This decrease in the number of moderates has made it more
difficult for legislation to pass. Party polarization and its effect on policymaking will be
discussed in greater detail in forthcoming chapters.
Unorthodox Policymaking
As noted previously, Sinclair (2007) makes the argument that Congress no longer
follows the traditional textbook lawmaking process. She outlines these changes in
policymaking over time by comparing the 1970 Clean Air Act with the 1990 Clean Air
Act. The 1970 Act, for example, was introduced in both respective House and Senate
committees, and then proceeded to a vote on the floor where it passed. In 1990, however,
the bill was introduced in three different House committees and then went to the floor
where a series of compromises through informal processes occurred. In the Senate, the
bill was introduced in committee, went to the floor where a series of informal
compromises occurred, followed by filibuster before a vote. Sinclair (2007) argues that
the 1970 process is not likely to ever occur again as most bills today are now passed
through short cut procedures for small bills and a variety of once unorthodox practices
and procedures for major legislation.
These unorthodox practices and procedures include the increase in usage of larger
omnibus bills, the use of multiple committees for the same piece of legislation, more
complex and restrictive rules tailored to deal with problems associated with a particular
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This remains hotly contested within the literature. See Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008 and DiMaggio,
Evans, and Bryson (1996).
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bill in the House; and in the Senate, the fact that bills are subject to greater floor
amendments (many irrelevant to the bill at issue), and filibuster threats and cloture votes
are much more routine.
Additionally, Congress is certainly affected by the macro political climate. When
policies become unattractive, legislators become risk averse to signing on to such
legislation. Recently, however, Sinclair (2007) argues that there are opportunities for
members to circumnavigate the traditional legislative process in order to realize some of
their individual or constituent policy goals through the use of riders. Yet even with these
Sinclairian opportunities, in certain cases and at certain times, some legislation becomes
too risky and legislators prefer not to have their names attached to certain pieces of
legislation. This is where Congress finds itself after 2004 and particularly after 2008
when no legislation is introduced.
According to Sinclair, however, these unorthodox practices have become so
routine that they are actually no longer unorthodox. While Sinclair does not tell us why
the legislative process has changed over time, largely because there is no agreement
among scholars as to why this change occurred (Cooper 1981; Gamm and Shepsle 1989),
polarization does appear to play a role in this as well. In a different work, she does make
the argument that polarization and the “ideological gulf” between the parties in both the
Senate and the House (which she terms “hyperpartisan”) has accelerated unorthodox
lawmaking (Sinclair 2006). The role of polarization will be discussed further in chapter
seven.
As a result of these new and previously unorthodox practices, consequences are
such that major legislation has a better chance at passage than non-major legislation.
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Similarly, members are less specialized today and face greater information problems than
before. Additionally, in the Senate, the supermajority requirement has made coalition
building more difficult and gridlock more likely.
Stalemate
The bargaining failure or stalemate argument is a rational choice game theory
model that claims that failure occurs when a zone of agreement exists between two
parties but one side deliberately chooses to avoid that zone. The defecting side avoids
compromise in an attempt to seek some other type of political gain that they believe will
ultimately be preferable in the long run. Gilmour (1995) calls this the “accepting half a
loaf” argument where the defector feels that accepting half of a loaf today may keep them
from obtaining the whole loaf (which is their ultimate preference) at a later date.
Gilmour (1995) argues that it is common for supporters of a comprehensive
reform measure to oppose piecemeal measures because they fear that in accepting a
smaller portion of a policy, they risk not getting the comprehensive measure passed at a
later date. In fact, Gilmour (1995) argues that passing piecemeal legislation actually does
make it harder to pass comprehensive legislation. Therefore, rather than pass piecemeal
legislation, supporters will simply wait until they can gain control in both chambers and
the presidency. Figure 3.1 below illustrates this policy strategy.
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Figure 3.1 Strategic Disagreement
Before Election and Comprehensive Reform
X
b’

P
b’’…

Q
b’’’

After Election
P

X
b’

Q
b’’

b’’’

Q = Status Quo
P = President’s Position
X = most extreme proposal that can win
b = alternatives that can beat Q
Source: Adapted from Gilmour (1995: 46)

It is worth recalling here that following Krehbiel (1996; 1998), in order for policy
change to occur, both moderate policy proposals and moderate members are needed. As a
result, policy change is incremental and typically passed only through the use of
supermajorities. Therefore, in order for legislation to pass, the majority party would
simply need to shift the legislation to the position of the median legislator. In 2006, for
example, when Republicans controlled both chambers, but failed to meet the threshold
for cloture with only 55 Republicans, we would expect the median legislator to be center
right, and in 2007 and 2008 when Democrats controlled both chambers but the Senate
with only 51 and 55 Democrats respectively, we would expect the median legislator to be
center left and policy to shift accordingly. This however did not happen. In each instance,
the parties remained firm in their positions and no shifting of policy occurred. Instead,
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with contemporary increasing levels of polarization, no policy space remains for
individuals to use Sinclairan tactics and the consequence has been gridlock.
Macro-Level Factors
Public Opinion
With regard to public opinion and elections, Arnold (1990) argues that Congress
is partly manipulated by coalition leaders, voters, and free agents. They enact legislation
based on general interests, concentrated interests, and geographic interests. Assuming
that legislators are most concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974; Jacobson and Kernell
1983), he argues that when Congress enacts legislation for concentrated or geographic
interests, they do so as a result of strong lobbies and reelection goals. Legislators,
according to Arnold (1990: 8) “choose among the paired alternatives presented to them in
part by estimating the electoral consequences of being associated with each option.” And
while voters may not know about each legislator’s policy positions, these positions can be
used against a candidate in future elections (Kingdon 1989; Sulkin 2005). Voter
preferences are typically gauged by either punishment or reward of an individual
candidate or party (Fiorina 1981).
Arnold’s (1990) model assumes that voters are more concerned with outcomes
rather than the policy itself. Actors in the political process (voters, legislators, and
coalition leaders) make four separate decisions: (1) citizens establish policy preferences
by evaluating policy proposals and effects; (2) they choose among candidates by
evaluating their policy positions and connections with policy effects; (3) legislators
choose among policy proposals by establishing voters’ potential policy preferences and
establishing the likelihood that they will incorporate these preferences into their vote
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choice in a future election; and (4) coalition leaders adopt strategies for enacting their
policy proposals by anticipating how the legislators will act.
In the literature, public opinion is typically viewed in the context of salience.
Salience refers to the importance that voters place on a particular issue (Berelson et al.;
1954; Behr and Iyengar; 1985). Salient issues are those that voters are most likely pay
attention to by way of legislative behavior or through the media (Brody 1991). The more
salient an issue, the more likely Congress will act on it. Typically, Congress will respond
in a manner consistent with public opinion because legislators are first and foremost
concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).
For the most part of U.S. history, however, Congress acted in direct opposition to
public opinion on immigration and as a result, public opinion and actual policy on
immigration did not converge. With the exception of a brief humanitarian exception
following the second World War, public policy has tended to be more restrictionist on
matters dealing with immigration, while Congress has tended to exhibit a more liberal
policy since the 1940s (Simon 1989; Epenshade and Hempstead 1996; Kane et al. 1984;
Pear 1986; Day 1990).
Yet Muller (1996) hypothesizes that immigration policy becomes salient and
captures public opinion when three factors converge: (1) in areas where and when
immigration is high; (2) at times and in places where the public is uneasy about the
economy; and (3) when the public begins to question the potential contribution of
immigrants and views them more of a burden than a benefit. Upon aggregation, Gimpel
and Edwards (1999) claim that immigration still is not a salient political issue unless the
economy is so bad that immigrants are blamed. As such, I hypothesize that in the wake of
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the recent economic recession, Congress has become more receptive to public opinion, a
new key variable in explaining failure of immigration bill passage (which will be
discussed independently below).
Earlier I outlined Carmines and Stimson’s (1980; 1989) “easy” and “hard” issue
distinction. Remember that easy issues are those that generate a gut reaction on the part
of the public. Hard issues, on the other hand, require much more political sophistication
and knowledge and tend to be much more nuanced and complex.
Immigration as a general issue has over time been presented to the public through
the media and other outlets in the context of border security and illegal immigration
issues. As a result, I hypothesize that it has become an emotional and easy issue that the
public is largely adverse to. On the other hand, the H-1B visa is a very complex issue
with so many nuances that it requires very sophisticated knowledge of both the policies
and the economic reasons underlying it. As a result, we have this complex hard issue
trapped within a larger easy issue that most are familiar with and adverse to at the macrolevel and we have spillover effects from issues pertaining to illegal immigration,
unskilled labor, and border security issues seeping into policy dealing with skilled foreign
workers, a completely separate policy area dealing more with economics and business
than border security.
Economic Conditions
Studies on immigration policy often begin with a more general conceptualization
of migration as a social global phenomenon (Zolberg 2006). As a social phenomenon,
migration theorizing typically touches on political science, political economy, sociology,
and anthropology. While migration is the social act of an individual moving from one
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sovereign state to another, it also impacts the social, political, and economic fabrics of
both the losing and receiving states within both domestic and international systems and
markets.
In industrialized capitalist states, such as the United States, immigrants have long
been viewed as a class of labor. This classification has resulted in animosity towards
immigrant workers as they are viewed as competing for jobs with domestic workers.
Economic studies of immigrant labor have traditionally been reviewed in a Marxist
framework (Zolberg 2006; Castles and Kossack 1985; Petras 1981). Additionally, studies
abound on the debate on whether immigrants are, on average, contributing members of
society through consumption and taxation or are simply free riders.
Using organization theory, Freeman (1995) argues that immigration policies tend
to be both expansionist and inclusive because policymakers tend to be more responsive to
organized interest than individual members of the public who are anti-immigration. This
results in policies that are more liberal than the public opinion of the median voter.
He creates a political economic model of policymaking for liberal democracies,
including the United States with the units of analysis being the individual voters,
organized groups, and state actors. He argues that immigration policy in liberal
democracies relies more on organized interest than public opinion because it is in
politician’s best “electoral interest” to cater to interest groups because while public
opinion is restrictionist, it is not “well articulated” (Freeman 1995: 886-887). As a result,
policymakers in the United States would be expected to align with business interests
when making immigration policy dealing with the employment side of immigration 43.
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While studies on congressional behavior typically do include an analysis on interest group pressure, it is
impossible to disaggregate the amount of group pressure attributed to immigration versus other areas. For
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As the traditional textbook Congress has changed dramatically, there are other
factors that can impact congressional behavior on immigration policy as well. For
example, the state of the national and international economy can affect domestic
immigration policy. In a positive growth or status quo economy, voters are less likely to
be concerned with increased immigration and effects on employment opportunities. In
times of weak economic growth and high levels of unemployment, however, constituents
are less likely to be tolerant of any type of immigration policy increasing the number of
foreign nationals competing for jobs.
While the H-1B visa is designed to fill a market void of skilled workers in any
given field, voters typically view any increase in immigrants as direct competition for
jobs (Foner 1964; Higham 1985; Olzak 1992; Passel and Fix 1994; Pomper 1993; Citrin,
Green, Muste, and Wong 1997). As a result, I hypothesize that the recent economic
recession starting in 2007 contributed in a shift in legislative support for H-1B legislation.
Media
The media plays a strong role in policy, specifically in providing information,
whether objective or not, to the public. It has been shown that the media plays a stronger
role in salient issues and less of a role in complex issues (Gormley 1986; Eshbaugh-Soha
2006; Epstein and Segal 2000). Additionally, Mazur (1981) has shown that when the
media increases their coverage of technical issues, public support typically decreases.
Immigration has been a salient issue for many years now, particularly with the
increase in undocumented immigration and the complex solutions proposed by elites. As

example, if company X contributes Y amount in campaign contributions to member Z, it is impossible to
disaggregate how much of that contribution is attributed to immigration, and how much is attributed to
other political aspects, i.e. tax incentives, various regulatory changes, etc. Therefore, this study will not
examine the impact interest groups have on H-1B policy.
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a result, the media has certainly been very involved in issues surrounding undocumented
immigration. Following Mazur’s (1981) logic, public support for immigration generally
should have decreased due to the complex nature of immigration legislature.
Additionally, however, the issue of skilled workers and the visa options is a much
more complicated issue that has largely been left untouched by the media. Not only has
the media as a whole neglected to distinguish between the differences between skilled
and unskilled workers, it has also neglected to distinguish between the various policies
and goals that legislators have for skilled workers. As such, the public as a whole is
relatively ignorant to both the general differences that exist between skilled and unskilled
immigrants, as well as the legal immigration differences. Based this lack of distinction
and attention, I hypothesize that the media is responsible for creating a spillover effect
from their constant coverage of unskilled and undocumented immigration and issues
stemming from those issues that has resulted over time in creating negative public
opinion towards immigration, immigration related issues, and immigration related
legislation as a whole.
Conclusion
In this chapter I outlined the literature, theory, and policy models dealing with
migration, immigration policy, and congressional behavior. Specifically, because the
congressional literature is extensive and attempts to explain numerous phenomena within
the legislative branch, I outlined those theories and policy models most relevant to this
discussion.
Additionally, I provided the framework for my analysis. Because the macro
environment is constantly changing, one model cannot accurately explain legislative
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behavior over a period of time and a longitudinal analysis of legislation over time such as
this one will need a variety of different theories and models to explain congressional
behavior. Specifically, my longitudinal analysis will be broken into four time periods and
use four congressional models to explain these periods of congressional behavior. These
include: pivotal politics (Krehbiel 1998); party politics (Cox and McCubbins 2005;
2007); unorthodox lawmaking (Sinclair 2007); and bargaining failure (Gilmour 1995). In
the next chapter, I will outline and develop my hypotheses and discuss my methodology
for the remaining analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN
The previous chapter provided a literature review of the relevant studies on
congressional behavior and policymaking, as well as the foundation of my theory and
hypotheses. In this chapter I will outline and develop my hypotheses and set the stage for
the forthcoming analysis. In order to do that, it might be helpful here to provide a quick
recap of the legislative history on the H-1B visa program. In 1997, the H-1B cap was hit
for the first time since the creation of the current H-1B visa program in 1990. Since 1997,
seven pieces of legislation were able to be realized into policy, through the use of standalone legislation and riders until 2004. During that same period, twenty-nine other pieces
of legislation were introduced in either the House or Senate as stand-alone pieces of
legislation. Many of these policy proposals were in some way actually realized as policy
through the seven successful pieces of legislation.
In 2005, Congress was silent on legislating on the H-1B visa. In early 2006,
however, the House introduced a bill to increase the H-1B cap, followed by the
introduction of comprehensive immigration reform in the Senate just a week later. A
series of sixteen total bills during the period from 2006 to 2008 were introduced in either
the House or Senate dealing with increasing the H-1B cap in one way or another. Each of
these bills was introduced individually and consequently each failed. After 2008, no
legislation has been introduced to date.
Research Design
While polarization increased during this period, the traditional internal and
external factors surrounding Congress typically used to explain shifts in congressional
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behavior remained the same between the time Congress was able to pass legislation on
the H-1B visa and when it could not. Partisanship did not change from 2001 through
2006 as both chambers were controlled by the Republican Party as was the President.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 44, the
unemployment rate remained steady throughout this period. It was at 4.0 percent in 2000,
increasing to 5.5 percent in 2004 and then falling to 4.6 percent by 2006 where it
remained until increasing again in 2008 to 5.8 percent. Additionally, according to the
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 45, the real GDP (based on
chained 2005 dollars) also remained steady during this period, increasing slightly in each
year between 1998 until leveling in 2008 and beginning to fall in 2009. Therefore, we
have both a political climate that does not change and an economic climate that actually
appears to be improving through this period of stalled legislation. This leads to the
following research questions:
1) What factors explain congressional policy making within the context of skilled
worker (H-1B) immigration?
2) Why did Congress stop using alternative methods (i.e. riders) to pass positive
H-1B legislation?
3) Why did even minor changes to the H-1B program that were successful as
stand-alone pieces of legislation pre-2004 fail after 2004?
4) Is the U.S. experience unique? How does it compare to legislation in Canada
and Australia?

44
45

http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_yrs.htm/
http://www.bea.gov/

69

Traditionally, studies on Congress, congressional behavior, and policymaking
have been conducted using quantitative statistical methods. Due to the institutional nature
of Congress, when a bill is decided by roll call votes, a tally of these votes is available
through the Library of Congress’s THOMAS website. This allows for neat statistical
analyses on stand-alone pieces of legislation, as well as on individual congressional
members.
There are, however, some limitations to this type of quantitative study on
Congress. Obviously it necessitates that the researcher have the roll call votes for each
piece of legislation he intends to analyze. Additionally, while this type of analysis does
allow for some sophisticated statistical methods, which has increasingly become expected
in this discipline, it does not allow a researcher to analyze member or party views on
issues and/or the substance of policymaking. Looking only at roll call votes only allows
the researcher to analyze the end result, or passage or failure of a bill, when other factors
may be just as important to the end result.
I will begin the analysis by demonstrating the change in legislative support over
time. I will then explain why this change has occurred using public opinion data from
Gallup, as well as data from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. After explaining
why the change in legislative support over time has occurred, the next step in the analysis
is explaining how proponents of H-1B legislation have used institutional procedures to
obtain favorable outcomes in terms of bill passage looking at both individual sponsorship
and party support for each bill. Finally, I will analyze the literature and legislative
outcomes in Canada and Australia and compare their recent experiences with that in the
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United States. Below I outline my data sources, followed by my hypotheses for the
ensuing analysis.
Data
This study is a qualitative study on congressional behavior due largely to the fact
that individual roll call votes do not exist for each of the bills I will be examining. In fact,
roll call votes only exist for five out of a total 36 bills. Given the small number of
observations, a statistical examination of roll call voting would not provide any predictive
findings. Instead, I will look at data provided by the Library of Congress’s THOMAS
website on each piece of legislation, including the names and parties of bill sponsors and
co-sponsors, as well as the text of floor debate within the congressional record in order to
determine legislative intent and preferences during this period.
I decided to select only those bills that made (or purported to make) positive
changes to the H-1B program. This includes legislation that would increase the annual
cap, create exemptions from the cap that essentially would increase the cap, or legislation
that would make the application process easier for U.S. employers. While there were a
handful of bills introduced during this time period to either decrease the annual cap or
eliminate the visa category entirely, little movement occurred with the exception of some
limited debate on the floor in opposition to positive legislation on the H-1B46.
Additionally, I am attempting to understand under what context Congress is able to pass
legislation to increase the number of skilled workers within the market, rather than
decrease them. I also chose not to include other extraneous pieces of legislation that were
neither positive nor negative, such as the Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and
Singapore and Chile, which simply carved out a number of cap numbers for nationals of
46

Four bills were introduced in 1997, 2001, 2003, and 2005. None of them came out of committee.
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Singapore and Chile. It did not affect the cap numbers in any way. Numbers not used by
nationals of Singapore and Chile are recaptured that year by individuals from other
countries.
While the general trend in polarization has been an increase over time, there are
some major increases that coincide with the patterns of congressional behavior on H-1B
legislation. To illustrate the change in polarization over time and compare it with those
patterns, I use McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal’s (2006) own statistical measure, termed
NOMINATE, which scores members directly from roll call voting records using all
recorded votes. They use individual roll call votes for all members and examine when
and which members vote with other members and how often. One example they provide
looks at the voting patterns among Senators Specter, Clinton, and Frist. They argue that if
Specter votes with Clinton and Frist more frequently than Clinton and Frist vote together,
then Specter is the moderate. Using this algorithm over millions of individual roll call
votes made by thousands of Senators and Representatives on tens of thousands of roll
calls over time allowed them to develop precise measures of each member’s position and
use that to measure polarization over time with the higher the score, the higher the level
of polarization. Because it includes all recorded votes over time, it provides the most
comprehensive measure for changes in polarization over time.
In addition to data on the legislation itself and on polarization, I will also use a
variety of other data sources to explain how changes in the macro political and economic
climate affected congressional behavior. This will include public opinion data from
Gallup, media data from the Vanderbilt Television News Archives, and data on Latino
voting patterns from the Pew Research Center.
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Finally, as stated above, this analysis will seek to ascertain whether this is a
uniquely American phenomenon. In so doing, I will analyze the literature and legislation
in Canada and Australia in the penultimate chapter in order to provide a comparative
analysis. These three countries share similar colonial histories and relied to a large extent
on immigration to populate their countries at one point. As such, Canada, Australia and
the U.S. have historically been the largest immigrant receiving countries in the world. Yet
some important differences in the immigration policies of these three countries exist. In
Canada and Australia, for example, skilled worker immigration has been much less
restricted by their respective Parliaments than in the United States. It will be interesting
to ascertain whether different institutional structures tempered by some similar and some
different macro-level conditions yield similar or different outcomes in these countries.
Hypotheses
My hypotheses are rooted in the easy versus hard issue dynamic discussed in the
previous chapter. Largely, I hypothesize that H-1B bills have failed to pass on their own
in the past ten to fifteen years as a result of party polarization and that individual
legislators have responded to this by using alternative tactics to further their policy goals.
I also hypothesize that in addition to this polarization, macro-level factors such as public
opinion, the economic downturn, and the media have all resulted in legislators becoming
adverse to H-1B legislation over time. I hypothesize that the macro environment became
less accepting of immigration related legislation over time, with the tipping point being
the introduction and failure of comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007. As a
result, members who previously may have supported H-1B legislation found themselves
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risk averse in supporting any immigration related legislation. My primary hypotheses are
as follows:
1) Party polarization has over time made it more difficult for this type of
legislation to pass.
2) The increase in the Latino voting population has changed the dynamics of
legislative politics on the subject of immigration generally.
3) Changes at the macro-level over time have resulted in less congressional
support for the H-1B program and the 2006 failure of comprehensive immigration
reform (CIR) was the tipping point for this shift in policy.
4) Because these changes are unique in nature to the U.S., I expect a more open
policy in Canada and Australia.
With regard to the comparative section of the analysis, as mentioned previously, a
number of historical and cultural similarities among these three countries combined with
relatively similar economic conditions (with the United States obviously having a larger
labor base and economy due to a larger domestic population) could result in an
expectation that such similar states would have similar policies when it comes to
immigration policy. Specifically with regard to foreign skilled labor policy, one could
expect to find similar policies or at least relatively unrestrictive policies across these three
states. Additionally, however, the sheer size of the United States labor force and the great
labor shortages in many highly skilled fields could result in an expectation that the U.S.
should have a more liberal and open policy. Instead, however I hypothesize that the
spillover effect of undocumented immigration, and the increased polarization over time
combined with the institutional arrangements in place within the legislative branch are
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unique phenomena to the United States which I hypothesize should result in the United
States having a more restrictive skilled immigrant worker immigration policy. As a result,
it will be interesting to ascertain how policies compare or differ in these countries.
Conclusion
Up to now, I have provided an introductory background into immigration law in
the United States generally, a more thorough background into legislative policy on skilled
worker immigration, provided a literature review on Congressional behavior, and
outlined my theory and hypotheses. I have also provided an overview of the methods to
be used in the forthcoming analysis. In the following four chapters, I will begin the
analysis of the data collected as set forth here in an attempt to answer my research
questions.
The pattern of legislative behavior on the H-1B visa is very neat. The original
legislation was passed in 1990. From 1998 to 2004, legislation was introduced and passed
both individually and through the use of riders, and from 2006 to date legislation was
only introduced individually and each failed. Chapters five through eight will be broken
down into these various periods of time and will analyze the context in which legislation
is either successful or unsuccessful and attempt to explain why.
Chapters five and six will illustrate how the more traditional models of
congressional behavior can be used to explain legislative behavior on the H-1B visa and
why legislation either was or was not successful. Chapter five will examine the
Immigration Act of 1990, the original piece of legislation that created the H-1B skilled
worker visa within the context of pivotal politics. Chapter six will look at the legislation
that was passed individually between 1998 and 2004 through party models. Chapters
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seven and eight will delve into the lesser known and more niche models of congressional
models. Chapter seven will explain how the institutional nature of Congress has changed
and how this changed affected the success and failure of legislation in the context of
unorthodox practices. Chapter eight will use congressional stalemate theory to explain the
failure of all H-1B related legislation post-2004. Finally, chapter nine will compare the
U.S. phenomenon to that of Canada and Australia.
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CHAPTER 5
PIVOTAL POLITICS
Thus far, I have examined both the history of immigration policy generally as
well as the history of the H-1B visa and the politics surrounding it. As we have seen,
support for the H-1B program has steadily waned in Congress over time. In this and the
next three chapters, I will look at why this shift in support occurred and argue that no one
model of congressional behavior adequately describes legislative behavior relevant to this
issue. Rather, I will show that over time, a variety of congressional models must be used
to explain congressional behavior on the H-1B visa. Each captures different strategies
that are shaped by changes in the broader political environment and the internal dynamics
of Congress.
As I showed in chapter two, immigration policy generally has not changed much
since the Immigration Act of 1990 and neither has policy on skilled worker immigration.
The current immigration system still closely resembles the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act. After 1952, major legislative changes to immigration policy were limited
to the Acts of 1965, 1986, and again in 1990. With regard to the H-1B, today it still
remains nearly identical to the 1990 program with the exception of some additional
government filing fees and some cap exemptions. As such, post 1990 there are just a few
minor tweaks to the initially created H-1B as the scope of this legislation slowly
decreases over time, but no major legislation on either the H-1B/skilled labor specifically
or on immigration policy generally is successful.
Although the current nonimmigrant skilled visa policy has not changed, the
politics in Congress have changed over time. Party polarization has increased over time,
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making it more difficult for members to realize their individual and/or constituents’ goals
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Nivola and Brady 2006; 2008). Additionally,
since immigration reform has been rendered impossible since 1986, members of the
Democratic Party are increasingly more willing to sacrifice other types of immigration
reform (including not only comprehensive reform but also the Dream Act) in an attempt
(albeit failed) to get total comprehensive immigration reform (more on this in chapter
eight).
I begin this analysis with the assumption that both parties have an incentive to
pass positive legislation on foreign skilled workers, specifically the H-1B visa.
Traditionally, the cost of immigration has divided elites along party lines (Gimpel and
Edwards 1999). Because Democrats were the New Deal party and favored civil rights
legislation and first generation immigrants were working class individuals who lived in
Northern urban areas, they easily identified with the Democratic Party47, making them a
significant constituency base for the Party. In the 1950s and 1960s, conservative
Republicans and Southern Democrats began to voice opposition to immigration based on
Cold War fears. Additionally, the 1965 Act resulted in an inflow of Hispanic and Asian
immigrants, resulting in an expansion of the welfare state that Republicans had opposed
since the New Deal. This led to clear cleavages over time on partisan attitudes towards
immigration.
As mentioned, traditionally, Democrats have generally been pro-immigration
while Republicans, on the other hand, have tended to oppose positive immigration related
legislation. Instead, they tend to favor tighter borders and increased enforcement

47

The exception here being Southern Democrats who operated in a region without much immigration, and
did not support broad immigration policy like their Northern counterparts.
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measures. Again, however, the subject matter of the legislation makes a difference in the
traditional partisan cleavage on immigration. Republicans, have historically been the
party of business (Huntington 1950; Miller and Schofield 2008). Many are donor
beneficiaries of larger corporations who coincidentally are in great need of foreign skilled
workers. As a result, while Republicans tend to oppose general immigration policy,
supporting measures that make hiring foreign skilled workers easier is consistent with
their party platform.
Table 5.1 below outlines the various years in which H-1B legislation was
introduced, the partisan makeup of both chambers as well as the president and his party,
whether legislation passed, and which congressional paradigm best explains the political
phenomenon occurring during that particular congressional term. Additionally, the table
includes Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE polarization measure which estimates the
distance between the two parties in each chamber for each year. This measure will be
described in greater detail later in this chapter and in the following three chapters.
Remember that the greater the score, the greater the amount of polarization within a
chamber in a given year. The following analysis will delve deeper into each of the H-1B
pieces of legislation in order to better explain the context in which legislation is able to
pass as well as when it fails.
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Table 5.1 Internal Factors in the Years H-1B Legislation is Introduced
Control
Year

Polarization*

1990

Type
Immigration

1997

Stand
Alone

N

R-55

R-228

Clinton
(D)

1998

Rider

Y

R-55

R-228

Clinton
(D)

Unorthodo
x Politics

0.755

0.857

1998

Stand
Alone

R-228

Clinton
(D)

Party
Models

0.755

0.857

1999

Stand
Alone

R-223

Clinton
(D)

Party
Models

0.734

0.878

2000

Stand
Alone

R-223

Clinton
(D)

Party
Models

0.734

0.878

2000

Stand
Alone

R-223

Clinton
(D)

Party
Models

0.734

0.878

2001

Stand
Alone

Bush (R)

Party
Models

0.745

0.91

Bush (R)

Unorthodo
x Politics

0.745

0.91

Bush (R)

Unorthodo
x Politics

0.731

0.938

Bush (R)

Party
Models

0.731

0.938

Bush (R)

Bargaining
Failure

0.776

0.972

Bush (R)

Bargaining
Failure

0.787

0.982

Bush (R)

Bargaining
Failure

0.787

0.982

2002

Rider

2004

Rider

2004

Stand
Alone

2006

Stand
Alone

2007

Stand
Alone

2008

Stand
Alone

Pass?

S

H

Pres

Y

D-55

D-260

N
N
N

R-55
R-55
R-55

Y

R-55

N

D51**

Y
Y
Y
N
N
N

D-51
R-51
R-51
R-55
D-51
D-55

R-221
R-221
R-299
R-299
R-232
D-233
D-233

S

H

Bush (R)

Paradigm
Pivotal
Politics

0.622

0.645

Party
Models

0.755

0.857

* Source: Poole and Rosenthal, Polarization America, www.voteview.com
**The Senate was split in half until May 24, 2001 when James Jeffords (R-VT) became
an independent and subsequently switched to the Democratic Party effective June 6,
2001, giving the Democrats a slight majority.

80

The Immigration Act of 1990
As mentioned, the H-1B visa as it exists today was created by the Immigration
Act of 1990. The prior H-1B visa category was reserved for applicants with distinguished
merit and/or ability. Prior to the 1990 Act, there was no nonimmigrant visa category
available for skilled workers. By 1990, the information technology (IT) industry was
emerging, shortages in the healthcare fields began to emerge for the first time, and
Congress was suddenly faced with a new lobby in support of some type of visa to
accommodate these shortages with qualified foreign workers. The Act redefined the H1B as a category for “specialty occupation” workers, and defined them as those with a
minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in work experience. As such, the
evaluation of the H-1B visa and legislation on the H-1B visa in this study will begin in
1990 and continue to the present.
As indicated in Table 5.1, the 1990 Immigration Act was passed in a Democratic
controlled Senate and House with a Republican president, one of the types of divided
government. There has been a debate in the literature over whether divided government
causes gridlock. The widespread claim within the literature and the media has been that
divided government is the main cause for gridlock (Cutler 1989). Mayhew (1991),
however, argued there was not much difference between divided or unified control when
it came to gridlock. These theories of divided and unified government were tested again
in 1992 when Clinton was elected president and the Democrats maintained their
majorities in both chambers yet gridlock still occurred (Krehbiel 1996).
As a result, Krehbiel (1998) examined gridlock in the context of institutional
variables rather than partisan makeup. According to Krehbiel’s (1998) pivot politics
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theory, gridlock occurs for a variety of reasons, including moderate status quo policies,
supermajority procedures such as cloture and the presidential veto, heterogeneous
preferences, and partisanship. Because some of these institutional tactics such as cloture
and the presidential veto require moderate members to overcome gridlock, in order for
policy change to occur, both moderate policy proposals and moderate members are
needed. As a result, policy change is incremental and passed only through the use of
supermajorities. Obviously this is a Senate focused study and discounts any lawmaking in
the House. Regardless, because passage is required in both chambers, Krehbiel’s game
theoretic model is necessary in explaining how legislation passes in the Senate and why it
often fails.
The cloture rule is one of the more recent institutional changes that distinguishes
policymaking in the Senate from the House. Prior to Rule 22, any member within the
Senate could file a motion for extended debate, or filibuster. Since the Senate’s adoption
of Rule 22 in 1917, the filibuster can be terminated and the motion at hand brought to a
vote through the use of cloture. To invoke cloture, a senator must file a cloture petition
while a filibuster motion is pending, which requires the signatures of 16 other senators.
Then, a cloture vote will be brought before the full Senate within two days. To be
invoked, it requires a supermajority48, or 3/5 of the Senate. Once cloture is invoked, the
original pending motion will be brought to a vote after the time stipulated in the cloture
motion.
Krehbiel argues that because 60 members are required to invoke cloture, 60
members are needed in a coalition to enact legislation. Using Mayhew’s (1991) dataset of

48

Since 1975, three-fifths of membership is required to invoke cloture. Cloture from 1917 to 1975 required
only two-thirds of those present and voting.
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major successful legislation, Krehbiel found that between 1947 and 1994, the average
coalition size was 81.9 percent.
In Krehbiel’s game theoretic model, the pivot is an exogenous institutional
element. A player/member is pivotal when his support is necessary for the passage of
legislation. Pre-cloture, the pivot was the median voter or the veto pivot (the member
needed to pass legislation or override a presidential veto, respectively). Post-cloture, the
filibuster pivot determines the outcome of legislation because without the support of the
filibuster pivot (the 60 percent member), cloture cannot be invoked, and without cloture,
a final vote on the legislation cannot occur. Therefore because cloture requires 60 percent
of the voting membership, the filibuster pivot is the 60th percentile.
The effect of cloture is that while the original motion may require only a simple
majority, in order to overcome filibuster in the Senate a supermajority is necessary. Precloture the pivotal player was the medial voter. Post-cloture, however, the pivotal player
moves either left or right (left if the majority is liberal and right is the majority is
conservative) and is the filibuster pivot rather than the median voter. The cloture vote is
largely important because it has been argued that the cloture vote amounted to a vote on
the actual legislation on which cloture was being sought, rather than a procedural vote on
the length of debate (Binder and Smith 1997). Within the context of pivotal politics,
when cloture makes it more difficult for senators to change unattractive policies relative
to alternative policies, they “lash out” against the filibuster (Krehbiel 1998: 96).
Additionally, Sinclair (2006: 190-191) has shown that as the frequency of
filibusters and cloture votes has increased, so too has polarization. The increase in
filibusters and cloture votes begins in the 1970s and continues throughout the 2002.
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Similarly, polarization began in the mid-1970s and polarization along partisan and
ideological lines increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
If, however, there are enough moderates to refuse cloture, then these moderates
have the power to water down the proposal and move it towards their side of the policy
space. Using a specific example, if there are enough Republicans in the Senate to refuse
to invoke cloture, then Democrats will need to move their policy more towards the right
to create a more moderate policy that Republicans will prefer over the status quo or
Democrats will need to fear gridlock (which would also occur in the absence of
moderates). Figure 5.1 provides this spatial diagram.

Figure 5.1 Pivotal Politics Spatial Model

q
Liberal

3/5
b*

…b’’’

1/2
b”

f

m

b’

b
Conservative

Source: Adapted from Krehbiel (1998)

In Figure 5.1, Congress is majority conservative, f denotes the filibuster pivot and
m denotes the median voter. The filibuster pivot is the legislator whose ideal legislative
point and all points to his left make up exactly or just more than 3/5 of the legislature.
Therefore, in order for legislation to pass (b*), conservatives will need to dilute the
legislation (b) to the point where f (and the 59 members to his right) prefers the
legislation over the status quo and the legislation is still right of the status quo.
Turning back to the legislation at hand, the Immigration Act of 1990 was
introduced by Senate Democratic veteran and Chair of the Senate Committee on Labor
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and Human Resource, Edward “Ted” Kennedy as Senate Bill 358 in February 1989. The
Act was a bipartisan effort cosponsored by Democratic Senators Christopher Dodd of
Connecticut and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, and Republican Senators
Alfonse D’Amato of New York and Alan Simpson of Wyoming.
It made a number of changes to the immigration system and arguably is the
closest Congress has come to comprehensive immigration reform since 1986. The Act set
permanent annual worldwide limits on immigration in the family based, employment
based, and diversity immigration categories beginning in 1995. It also set a ceiling per
country in each immigrant category, excepting spouses and minor children. It delineated
categories within the family based and employment based categories, with annual
numerical caps of each category. It also made changes to a variety of nonimmigrant visa
categories including the H, created the diversity visa program, and the O, P, Q, and R
visas49. It created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program, a new system and
requirements for naturalization, as well as added additional enforcement provisions.
With a measure such as the Immigration Act of 1990, the expectation is that the
status quo was slightly liberal, much like the spatial model in Figure 5.1. With
Democratic control of both chambers and a Republican President, in order for legislation
to pass, the legislation (b) would have to be diluted until f (and the 59 members to his
right) prefers the legislation over the status quo and the legislation is still right of the
status quo.

49

The H visa, as we know, if a temporary worker and trainee visa. The O visa is available to aliens with
extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. The P is available for athletes or
entertainers for a specific performance, for a reciprocal exchange program, or a culturally unique program.
The Q is available for international cultural exchange programs and the R is for aliens in religious
occupations.
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The legislation as explained above was sufficiently liberal while still maintaining
some conservative aspects, such as the H-1B provisions. The bill was introduced by a
Democrat and co-sponsored by two Democrats and two Republicans. Thus far we have a
bipartisan effort.
It was passed in the Senate by a supermajority of 89 to 8 and in the House by 264
to 118. With an 89 vote in the Senate, the bill clearly overcame the required 60 votes in
order to overcome cloture. Of the 89 yea votes in the Senate, 51 were Democrats and 38
were Republicans. Nay votes in the Senate came largely from conservative Republicans,
including Jesse Helms (R-NC), Trent Lott (R-MS), Bill Roth (R-DE), Warren Rudman
(R-NH), William Armstrong (R-CO), as well as three Democrats including Dale
Bumpers (D-AR), Robert Byrd (D-WV), and Jim Exon (D-NE). In the House, the 264
yea votes were comprised of 171 Democrats and 93 Republicans and the 118 nay votes
were comprised of 64 Republicans and 54 Democrats. In sum, the 1990 Act was a clear
bipartisan effort. While Kennedy did not have 60 Democratic Senators, there were greater
numbers of moderate Republicans (as we will see below). As a result, with 89 yea votes
Senator Kennedy clearly had true bipartisan support and well above the 60 votes needed
for cloture.
Because polarization has been increasing in both chambers since the 1970s (see
Figure 5.2 below), gridlock has been more rampant and bipartisan legislation has been
steadily decreasing (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Figure 5.2 shows Poole and
Rosenthal’s illustration of party polarization from 1879 to 2011. The graph provides their
data estimates for the distance for each individual member in each chamber in each year
which they use to estimate the distance between the two parties in each chamber for each
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year. Looking at roll call voting over time, they show that polarization declined in both
the House and Senate beginning in the early 1890s until the Second World War and then
steadily began to increase beginning in the 1970s.
Looking at Poole and Rosenthal’s party polarization data (Figure 5.2), it is evident
that beginning in about 1969, party polarization has steadily increased and the distance
between the parties has steadily increased since the mid 1990s. In the 1990s particularly
in the House, we see a significant spike in polarization. Sinclair (2006) attributes this
spike to Gingrich’s Republican Revolution in 1994. During this period there only one
major, albeit slight, decrease in the mid 2000s when Republicans regained control in
2004. Over time, however, they argue (as is evident from the Figure) that the median
member has slowly diminished and as a result it has become much more difficult for
legislation to pass. These dates are extremely consistent with the dates on H-1B
legislation where legislation was successful through 1990, and after that both the scope
and number of successful legislation began to decrease (as polarization was increasing)
until eventually no legislation was successful.
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Figure 5.2 Party Polarization 1879 - 2011
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Conclusion
With the Immigration Act of 1990, both chambers exhibited complete bipartisan
passage, a phenomenon that according to Krehbiel requires a pivotal actor or moderates.
As we will see in future chapters, however, this increase in party polarization will result
in the failure of H-1B related legislation.
If we could have stopped time in 1990, this analysis would have been for naught
as legislation could have continued in a similar fashion. The way in which the
Immigration Act of 1990 passed was in a completely textbook example and illustrated
bicameralism in its purest form. Since then, increased polarization of parties has led to

88

new groups entering the political arena and tilting the balance of power in several key
states.
After 1990, the 1994 midterm election resulted in a Republican takeover of
Congress and the net gain of 54 seats in the House and eight seats in the Senate for
Republicans. The takeover gave the Republican Party their first majority in the House in
over forty years. In the subsequent 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections, Republicans
maintained control of the House and Senate. It was not until 2006 when Democrats
regained control of the House and Senate 50.
Additionally, the realignment along ideological lines that occurred, with median
members being replaced by ideologues who positioned themselves at either ideological
pole also significantly changed the manner in which legislation passed (Sinclair 2006;
Theriault 2003; McDonald and Grofman 1999; Sinclair 1982). As we will see in chapters
six, seven, and eight, this new balance of power changed the way in which legislation on
the H-1B visa was passed in Congress.

50

For a brief period in 2001, Republicans held a majority when James Jeffords (R-VT) became an
independent on May 24, 2001, splitting the Senate in half with neither party holding a majority until
Jeffords subsequently switched to the Democratic Party effective June 6, 2001, giving the Democrats a
slight majority.

89

CHAPTER 6
PARTY MATTERS
In the last chapter, I outlined how Krehbiel’s (1998) pivotal politics model
explained the success of the original 1990 bill that created the H-1B visa as it exists
today. As we have seen, however, the relative success enjoyed by the pro-immigration
camp was short lived. After a series of successful immigration policies throughout the
larger part of the twentieth century, this all came to a halt after 1990.
After 1990, there were a total of 34 pieces of positive H-1B legislation introduced
in both chambers between 1998 and 2004. Of these, seven pieces of legislation passed
that were designed to increase the annual cap, increase a government filing fee, or create
a cap exemption. Of these seven bills, three were attached as riders to larger pieces of
omnibus or appropriations legislation. The remaining four either were stand-alone pieces
of legislation or attached to a larger immigration bill and made relatively trivial changes
to the H-1B program. These bills will be examined in turn below and as will be shown,
we are not just concerned with the number of bills that were passed, but also the scope of
the legislation. By definition, the party bills have a much smaller scope, as will be shown
below. The only substantive pieces of successful legislation were those that were only
able to pass through the use of riders. Those will be discussed in chapter seven.
Recent literature has indicated that parties have become increasingly important in
sorting ideologies and providing cues for legislators (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Rohde
1991). This has been particularly enhanced by party polarization since the 1970s.
Additionally, parties provide individual voters with cues that help legislators in their
reelection goals. Over time, the role of parties has become more important and parties
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serve an even greater role in agenda setting and organizing committees (Kingdon 1984;
Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007). Essentially, this literature has found an inverse
relationship between parties and committees. The limitation here, as mentioned before in
chapter three, is that these studies focus on politics within the House only. As legislation
must make it through both chambers in identical form in order to pass, a model
explaining legislative behavior for both chambers is necessary, particularly considering
recent cloture changes in the Senate as discussed in the previous chapter.
Additionally, institutions are framed in the literature largely in terms of party
politics. Specifically, when member preferences are homogenous within the party, party
leaders will support the legislation. Rohde (1991) argues that a series of House reforms
by liberal Democrats in the 1970s allowed party leaders to push legislation through that a
majority of House Democrats supported. Essentially, his argument is that party leadership
in the House is strongest with the presence of three factors: (1) homogenous party
membership; (2) institutional leverage; and (3) a strong leader.
Following in the tradition of Rohde (1991), Cox and McCubbins (2005; 2007)
provide the seminal work on institutions through their work studying the House. They
argue that lawmaking in the House is predicated by collective efforts that are difficult due
to individual member and constituent policy goals. As a result, parties organize the House
in order to solve these collective action problems on the part of individual members.
Essentially, parties act as market cartels, organizing individual members in an attempt to
create collective benefits for the party as a whole. Additionally, the majority party has the
ability to control the policy agenda, allowing a greater likelihood of bill passage for the
policy goals of individual members and/or their constituencies.
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While parties were able to solve some collective action problems, another
problem began to take shape within Congress. Over time, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
(2006) argue that since the 1970s, politics have become more divisive largely due to
income inequality. As a result, individual members have become increasingly more
liberal or conservative within their respective parties, a phenomenon referred to as
polarization. With the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, members began
polarizing within their parties to a greater degree. Because of this polarization, we see
some trepidation within the Republican camp as members have become much more
conservative and less supportive of general immigration measures. This trepidation,
however, has been countered with a constituent base of big business that needs H-1Bs in
order to successful run their businesses. As such, as Republicans have congressional
control during this period the party is able to get some legislation passed.
Across the board, however, their efforts are minor as two of the three successful
pieces of legislation during this period are relatively trivial. That third piece of legislation
(S.2045) was, of all of the passed legislation, the most significant piece of H-1B
legislation yet still minor when considering it did nothing to meet an ever increasing
demand for more cap numbers.
For the past 35 years or so, the parties have as McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
(2006: 1) claim, “deserted the center of the floor in favor of the wings”. Analyzing
individual roll call voting patterns of members in the House and Senate, they found that
the median legislative position of each party has diverged sharply since the mid 1970s
(Poole and Rosenthal 1984; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Said differently, they
showed that that in both chambers Republicans and Democrats have become either more
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conservative or more liberal and moderates have slowly begun to vanish since in the
1970s. Additionally, they showed that while members are becoming more partisan, the
parties themselves are becoming more homogenous.
Therefore, the theoretical expectation here is that the parties should organize
individual members in order to realize individual and party goals through legislation.
However, as members have increasingly clustered around either the conservative or
liberal poles and our moderates have slowly been replaced by ideologues (Mann and
Ornstein 2012) and as both the numbers of filibusters and cloture votes have increased
(Sinclair 2006) in concert with polarization, this polarization over time has resulted in the
death of the pivot. As a result, rather than having a continuum of members across the
board from left to right (liberal to conservative) we now have clusters of conservatives
and liberals with very few moderates to temper legislation and bring the two poles
together. Therefore, bills that are successful are party driven bills.
We can particularly see this phenomenon occurring with our H-1B legislation.
After 1990, the legislation that passed on its own was relatively minor and few and far
between. As we will see, the scope of legislation begins to decrease over time, and the
success of these bills is predicated on party support.
It is worth noting here that typically, roll call votes are necessary in order to prove
that legislation is predicated on party based support. Because I do not have roll call votes
on this legislation, proving party based support is extremely difficult. As a result, I am
forced to use the only data available to me, which is sponsorship and co-sponsorship of
legislation, as well as relying on the above listed literature which indicates that legislation
was predominately passed through party based support during my timeframe. The
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following section will examine this legislation within the context of party politics and
polarization.
Successful Legislation
H.R.5362
H.R.5362 was a small two section bill passed in 2000 that that simply
reauthorized51 and increased the $500 filing fee established to fund training and education
programs by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Labor to $1000 and
created an exemption of that fee for nonprofit primary and secondary educational
institutions. It was sponsored by David Dreier (R-CA), and cosponsored by John
Moakley (D- MA). In 2000, Republicans controlled the Senate with 55 members and the
House with 223 members. It was passed through unanimous consent in both chambers
and as such, we do not have actual roll call votes to ascertain votes along partisan lines.
Since Republicans had control of both chambers, the bill did very little to change the
program and was sponsored by a Republican member, it could reasonably be asserted that
voting along party lines likely occurred.
S.2045
Called AC-21 and also passed in 2000, S.2045 increased the H-1B cap to 195,000
for fiscal years 2001 to 2003. It created exemptions from the annual cap for institutions of
higher education as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1001(a)), nonprofit entities related to or affiliated with a nonprofit educational
entity as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1001(a)), and nonprofit or governmental research organizations as defined by 8 CFR

51

The training fee of $500 was originally passed in the ACWIA in 1998 as was set to sunset October 1,
2001.
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214(h)(19)(iii)(C). It allowed employees to change employers upon the filing of a change
of employer application while the application is pending for a period of up to 240 days.
This change was significant in that it allowed a subsequent employer to begin employing
the foreign national upon just the filing of the application for a period of up to 240 days,
rather than having to wait several months for an approval52. Additionally, it created
extensions beyond the six years of eligibility initially allocated in the 1990 Act for
applicants who have filed an immigrant visa application but do not have a visa number
available to become permanent residents.
The bill also included a provision on crime provisions and computer education for
kids. It was sponsored by Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) and designed to ensure proper
training of American workers in order to both increase diversity in the high tech industry
and lessen the need for foreign workers.
To illustrate the importance of AC-21, let us use our friend Dr. Singh from
chapter two as an example. As a reminder, Dr. Singh is a cardiovascular surgeon and
researcher from India who obtained an employment agreement with a private physician’s
group. Let’s call this group the XYZ Group. XYZ files an H-1B application on behalf of
Dr. Singh for the initial 3 year period and the application is approved. Dr. Singh works
for XYZ for two years and is approached by the ABC Group who is desperate for a
cardiovascular surgeon of Dr. Singh’s caliber and they offer to pay him an extra $100,000
in salary. Dr. Singh signs a new employment agreement with ABC Group who promptly
files a change of employer H-1B application with USCIS. Once the application is
receipted into the system by USCIS, Dr. Singh is free to change employers and begin
52

A request for premium processing of an H-1B application is typically available. It requires a government
filing fee of an additional $1000 for a response within 15 calendar days. AC-21 saves employers that fee as
well.
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work with ABC for a period of up to 240 days while the application is pending. This
saves both ABC and Dr. Singh several months of having to wait on an approval and the
possibility of early termination by XYZ if he provides notice too soon which would
require him to leave the U.S. and consular process the H-1B visa which could result in
another several months of having to wait on security checks once his H-1B is approved53.
Now let us pretend that Dr. Singh works for ABC for an additional two years and
he decides he likes the company and would like to stay there for the foreseeable future.
He asks the CEO if they would consider sponsoring a green card application for him.
ABC really likes Dr. Singh and would like to keep him for the foreseeable future as well
so the CEO decides they will sponsor Dr. Singh’s green card application. The CEO
contacts an immigration attorney and begins the process. The attorney files the labor
certification application before the end of his fifth year on H-1B and it takes about
another year and a half before the applications are approved. Because Dr. Singh is from
India, however, there is a backlog on green card availability (see chapter two for an
explanation of visa numbers) so he is not eligible for a green card until the numbers
become current. At this point, Dr. Singh has already been on his H-1B for five and a half
years out of the statutorily allowed six years.
Thanks to AC-21, because Dr. Singh has filed an immigrant visa application but
does not have a visa number available to him, he is eligible for an extension beyond the
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For applicants outside of the United States, the employer still files the H-1B application with USCIS.
Once the application is approved, the foreign national must actually obtain a visa from a U.S. consulate
abroad before they can enter the U.S. Waiting times for visas and countries vary, but the H-1B carries with
it a lengthy FBI security check which will certainly delay Dr. Singh’s process even longer.
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six year period. As such, ABC can continue filing three year extensions on behalf of Dr.
Singh until his visa number becomes current, which can take up to five to ten years 54.
AC-21 was introduced by Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and cosponsored by 24 Senators:
Spencer Abraham (R-MI), John Ashcroft (R-MO), Robert Bennett (R-UT), Sam
Brownback (R-KS), Jim Bunning (R-KY), Paul Coverdell (R-GA), Mike DeWine (ROH), John Edwards (R-NC), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Slade Gorton (R-WA), Bob
Graham (D-FL), Phil Gramm (R-TX), Rod Grams (R-MN), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Jesse
Helms (R-NC), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Trent Lott (R-MS), Connie Mack (R-FL),
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Don Nickles (R-OK), Gordon Smith (R-OR), Arlen Specter
(R-PA), George Voinovich (R-OH), John Warner (R-VA). We have clear partisan
support here as 21 of the 24 Senators represented the Republican Party. Additionally,
AC-21 passed with near unanimity. In the Senate it passed 96-1 with 54 Republicans and
42 Democrats voting yay and Ernest Hollings (D-SC) casting the sole nay vote, and
passed by voice vote in the House. The level of bipartisan support for this legislation at
least in the Senate in 2000 is staggering. Unfortunately, we cannot gauge the level of
support in the House for this legislation as it passed with a voice vote.
Based on prior partisan support, the expectation is that when Republicans sponsor
an immigration bill, we can expect that Democrats will support is as well. However,
when the Democrats sponsor a bill, there is a greater expectation that party voting will
occur simply due to the subject matter of the bill. The more liberal the provisions are, the
less likely it is that Republicans will sign on. With increased polarization and fewer

54

It could take less or more time, depending on the number of applicants in any given year as well as prior
years.
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median members, polarized members are more likely to vote along party lines as median
members are not available to temper the legislation.
H.R.3767
Part of an immigration related bill, H.R.3767 made an extremely minor change to
the H-1B program. This provision of the bill allowed employers engaging in corporate
restructuring to have an exemption from having to refile an H-1B application. Remember
that the H-1B is employer specific so whenever an employer changes, a new application
must be filed with USCIS. This provision allows companies that are simply engaging in
corporate shuffling to maintain the same H-1B approval without having to pay the several
thousands of dollars in government filing fees and legal fees.
H.R.3767 was sponsored by Lamar Smith (R-TX) and cosponsored by twelve
Representatives: Ken Bentsen (D-TX), Shelley Berkley (D-NV), Charles Canady (R-FL),
Barney Frank (D-MA), Elton Gallegly (R-CA), Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Sheila JacksonLee (D-TX), William Jefferson (D-LA), Matthew Martinez (D-CA), Bill McCollum (RFL), Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), and Joe Scarborough (R-FL). Again it passed by
unanimous consent in the Senate and by Voice Vote in the House, although we can
ascertain that among the cosponsors were seven Democrats and five Republicans.
S.2302
Finally, the last piece of successful H-1B legislation was a short, one section bill
that simply created an exemption from the annual cap for physicians with an approved J1 waiver who agree to work and obtain a sponsoring employer in a federally designated
medical shortage area by the Department of Health and Human Services through the
Conrad 30 program.
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Remember from the plight of our friend Dr. Singh in chapter two that there are
two visas available for foreign medical graduates to complete a residency/fellowship
training program in the United States: the J-1, which requires a two year home residency
requirement upon completion, or the H-1B which requires that the applicant have
completed all three steps of the USMLE exam. Like nearly half of all foreign medical
graduates, Dr. Singh had not completed step 3 of USMLE, and had to complete his
program on the J-1 visa. The J-1 visa carries with it a two year home residency
requirement for foreign medical graduates who complete a residency/fellowship.
The original Conrad 20 program (now termed the Conrad 30 program) was
created by Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) and passed as an amendment to the Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994. It gave each of the 50 states 20 (the
number has subsequently been increased to 30) waivers of this home residency
requirement to grant to physicians who agree to work and receive approval to work in a
facility located in a medical shortage area as designated by the United States Department
of Health and Human Services for a period of three years. The waiver does not provide
any legal status. Upon approval of the waiver, Dr. Singh had to apply for an H-1B visa to
actually give him legal status to stay and work.
The bill was introduced (as would be expected) by Kent Conrad and cosponsored
by Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Sam Brownback (R-KS), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Thad
Cochran (R-MS), Mike DeWine (R-OH), John Ensign (R-NV), Russell Feingold (D-WI),
Chuck Hagel (R-NE), James Jeffords (I-VT), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Herb Kohl (DWI), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Patty Murray (D-WA), Benjamin Nelson (D-NE), and
Charles Schumer (D-NY). The bill was cosponsored by nine Democrats, four
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Republicans, and one Independent. It passed by unanimous consent in the Senate and by
a staggering 407 to 4 in the House. While there is bipartisan support, the scope of the
legislation here is obviously much smaller than prior legislation and other attempted
legislation that fails.
Additionally, this really is an extension of already existing legislation that
requires a J-1 physician to complete three years of service in a medical shortage area on
an H-1B visa. Congress has already authorized the H-1B for these foreign nationals yet
the annual cap could, and in practice, was limiting their ability to do so. As such, S.2302
simply granted these physicians a waiver from the cap in order to provide the medical
services Congress had already authorized them to do at a time when median members
still existed.
With each of these successful bills, we have Republican control of both chambers.
With AC-21, we have individual roll call votes in the Senate that indicate that all voting
Republicans in the Senate voted yay. While we do not have individual roll call votes for
any of the remaining bills to ascertain voting along party lines, I expect that when
Republican support is high, Democratic support will also be high due to traditional and
historical support on immigration legislation. When, however, Democratic support is
high, party voting is much more likely. Therefore, we can reasonably assume based on
the levels of increased polarization and realignment that these are party driven bills.
Failed Legislation
My hypothesis is that as polarization increases, H-1B legislation is more likely to
fail. After 1990, a total of 34 bills are introduced and only 7 passed. Through 2004, a
number of the provisions in these failed bills were included in the legislation that did
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pass, although as we will see below, it becomes harder and harder for legislation to pass
over time until eventually legislation is not able to pass at all (see chapter eight).
Following the creation of the H-1B visa program, the H-1B cap was not hit until
1997. Thus, beginning in 1997 and through the last piece of successful legislation in
2004, 13 additional pieces of legislation were also introduced dealing with the H-1B visa
and all failed (see Table 6.1 below). These were all introduced as stand-alone pieces of
legislation. However, most of the provisions included in this legislation were eventually
passed through riders (see chapter seven) or passed individually.
Table 6.1 below indicates the unsuccessful legislation that was introduced in
either chamber between the period of 1997 and 2001. As the table indicates, 13 pieces of
legislation were introduced during the period of time when the parties were able to get
some legislation was passed, either individually or through the use of alternative
methods.
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Table 6.1 Timeline of Unsuccessful H-1B Legislation (Pre-CIR)
Year Legislation
1997 H.R.3736
S.1723
1998
1999 H.R.2698
1999 H.R.3508
S.1440
1999
2000 H.R.3814
2000 H.R.3983
2000 H.R.4200
2000 H.R.4227
2000 H.R.5625
2001 H.R.2809
2001 H.R.2984
2001
S.1342

Key Provisions
Increase cap
Increase cap/enforcement
Increase cap/exemption
New cap for high skilled
Increase cap/exemption
Increase cap/fee
Increase cap/fee
Increase cap/fee
Increase cap
Cap exemption
Increase cap/exemption
Accurate cap computing
Increase cap for rural areas

Bill Sponsor
Lamar Smith (R-TX)
Spencer Abraham (R-MI)
David Dreier (R-CA)
David Wu (D-OR)
Phil Gramm (R-TX)
Lamar Smith (R-TX)
David Dreier (R-CA)
Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX)
Lamar Smith (R-TX)
Christopher Cox (R-CA)
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)
Robert Andrews (D-NJ)
Byron Dorgan (D-ND)

I + C Sc: Immigration and Claims Subcommittee
Tech Sc: Technology Subcommittee
Source: THOMAS (Library of Congress)

In the 105th Congress, two pieces of legislation were introduced. H.R.3736 and
S.1723 proposed increasing the cap for fiscal years 1998 to 2000 and 2001 respectively,
as well as changing enforcement and penalties for fraud. These provisions were
ultimately passed as a rider to an omnibus bill in 1998 and will be discussed in the next
chapter. In the 106th Congress, seven pieces of legislation were introduced. Of these
seven, the only provisions not included in the passed legislation included a cap exemption
for foreign nationals with a Master’s Degree from a U.S. institution (this was ultimately
passed in 2004), creating a new cap for the highly skilled, reserving 10,000 of the annual
cap for nonprofit organizations (a variation of this was passed in AC-21 in 2000), and
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creating a cap exemption for employers who make a scholarship contribution and are
employing a highly skilled foreign national.
Finally, three pieces of legislation were introduced in the 107 th Congress in 2001.
None of these provisions found themselves in passable legislation. H.R.2809 would have
provided a cap exemption for locally owned hospitals located in federally designated
shortage areas and similarly S.1342 would have carved out cap numbers for employers
located in rural areas. H.R.2984 would have changed numerical computation procedures
in order to make sure computation of the cap numbers was accurate in order to prevent
any foreign national from being counted twice against the cap.
Conclusion
Polarization has resulted in making the leadership’s jobs easier by providing them
with more tools to work the party’s agenda, particularly in the House which is where Cox
and McCubbins focus their attention and research. Additionally, while party polarization
has increased over time, the scope of legislation has decreased. Through the early part of
the 2000s, this is how H-1B related legislation was able to pass. Legislation, however, is
not solely passed through the House. In the Senate, cloture makes it much more difficult
for the parties to further their agendas. They have to be much more concerned with
overcoming the 60 vote requisite for invoking cloture, meaning concessions must be
made or risk losing legislation. The increase of party polarization, however, has made it
more difficult for the members to succumb to alternative proposals from a competing
party. This is where Cox and McCubbins’ model fails.
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Prior to 1980, the Democratic Party regularly had a majority of over 60 in the
Senate55. Since 1977, however, neither party has been able to have a 60 member majority
purely based on party. Therefore, in no congressional term between 1997 and 2008, did
either party have a 60 member majority. So now that the parties cannot get to 60 when a
bill gets to the Senate, it either dies or gets substantially watered down because a
mismatch currently exists in the Senate that previously did not.
As a result, the stage is set for members to try alternative tactics to try to get their
goals realized. In this chapter, I examined legislation that was able to pass on its own
without any additional interference or manipulation on the part of individual members.
For the most part, this legislation made trivial changes to the H-1B program and the
scope was small. During this same period, however, not all H-1B legislation was able to
pass on its own and members were reduced to using some newer and alternative methods
in order to get their policy goals realized. These alternative methods will be discussed in
the next chapter.

55

The Democratic party had a member majority of over 60 in the 86th through 90th and 94th through 95th
congressional terms (1961-1968 and 1975-1978).
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CHAPTER 7
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING
As we know, the scope of H-1B legislation has become smaller and smaller over
time. Additionally, a number of external and internal changes such as cloture and the
increase of polarization throughout Congress have resulted in a shift from the relative
(albeit small) success that members were able to realize throughout the last 1990s and
early 2000s. While these internal and external changes have occurred, the goals have
remained intact as members and their constituents still needed positive changes to the H1B program, particularly with regard to increased cap numbers. Therefore, because
members were unsuccessful in getting legislation passed in the traditional manner, they
needed to find alternative methods in order to get their goals realized.
As institutional arrangements have become more constricting for legislators over
time, Sinclair (2007) argued that Congress no longer follows the textbook process
described by countless political scientists, historians, and even the media over the past
several decades. She outlines these changes in policymaking over time by comparing the
1970 Clean Air Act with the 1990 Clean Air Act. The 1970 Act, for example, was
introduced in both respective House and Senate committees, and then followed to a vote
on the floor where it passed. In 1990, however, the bill was introduced in three different
House committees and then went to the floor where a series of compromises through
informal processes occurred. In the Senate, the bill was introduced in committee, went to
the floor where a series of informal compromises occurred, followed by filibuster before
a vote. Sinclair (2007) argues that the 1970 process is not likely to ever occur again as
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most bills today are now passed through short cut procedures for small bills and a variety
of once unorthodox practices and procedures for major legislation.
These unorthodox practices and procedures include the increase in usage of larger
omnibus bills, the use of multiple committees for the same piece of legislation, more
complex and restrictive rules tailored to deal with problems associated with a particular
bill in the House, and in the Senate, bills are subject to greater floor amendments (many
irrelevant to the bill at issue), and filibuster threats and cloture votes are much more
routine. This is a significant departure from prior literature on the manner in which the
textbook Congress makes policy.
Additionally, Congress is certainly affected by the macro political climate. When
policies become unattractive, legislators become risk averse to signing on to such
legislation. Erikson, McKuen, and Stimson (2006), for example, argue that public
preferences influence congressional policy. However, in the face of negative macro
factors, there are Sinclairian (2007) opportunities to circumnavigate the traditional
legislative process and legislators can realize some of their individual or constituent
policy goals with little public notice through other methods such as riders. In certain
cases and at certain times, however, some legislation becomes too risky and legislators
prefer not to have their names attached to certain pieces of legislation.
The increased use of riders and other unorthodox practices is a departure from
traditional policymaking. Traditionally, we expect legislation to pass in a majoritarian
institution when one party has a majority and the legislation favors that majority’s
position. Recently, however, members have had to resort to “unorthodox” measures in
order to get legislation passed in a Congress that has institutional measures in place, such

106

as the filibuster, that just one member can use to easily halt the progress of any piece of
legislation.
As a result, members have become increasingly receptive to using riders to realize
their policy goals, particularly when polarization has made it more difficult for legislation
to pass on its own. Riders allow members the ability to pass legislation without
specifically having to vote on the rider itself. Instead, they are able to return to their
districts and shy away from the vote on the rider by claiming to have voted on the whole
bill, or rather the bill that was, for example, a must pass appropriations bill. Specifically,
while members might have an incentive to reform the H-1B program, they may not want
to have their names attached to that legislation, particularly if they have a contested seat.
Because individual votes on riders are not transparent, there is an incentive to shift to this
mode of passage.
During the 1998 to 2004 period, various members were successful in attaching
legislation as riders to larger bills likely to pass bipartisan muster in both chambers. As
with the stand-alone legislation, Congress is still driven by various internal and external
factors limiting their ability to pass any significant changes to the H-1B visa program. As
a result, the scope of legislation over time remains small. The three bills listed below are
examples of members attempting to use these unorthodox Sinclarian tactics in an attempt
to realize their individual and/or constituents’ goals.
As a side note, before getting to these bills, it should be noted that there are
various methodological issues with studying riders. There is not a lot of information on
riders within the congressional record, and this information is actually difficult to find.
The congressional record only keeps data on floor amendments during floor debate so it

107

is not possible to ascertain if riders were attempted through another method during
committee debate. Therefore, with regard to H-1B riders, I could not ascertain whether
there were any unsuccessful attempts to attach a rider, but only when riders were
successfully attached to a must pass bill. Additionally, the only information typically
available on any given rider is the sponsor and any members who speak in favor or
against the attachment of a rider.
As a side note, there are no individual votes on the riders themselves so it is
impossible to ascertain the level of support for a given rider. Instead, the votes on a piece
of legislation are votes on the larger bill itself that the rider is attached to. Consequently,
as I mentioned earlier, this is precisely why members like to use riders. Now that I have
briefly outlined these methodologically problems, let us turn now to examining the riders
that were attempted and passed as part of larger, non-immigration related legislation.
H.R.4328
In 1998, Congress passed the American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA). It increased the annual cap of 65,000 on the number
of H-1B nonimmigrant visas available per fiscal year that was passed in the Immigration
Act of 1990 to 115,000 available visas for the fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The cap would
then decrease to 107,500 in 2001 and revert to the original 65,000 in 2002.
ACWIA also created a new filing fee of $500 for initial applications to be
earmarked for job training, low-income scholarships, grants for mathematics,
engineering, or science enrichment courses. It created provisions to protect U.S. workers
from layoff and for employers who become H-1B dependent. ACWIA also made changes
in enforcement and penalties for employers who violate the law.
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This legislation was important because the 65,000 cap was hit for the first time
prior to the end of the 1997 fiscal year and in 1998, the cap was hit within the first two
months, according to a report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 56.
As a result, employers were unable to get the skilled workers they needed in order to
successfully run their businesses. It was passed in an attempt to remedy the shortcomings
of the immigration system at the time and allow businesses and corporations to hire more
skilled foreign employees.
The bill was a compromise amendment bringing together H.R.3736 which was
introduced by Lamar Smith (R-TX) and S.1723 which was introduced by Spencer
Abraham (R-MI). Together they proposed increasing the cap for fiscal years 1998 to
2000 and 2001 respectively, as well as changing enforcement and penalties for fraud.
Together with House and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairmen Henry Hyde (R-IL) and
Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Smith and Abraham created a workable compromise between the
House and Senate bills. These provisions were ultimately passed as a rider to the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998.
H.R.2215
Attached as a rider to the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, H.R.2215 established the prevailing wage requirement for employers.
The prevailing wage is the average wage paid to United States citizens in a particular
county for any particular occupation and is compiled by the United States Department of
Labor. Employers found violating this requirement can be fined heavily by the
Department of Labor and may be banned from hiring foreign workers in the future. In
practice, the Department of Labor has steadily increased their audits of H-1B sponsoring
56

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03883.pdf
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employers since the mid 2000s. The rider also created additional extensions beyond the
six year period of eligibility for applicants who have begun the green card process and
filed a labor certification application 365 days prior to the end of their six years of H-1B
eligibility.
Using Dr. Singh again as an example, assume that visa numbers are currently
available for nationals of India. Remember that Dr. Singh began the immigration visa
process after his fourth year on H-1B and his labor certification application was filed
before his fifth year of H-1B eligibility. H.R.2215 would allow the ABC Group to file
one year extensions for Dr. Singh indefinitely until his green card is approved57.
This provision was included in the conference report through the work of Senators
Ted Kennedy (D-MA), the Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee, and Sam Brownback (R-KS). Additionally, a speech in support of the
measure (and other immigration measures) by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) helped
gain widespread support for approval of the slight modification to previously existing
law.
H.R.4818
After hearing from the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and Intel
Corporation to determine the importance of the H-1B visa to the U.S. economy, Ted
Kennedy, Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary attached the H-1B Visa Reform Act of
57

Upon the filing of an adjustment of status (or more commonly termed green card) application, an
applicant for a green card is granted legal stay and can apply for authorization to travel outside the U.S. and
work authorization. As a result, many do not maintain a valid underlying nonimmigrant visa. However, it is
recommended that green card applicants maintain a dual intent nonimmigrant visa during this period in the
event that the green card is denied. Otherwise, the foreign national will have no legal basis to remain in the
U.S. and will have to leave immediately upon denial and start the H-1B process anew and obtain a visa at a
U.S. consulate before being able to reenter the U.S., a process that can take up to a year or longer if the
applicant is outside of the U.S.
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2004 as an amendment to the Omnibus Spending Bill passed by the House. The
significance of H.R. 4818 was that it set forth compliance standards for the H-1B visa,
reinstituted and increased the previously sunset filing fee for job training and scholarships
to $1500, created a new $500 Fraud Prevention and Detection fee for initial applications
filed by employers per foreign worker. This portion of the Act was originally introduced
in the Senate by Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) and later supported by Senators Frank
Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Joe Lieberman (D-CT).
More importantly, however, the Act created a second cap and exemption from the
annual 65,000 cap for up to 20,000 foreign nationals who have obtained at least a
Master’s Degree from an educational institution in the United States58. In effect, this
cleared 20,000 from the annual cap and raised the cap permanently to 85,000.
Conclusion
In chapter seven, I examined legislation that was able to pass through party
models without any manipulation on the part of individual models between 1998 and
2004. For the most part, this legislation made trivial changes to the H-1B program and
the scope was small. During this same period, however, not all H-1B legislation was able
to pass on its own and members were reduced to using some newer and alternative
methods in order to get their policy goals realized.
This chapter looked at some of these alternative ways that legislators were able to
get legislation passed that served their constituents’ interests. As was shown, most of the
provisions of the introduced legislation were able to pass either individually or through
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In the event the Master’s cap is hit first, an applicant with a Master’s Degree from a U.S. institution can
still apply for an H-1B through the general 65,000 cap.
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the use of alternative methods such as amendments and additions to the conference report
(riders) by senior ranking members.
The increase in polarization is clearly impacting the success of H-1B legislation.
As I have shown thus far, as polarization increased, it has become more difficult for this
legislation to pass and as a result, members have been forced to use Sinclairian methods
in order to get their goals realized.
The meat of this analysis will be in the next chapter, which will shift gears and
look at the legislation that failed and attempt to explain why members stopped using
Sinclarian tactics to get legislation passed and why 2004 marked the end of positive H-1B
legislation while demand for these visas remained high.
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CHAPTER 8
STALEMATE
The previous three chapters examined how individual members and coalitions
within Congress were able to pass positive legislation on the H-1B visa. As we have seen,
however, after 2004, fourteen pieces of legislation were introduced in either chamber and
each of these failed. Additionally, for the first time since the creation of the H-1B
program individual legislators failed to use Sinclairian tactics and not a single piece of
legislation was attempted as an amendment to a larger piece of non-immigration related
legislation59. This chapter will attempt to explain why. My hypothesis is that a variety of
changes in macro-level variables resulted in a Congress risk averse to any immigration
related legislation.
After the last piece of positive legislation passed in 2004, there was a two year
moratorium on H-1B legislation introduced in either chamber. In 2006, legislation picked
back up again and 14 pieces of legislation were introduced as stand-alone bills between
2006 and 2008. Interestingly, during this period, not a single bill passed and not a single
legislator attempted to attach any of these provisions onto a larger must pass omnibus or
appropriations bill as an amendment during floor debate on those bills. Of these bills, all
would have either directly increased the annual cap or created a new cap (thus increasing
the total cap) for the highly skilled foreign nationals. After 2008, another moratorium on
H-1B legislation begins and until May 2012, not a single piece of positive H-1B related
legislation has been introduced in either chamber.
59

Congress through the Library of Congress (THOMAS) only keeps data on floor amendments during floor
debate. As such, it is not possible to ascertain whether riders were attempted during committee debate.
Regardless, assuming for the sake of argument that riders were attempted at the committee level, the fact
that they are no longer able to come out of committee debate onto the floor is still telling of a shift in
support for this type of legislation.
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As Table 6.1 indicated, 13 pieces of legislation were introduced during the period
of time when some legislation was passed through 2004. This legislation included either
trivial changes to the program through stand-alone legislation or through the use of riders.
In 2004, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) introduced comprehensive
immigration reform (H.R.3918) for the first time since 1986 60. After 2004 and the
introduction of comprehensive immigration reform in the House, a two year moratorium
existed when neither H-1B related legislation nor comprehensive immigration reform was
introduced, and consequently none was passed. In early 2006, however, Representative
Thomas Allen (D-ME) introduced for the first time in two years a measure to increase the
current H-1B cap (See Table 8.1). One week later, Senator Arlen Spector (D-PA)
introduced comprehensive reform in the Senate with a provision to also increase the H1B cap. For the first time in nearly twenty years comprehensive immigration reform
passed in the Senate with a vote of 62-36.
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In 1994, Senator Alan Simpson introduced S.1884 titled Comprehensive Immigration and Asylum
Reform Act of 1994. While given the comprehensive reform title, the text of the act was not truly a
comprehensive reform measure. Rather it focused solely on border control and asylum reform and had no
provisions for dealing with undocumented immigrants.
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Table 8.1 Timeline of Unsuccessful H-1B Legislation (Post-CIR)
Year
2006
2006

Legislation
H.R.5058
S.2611

Key Provisions
Increase cap
Increase cap (CIR)

2006

S.2691/H.R.5744

Increase cap/exemption

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008

S.1083/H.R.1930
S.1092
S.1348
S.1351
S.1397
H.R.1645
H.R.1758
H.R.5630
H.R.5642
H.R.7184
S.2839

Increase cap/exemption
Increase cap/exemption
Increase cap/exemption/CIR
Increase cap
Increase cap/exemption
Increase cap/exemption
New cap for high skilled
Increase cap/exemption
Increase cap
Cap exemption
Increase cap/fee

Bill Sponsor
Thomas Allen (D-ME)
Arlen Specter (D-PA)
John Cornyn (R-TX) / John
Shadegg (R-AZ)
John Cornyn (R-TX) / John
Shadegg (R-AZ)
Chuck Hagel (R-NE)
Harry Reid (D-NV)
Judd Gregg (R-NH)
Joe Lieberman (D-CT)
Luis Gutierrez (D-IL)
David Wu (D-OR)
Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ)
Lamar Smith (R-TX)
Jeff Flake (R-AZ)
Ted Kennedy (D-MA)

E, T, + Sc: Environment, Technology, and Standards Subcommittee
ERC, P, + R Sc: Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response Subcommittee
I, C, R, B, IL Sc: Immigration, Citizenship, Refugee, Border Security, and International
Law Subcommittee
Source: THOMAS (Library of Congress)

Yet this success was short lived. Comprehensive reform failed both in 2006 and
2007, and as a consequence, H-1B reform was swept up with that failure. What explained
this shift in support? Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue that Congress views legislative
changes within the context of the status quo. The legislative median is to the right in a
Republican controlled Congress and to the left in a Democratic controlled Congress. So
when Republicans control Congress we expect polices that sit to the left of the median to
be blocked or at the very least fail.
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Legislation that failed between 2006 and 2008 was introduced in unified Congress
controlled by Republicans in 2006 (with a Republican President) and controlled by
Democrats in 2007 and 2008 (see Table 5.1), a scenario very similar to the period
between 1997 and 2000 and 2004 when the Republicans controlled both chambers and
legislation was still able to pass. Additionally, in each of these years the presidency was
held by a Republican who actively was in support of comprehensive immigration reform.
In 2006, President Bush not only addressed comprehensive immigration reform but urged
Congress to come up with a bipartisan solution in 25 various national addresses and 34
times in 200761. In one such address to the nation in May 2006, he indicated that he
supported comprehensive reform that accomplished five objectives: border security,
creating a temporary worker program, holding employers accountable for the workers
they hire, dealing with illegal immigrants in a manner other than amnesty, and honoring
the American melting pot through assimilating immigrants into American culture. In
urging Congress, Bush argued that “An immigration reform bill needs to be
comprehensive, because all elements of this problem must be addressed together, or none
of them will be solved at all”.
In 2006 the median is to the right and from 2007 to 2008 to the left. In 2006, only
one piece of legislation actually passed in the Senate and none passed in the House.
Using Figures 8.1 and 8.2 to illustrate what occurred, the expectation here (per Cox and
McCubbins) is that Republicans in 2006 would have blocked legislation that was too far
left of the median (m), or essentially any legislation that included comprehensive reform
and/or amnesty (Figure 8.1), and Democrats would have blocked legislation that was too
far right of the median in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 8.2).
61

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/immigration/archive.html
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Figure 8.1 2006 Expected Spatial Model under Republican Control
Fail
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Figure 8.2 2007 and 2008 Expected Spatial Model under Democratic Control
Fail
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In practice, this did not happen. The legislation that was introduced (with the
exception of the two pieces of comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007)
should have appealed to a bipartisan audience, and in 1990, would have. Since members
were not able to pass legislation on their own and had to resort to Sinclairian tactics, the
expectation is that this should have continued throughout the 2000s. However, here we
have a situation where the legislation fell in line with the median legislative voter (and
even the median filibuster voter), but some outside influence kept him from voting yay. I
argue that the broader macro political and economic climate shifted politics from
Sinclarian tactics and caused this stalemate. The following section will outline and
analyze each of these macro factors in turn in order to explain why the stalemate
occurred.
The Latino Vote
Between 1980 and 2000, the number of Latinos registering and voting in the
United States more than doubled. Geographically, Latinos have been concentrated in the
states with more than half of the required electoral votes needed to win the presidential
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election, particularly California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois. Additionally, the
Latino vote in the 2000 election has been shown to have been particularly important in
Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, and Oregon, swing states where elections were decided
by less than six percentage points.
According to a 2007 Pew Hispanic Center Report62, a majority or 57 percent of
Latino registered voters affiliate themselves with the Democratic Party, 23 percent with
the Republican Party, leaving 34 percent independents. This percentage is up from 33
percent in 1999. In a 2010 Pew study63, voter preference among Latinos for Congress is
heavily slanted in favor of the Democratic Party. In this study, 65 percent or two-thirds of
all Latino registered voters indicated they planned to support a Democratic candidate
compared to 22 percent for Republican candidates in their local districts. Compared to all
registered voters, 47 percent indicated a preference for a Democratic candidate and 44
percent for a Republican candidate. Additionally, the survey also revealed that party
identification remains high among the Democratic Party for Latinos. Nearly two-thirds,
or 62 percent of Latino registered voters indicated they identify with or lean towards the
Democratic Party while only a quarter or 25 percent indicated the same for the
Republican Party.
Additionally, over time, support for the Democratic Party has increased by
Latinos, and conversely support has decreased for the Republican Party. As Table 8.2
indicates, over time, a greater percentage of Latinos have consistently identified
themselves with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. This gap narrowed in
2006 and then widened again in 2007.
62

https://latinamericanstudies.org/~latinam2/latinos/latino-vote-08.pdf
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/10/05/latinos-and-the-2010-elections-strong-support-for-democratsweak-voter-motivation/
63
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Table 8.2 Partisanship (%) of Latino
Registered Voters
Year
1999
2002
2004
2006
2007

Republican
25
25
28
28
23

Democrat
58
56
55
49
57

Source: Taylor, Paul and Richard Fry. 2007.
"Hispanics and the 2008 Election: A Swing
Vote? Pew Hispanic Center.

This new factor can explain the recent mobilization on the part of the Republican
Party in the mid 2000s to pass comprehensive immigration reform and why Bush was
largely in support of such a measure, particularly surrounding the 2004 reelection.
Essentially, whoever could claim credit for comprehensive immigration reform would get
the big prize of the Latino vote in the next election.
Reelection Concerns
As the Democrats have already been largely successful in obtaining the Latino
voting base, they have little incentive to bargain. Additionally, a younger voting base is
emerging that is less hostile to immigrants than previous generations that also support the
Democratic Party. Beginning with Kevin Phillips’ (1969) The Emerging Republican
Majority, many have predicted the end or fall of one party’s hegemony and the rise of
another’s. In reality, from 1932 to 1968, New Deal Democrats held a majority, followed
by a period of transition with Republicans holding a majority from 1980 to 1992. Most
recently, Judis and Teixeira (2002) argued that changes in work (including a new
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immigrant workforce), values, and geography in the 2000s would lead to an “emerging
Democratic majority”.
Similarly, Matthew Dowd, former chief campaign strategist to President Bush,
feared that a generational divide would soon put an end to the Republican majority.
Looking at exit polls from the 2004 election, he noticed that younger voters favor
Democrats in strong numbers because they favor gay marriage and school funding, are
more positive towards immigration, and less hostile to Social Security cuts and military
cuts than the Republican Party platform projects. Writing to other top Bush aides just
after Bush was reelected in 2004, he argued that a new Republican majority was not
emerging, but rather that younger voters “don’t think the Republican Party thinks like
them”64.
Ultimately, comprehensive immigration reform failed in 2006 65, and in each
subsequent year in which it was introduced. There are a variety of reasons that can
explain its failure. First and foremost, as members have become increasingly more
partisan, the parties have also over time become more and more ideologically
homogonous (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Fiorina and Levndusky 2008). As a
result, concerns for reelection beginning in 2004 and continuing in 2008 and 2010 after
the economic recession and the rise of the base may be one reason. Additionally, the
economic downturn can explain the post 2008 moratorium when not a single piece of
positive H-1B related legislation has been introduced as members became risk averse to
having their name attached to any legislation that might in any way be perceived as
taking jobs away from Americans.
64

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/the-generation-gap-isback.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss
65
The House was unable to pass a similar reform package.
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Various studies have shown that politicians have increasingly become more
concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974; Ornstein and Mann 2000). This obsession with
reelection has been manifested in what Sidney Blumenthal (1982) termed the “permanent
campaign” cited by Heclo (2000) here he suggests is “a nonstop process seeking to
manipulate sources of public approval to engage in the act of governing itself” where
campaigning and governing occurs simultaneously in a continuous loop. According to
Heclo (2000), six trends have caused this loop: the changing role of political parties
which are weaker in organization and mobilization but stronger in ideology and social
distinctiveness, the expansion of interest group politics, new communications technology,
political technologies, the need for political money, and the higher stakes in activist
government.
Additionally, as reelection has increasingly become more important, Republicans
have become much more fearful of their own base. Since 2008, moderate Republican
incumbents have been repeatedly replaced by more conservative Tea Party backed
candidates. According to Mann and Ornstein (2012), the parties (particularly the
Republicans) have become more ideological in a system that requires supermajority
support in order to overcome filibuster in the Senate. As a result, moderates have become
more fearful of their base as conservative Tea Party candidates have gained speed and
attention from the base.
The importance of reelection and the permanent campaign members are engaged
in also brings into play Sulkin’s (2005) uptake theory where she argues that legislators
adjust their legislative agenda based on criticisms on their own legislative history from
their prior election challenger. Essentially, she argues that winning legislators regularly
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take up their previous challenger’s priority issues from previous campaigns and act on
them during their new term. So if an incumbent is criticized by his opponent for his
stance on immigration in a previous term, he will adjust his voting record in the future in
order to keep that critique at bay during the next election.
Media and Public Opinion
Recent reelection concerns based on the 2008 recession are manifested in the
media and in public opinion. The Vanderbilt Television News Archive is the most
complete archive of national television news from 1968 to the present. The Archive
provides data on the number of times any given phrase was mentioned in a national news
broadcast. It includes data from ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, PBS, FOX, MSNBC, CSPAN,
CNBC, UNIV, and BLOOM. Between 2004 (the first introduction of comprehensive
reform) and May 2012, the Vanderbilt Archives found 1,425 items where the title or
abstract contained the word immigration, 379 mentions of immigration reform, and 13
mentions of skilled worker immigration. Table 8.3 breaks down the number of times
immigration was mentioned in a national news broadcast in the United States since the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1990.
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Table 8.3 Media Mention of Immigration and H-1B Post CIR

Year Immigration
1990
33
1991
26
1992
12
1993
69
1994
118
1995
49
1996
94
1997
52
1998
26
1999
34
2000
116
2001
66
2002
51
2003
25
2004
99
2005
88
2006
465
2007
339
2008
65
2009
29
2010
245
2011
75

Immigration
Reform
2
0
1
13
8
4
18
4
2
1
0
11
4
1
39
23
130
112
11
10
23
10

Skilled Worker
Immigration
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
1
0
0
0
0
0

Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive

Looking at Table 8.3, we can see that the mention of immigration in the media
has several punctuations throughout the 1990s and then increases steadily throughout the
early 2000s. The 1990s punctuations can be explained by the World Trade Center
bombing hearings in 1993, the introduction and passage of California Proposition 187, an
initiative designed to keep undocumented immigrants from using state resources in 1994,
and the passage of IIRAIRA in 1996.
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In 2000 the Elian Gonzalez case hit the media and all but a handful of these media
stories revolved around young Elian directly or the issue of human trafficking. In 2003
we hit a low point, but picked back up in 2004 with the introduction of comprehensive
immigration reform and then 2006 occurred. With the introduction of comprehensive
reform again in the Senate, the media rewarded us with 465 various mentions of
immigration throughout the 2006 year and another 339 in 2007 when reform was
reintroduced in both the House and Senate. Once talk of reform (and particularly amnesty
died down), and the economic recession hit in 2008, we see a decrease in media speak on
immigration for the next two years. We have another increase in 2010 due largely to the
Arizona immigration bill SB 1070. Looking specifically at the number of times
“immigration reform” has been mentioned in national media, we see a similar trend as
well with significant punctuated increases in 2006 and 2007.
The effect the failure of comprehensive immigration reform had on H-1B
legislation is staggering. After its introduction, an additional 12 pieces of legislation were
introduced. Combined with the failure of comprehensive reform, which included an H-1B
provision and the legislation introduced the week before, there was a total of 14 pieces of
legislation that all failed as they were swept up by the failure of comprehensive
immigration reform.
The effect of public opinion follows similar trends. Gallup has polled Americans
on issues dealing with immigration for a number of years. As part of their poll, Gallup
asks “in your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or
decreased?”. Their data since 2004 (see Table 8.4) provides a telling story.
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Table 8.4 Gallup Poll Results (%): "In your view, should immigration
be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?"
Year
2011 Jun 9-12
2010 Jul 8-11
2009 Jul 10-12
2008 Jun 5-Jul 6
2007 Jun 4-24
2006 Jun 8-25
2006 Apr 7-9
2005 Jun 6-25
2004 Jun 9-30
2003 Jun 12-18
2002 Sep 2-4
2002 Jun 3-9
2001 Oct 19-21
2001 Jun 11-17
2001 Mar 26-28
2000 Sep 11-13
1995 Jul 7-9
1995 Jun 5-6
1993 Jul 9-11
1986 Jun 19-23
1977 Mar 25-28
1965 Jun 24-29

Status Quo
35
34
32
39
35
42
35
34
33
37
26
36
30
42
41
41
27
24
27
35
37
39

Increased
18
17
14
18
16
17
15
16
14
13
17
12
8
14
10
13
7
7
6
7
7
7

Decreased
43
45
50
39
45
39
47
46
49
47
54
49
58
41
43
38
62
65
65
49
42
33

No Opinion
4
4
5
3
4
2
4
4
4
3
3
3
4
3
6
8
4
4
2
9
14
20

Source: Gallup

Table 8.4 indicates that public opinion has remained relatively steady on
immigration levels since the first introduction of comprehensive reform in 2004. While
we have seen a shift in Americans being very anti-immigrant (over 60 percent) in the mid
1990s, the trend throughout the 2000s on average, however, indicates that Americans still
largely favor decreasing immigration levels as opposed to increasing them. Since 2000,
for example, 14.5 percent of those polled favored increasing immigration levels,
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compared to 45.8 percent in favor of decreasing them. The percentage of those favoring
the status quo has remained steady over the course of the past 60 years which is not
surprising on the one hand as legal immigration levels have not increased much over that
period of time, but surprising on the other as illegal immigration levels have.
If we look specifically at the impact that comprehensive immigration reform had
on public opinion, some interesting trends emerge. Table 8.5 provides data from a Gallup
survey conducted in 2007 following the introduction of reform in 2006 and the
subsequent debate, both in Congress and in the media. The results indicate that only a
narrow majority of those polled were actively following the news on immigration reform
and a majority of people were not fully informed on the issue. Of those that were actively
following the issue, however, poll results indicate that the greater majority were strongly
opposed to the proposed plan.

Table 8.5 2007 Gallup Public Opinion (%) on CIR

Party
Republicans
Independents
Democrats

Following news about proposed
bill very or somewhat closely
63
62
57

Favor
15
7
11

Oppose
30
36
25

Don't know
enough to
say
58
56
64

Source: Gallup

Political sophistication refers to the quantity and organization of one’s political
cognitions (Luskin 1987). Within the political sophistication literature (Zaller 1992;
Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Luskin 1987) is the claim that information flows from elites,
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the media, and others to the mass public. Within the mass public, there are various
considerations in determining whether one will actually consider the information,
including one’s political sophistication and predispositions on a continuum with the
highly aware most likely to receive the greatest amount of political messages and the
least aware less likely to receive any message.
Additionally, those who are predisposed to favor a message are more likely to
accept new messages that are consistent with their beliefs and vice versa. The expectation
is that those who are politically sophisticated and aware on a given issue are more likely
to have predispositions on that issue. Additionally, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
(2002) found that when Congress debates and/or makes policy, the large majority of the
voting public is unaware and unresponsive to it. There is, however, an attentive minority
that makes demands on Congress and responds either favorably or unfavorably with their
votes. As a result, public opinion typically refers to minority opinion. Therefore it is not
surprising that while only a narrow majority of those polled were actively following the
news on immigration reform, that the greater majority of them were strongly opposed to
the proposed plan.
Additionally, trends concerning the media and changes in public opinion appear
to be correlated. Looking at Tables 8.4 and 8.5, in the years when the media was most
active in reporting on immigration and immigration reform, more people indicated that
they preferred decreasing immigration levels over either the status quo or increasing
immigration levels. It would be interesting to see if this was the case, however as I do not
have individual roll call votes, this is not possible to ascertain.
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While there does appear to be some correlation between media mentions of
immigration and public opinion, there does not seem to be a correlation with
unemployment levels at least on a national scale. I would expect, however, that on a local
level, the likelihood of correlation is greater with states with greater immigrant
populations, particularly border states, showing a correlation among media mentions,
public opinion, and local unemployment levels.
Additionally, based on the punctuation and number of times immigration is
mentioned in the media from 2005 through 2007, it is evident that members responded in
a risk adverse manner. As discussed previously, the H-1B has been swept up in the tide of
the larger and easier issue of immigration and border security. Therefore, when the media
reacts to the easy issue of immigration and public opinion follows in negative fashion,
members can be expected to be risk averse to the harder issue of H-1B legislation even
when it is relatively unrelated to the issues that the general public opposes.
As I mentioned in chapter three, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argued that
immigration is not salient unless the economy is so bad that immigrants are blamed, a
situation that began to occur in the late 2000s. In addition, due to the easy versus hard
issue distinction, the H-1B legislation gets swept up into the easy issue of immigration
and suffers.
As a result, when Congress was faced with the decisions of either granting legal
status to the estimated millions of illegal immigrants or increasing skilled immigrant
numbers throughout the 2000s, they were met with the majority of the American public
(nearly half) who favored decreasing immigrant numbers generally and less than 15
percent who favored increasing them, as well as a majority who were against

128

comprehensive immigration reform. Therefore, I argue that Congress’s reluctance to pass
comprehensive immigration reform amid low public support created a spillover of
negative public support on skilled immigration, particularly within the Republican Party
where increasing polarization resulted in far more conservative members.
Additionally, while members previously followed a variety of cartel party and
unorthodox models to pass legislation, we begin to see a shift away from this trend in the
mid-2000s following the introduction of comprehensive immigration reform in 2004 and
again in 2006. Instead what we have now is stalemate, or the bargaining failure argument
made by both Gilmour (1995) and Binder (2003). Therefore, I argue that members of the
Democratic Party were also engaged in a new political strategy to continue to reap the
benefits of the Latino vote.
Bargaining Failure
Essentially, the bargaining failure argument is a rational choice game theory
model that claims that failure occurs when a zone of agreement exists between two
parties but one side deliberately chooses to avoid that zone. The defecting side avoids
compromise in an attempt to seek some other type of political gain that they believe will
ultimately be preferable in the long run. Gilmour (1995) calls this the “accepting half a
loaf” argument where the defector feels that accepting half of a loaf today may keep them
from obtaining the whole loaf (which is their ultimate preference) at a later date.
Remember that per Krehbiel (1996), in order for policy change to occur, both
moderate policy proposals and moderate members are needed. As a result, policy change
is incremental and typically passed only through the use of supermajorities. Therefore, in
order for legislation to pass, the majority party would simply need to shift the legislation

129

to the position of the median legislator. In 2006, for example, when Republicans
controlled both chambers, but failed to meet the threshold for cloture with only 55
Republicans, we expect the median legislator to be center right, and in 2007 and 2008
when Democrats controlled both chambers but the Senate with only 51 and 55 Democrats
respectively, we expect the median legislator to be center left. Policies between the
filibuster pivot and median voter should have passed. This however did not happen. In
each instance, the parties remained firm in their positions and no shifting of policy
occurred.
Let us examine why. Polarization has been found to result in gridlock in many
instances. In our case, however, even in the face of polarization we clearly have a zone of
agreement. Both Republicans and Democrats have an incentive to pass this kind of
legislation and they been able to compromise on passing this type of legislation in the
past. Therefore, we need to understand what changed.
Following Gilmour’s (1995) logic, we can expect that Democrats have been
giving up their half of the loaf in an attempt to obtain comprehensive immigration
reform. As Gilmour (1995) showed, supporters of comprehensive reform often oppose
smaller piecemeal measures because it makes it harder for them to pass comprehensive
legislation. So essentially, Democrats might give up their half of the loaf in the short run
and work instead towards gaining bipartisan support or obtaining unified government so
they can pass comprehensive immigration reform that will include some measure of H1B reform as well.
In reality, the Democrats appear to be content to sacrifice reform on the H-1B in
the short run and to simply wait for comprehensive reform. In no instance have they
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attempted to couple the H-1B legislation with even Dream Act legislation. They want it
all or nothing at all. On the other hand, Republicans are not willing to budge on other
immigration issues. The alternatives provided by the Democrats have been too far left of
their status quo position for them to compromise. Therefore, they prefer the status quo of
65,000 visas for their business constituencies over passage of comprehensive reform (at
least in the forms presented to them). Whether there will be long term ramifications for
the Republican Party and individual members remains to be seen. Regardless, neither
party is currently willing to get legislation on the H-1B passed through use of riders and
the bargaining failure argument is the best explanation of why this is the case.
The dilemma members face here is whether they are shorting their constituents in
the process. On the one hand, we have Democratic elected officials that are willing to
hold off on passing piecemeal legislation in the hopes of pressuring Republican members
to concede or wait until they have a majority to pass comprehensive reform. On the other
hand, we have a Republican membership that over time has become much more
conservative, and consequently more staunchly opposed to any amnesty type measures
that the Democrats would like to see in a comprehensive reform package.
Politically, polarization has also increased since the demise of comprehensive
immigration reform. Republicans have continued to move more to the right and as a
result, Democrats know that if they give up on H-1B legislation, they will lose any
leverage they have on getting a comprehensive reform package. As the Latino vote has
become increasingly more important and as parties have become more internally
consistent ideologically, Democrats now find themselves in a unique win-win position
politically. As they have polarized on the left, they rely on big business to a lesser extent

131

when it comes to reelection than Republicans. Therefore, they do not lose much sleep
when H-1B legislation fails. Additionally, many have found that polarization contributes
to gridlock by incentivizing “blame game” politics (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006:
194; Gilmour 1995; Groseclose and McCarty 2000). Therefore when comprehensive
immigration reform fails, Democrats can blame the Republicans for failing to
compromise, gaining votes from the Latino camp. This is evident in our case where
Democrats have been able to use immigration as a wedge issue to split the Republican
Party into conservative ideologues and those who are beholden to big business.
Conclusion and Comments on the Future of the H-1B Program
In this chapter, I used the bargaining failure game theory model to explain why
Congress was unable to pass any legislation after comprehensive immigration reform was
introduced and failed, as well as why the introduction of H-1B legislation stopped after
2008. Essentially, a number of macro-level factors, including the Latino vote, the
economy, public opinion, and reelection concerns left members risk averse to this type of
legislation.
Yet even in the midst of an economic recession, there is still a high demand for
foreign skilled workers. As we saw in chapter two, the 65,000 cap on H-1B numbers fails
to meet the demand each year. Even in the economic recession years of 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012, the cap was met each year prior to the end of the fiscal year (see
Table 2.6). Most recently, the 2013 fiscal cap was reached on June 11, 2012. Thus, in the
course of just ten weeks, all H-1B numbers were filled and employers will now have to
wait another 18 months until October 1, 2013 before they can hire another foreign skilled
worker in the 2014 fiscal year.
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The Silicon Valley Leadership Group, a business advocate coalition for Silicon
Valley businesses, has been active in recent years in organizing lobbying trips and
sending dozens of Bay Area executives to the Hill to lobby expanding both H-1B cap
numbers and green card availability for skilled workers. Additionally, individual CEOs,
Bill Gates for example, have been active in lobbying and testifying before Congress
throughout the 2000s. Clearly, the business sector is not only in need of additional
numbers but has been active in asking members for them as well.
There have been some rumblings of potential movement in the 112 th Congress to
increase H-1B numbers again and/or make other changes to the immigration system
generally to shuffle the current immigrant visa category to increase the green card visa
numbers available in the employment sector and specifically the number of foreign
skilled workers by decreasing (or completely eliminating) the diversity and family
categories. As of May 2012, no actual legislation has been introduced in either chamber
to change the H-1B program. However, Senate members Jerry Moran (R-KS) and Mark
Warner (D-VA) have introduced legislation that would create a new visa category for
skilled workers graduating with an advanced degree in a STEM field (science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics) from a U.S. institution of higher education.
Other legislation proposed in both chambers respectively by Senator John Cornyn (RTX) and Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), would eliminate the existing diversity
lottery program and allocate these green cards to advanced STEM graduates from a U.S.
institution of higher education.
I anticipate that either there will need to be significant changes in the macro
environment, specifically with regard to the economy, or one party will need to create
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unification within both chambers and the presidency for any legislation to actually pass.
This is not likely as the chances of getting to 60 members without moderates in the
Senate (thanks to polarization) are slim. The Republicans already have an incentive to
pass skilled worker legislation and the Democrats will likely have the numbers they need
to pass comprehensive legislation with some changes to the skilled worker program as
well.
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CHAPTER 9
IS THE U.S. EXPERIENCE UNIQUE?:
COMPARING THE U.S. TO CANADA66 AND AUSTRALIA
Introduction
While debate looms about what the future of our immigration policy should be,
the U.S. remains the world’s largest receiver of immigrants. According to a Brookings
Institution study, there are currently 42 million immigrants in the United States, which
translates into one in seven residents and one in six workers67. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that in the international
market, immigration to the U.S. accounts for 27 percent of the world’s permanent
immigration flows and 23 percent of temporary labor immigration 68.
Turning to the issue of skilled workers, a study by the Georgetown Center on
Education and Workforce69 estimates that by 2018, the U.S. will have 2.8 million STEM
jobs available. They further estimate that of these, 779,000 will require some level of
graduate training and based on current education trends, only 555,200 U.S. workers will
have the qualifications to fill these jobs. As a result, the immigration of skilled workers
remains relevant and necessary to the U.S. economy.
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The Canadian province of Quebec has separate legislation and policies in place with regard to the
immigration of skilled workers. This paper will examine only Canadian policy and disregard the nuances of
Quebec’s policies.
67
Audrey Singer, Immigrant Workers in the U.S. Labor Force, Brookings Institution, March 2012.
Available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/Immigrant_Workers_Brookings.pdf
68
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) International Migration Outlook
2011. Available at http://www.wiso.unihamburg.de/fileadmin/vwl/aussenhandel/internationalewirtschaftsbeziehungen/Hauptstudium/Migration/WiSe2011_12/oecd_2011.pdf
69
Carnevale, Anthony P., Nicole Smith, and Jeff Strohl. 2010. “Help Wanted: Projections of Jobs and their
Education Requirements Through 2018.” The Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce. Available at http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/FullReport.pdf
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The U.S. invites and grants visas to thousands of students to obtain post
secondary education yet we have no program in place to allow, much less facilitate, them
to stay and work after their education is complete. Table 9.1 provides a list of how many
F-1 student visas and how many H 70 visas have been issued each year since 1992 by the
U.S. Department of State71.

Table 9.1 Student and Worker Visas Issued Per Fiscal Year

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Student Visa (F)
239,751
231,903
235,218
235,218
235,218
288,582
273,410
285,435
308,944
319,517
256,534
235,580
237,807
255,993
294,637
320,548
364,423
353,798
411,317

Worker Visa (H)
97,489
86,357
98,008
114,370
121,340
161,278
190,671
246,814
289,562
348,995
293,805
286,930
331,628
317,493
372,254
424,371
363,511
278,168
289,192

Source: U.S. Department of State
70

The Department of State does not break down the H visa category into the various types of H visas that
exist. Therefore, this statistic includes H-2A and H-2B visas as well. Regardless, the point remains the
same. Exponentially more student visas are issued each year than temporary worker visas.
71
While the visa category approval comes from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, the actual
visa comes from the State Department.

136

In most years (with the exception of 2001 to 2007, but keep in mind that cap
numbers were increased through 2004), the number of student visas far outweighed the
number of H visas issued. In 2010, the U.S. issued nearly a third more student visas than
H visas. There is an argument here (that has also been made in the mass media by both
politicians and media pundits) that the policy of educating people from around the world
and then letting them return home is counterproductive.
The policies in Canada and Australia are, as will be shown in this chapter, more
conducive to attracting and keeping the highly skilled. What accounts for these
differences among these three countries, considering the fact that all three share similar
colonial histories, similar needs to populate their countries with immigrants, and similar
ethnic restrictive policies throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s?
Sharing similar colonial backgrounds and similar cultures, there is no shortage of
studies comparing and contrasting the various political and social phenomena between
and among the United States, Canada, and Australia. These historical and cultural
similarities combined with relatively similar economic conditions (with the United States
obviously having a larger labor base and economy due to a larger domestic population)
could result in an expectation that such similar states would have similar policies when it
comes to immigration policy. Specifically with regard to foreign skilled labor policy, one
could expect to find similar policies or at least relatively unrestrictive policies across
these three states. Additionally, the sheer size of the United States labor force and the
great labor shortages in many highly skilled fields should expect one to predict that the
United States would have a less restrictive skilled immigrant worker immigration policy
than their counterparts.
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In reality, Canada, Australia and the United States did have a shared skilled
worker immigration policy until the mid-twentieth century. This policy was based on a
preference for immigrants from states with “similar values and norms” (Somerville and
Walsworth 2009: 149). As a result, most immigrants to the United States and Canada
were from western and northern Europe.
Additionally, Australia’s prewar immigration policy has been termed the “White
Australia” policy72. This policy existed from the 1850s until 1949, and essentially
restricted Chinese and Pacific Islander immigration to the island and preferred the
immigration of white immigrants. Beginning in 1949, many non-white refugees were
permitted to enter Australia and the Immigration Minister allowed these refugees to be
admitted as immigrants, forever changing immigration policy. In 1957, non-Europeans
with 15 years of Australian residence were permitted to become Australian citizens and
in 1958, permanent residence status was opened up to non-Europeans. In 1966, the
“White Australia” policy was officially abolished and non-European immigration began
to increase. A series of laws were passed throughout the 1960s and 1970s in an attempt to
reverse the “White Australia” policy. Australia’s current Migration Program allows for
immigration regardless of ethnicity, culture, religion, or language.
Canada in 1967, Australia in 1966, and the United States in 1965 dramatically
changed their immigration policies as a result of various economic, social, and
humanitarian goals. Since then, the policies of these countries have varied, especially
with regard to their policies on skilled worker immigration. The United States has a much
stricter policy of admission for foreign skilled workers than its Canadian and Australian
counterparts. Additionally, the U.S. still largely favors family based immigration efforts
72

http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm
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over employment based immigration as evidenced by the numbers allocated to each (see
chapter two), a dramatic difference among these three countries.
Comparing the Legislative Political Systems of Canada, Australia, and the U.S.
As majority white settler colonies of the former British Empire, the United
States, Canada, and Australia all evolved into industrial, capitalist, self-governing federal
states. Politically, Canada and Australia are both parliamentary plurality legislatures with
merged executive and legislative branches on both federal and provincial levels. In
Lijphart’s (1999) study of political institutions in 36 various democracies, both rank
closely together. Australia’s political system is made up of one central federal level, six
states, and two territories, and Canada has one central federal level, ten provinces, and
three territories.
The Australian constitution borrowed heavily from the U.S. constitution. Both
have a bicameral legislature, with specific legislative powers to the federal government
and a preemption clause. Canada’s constitution also outlines specific powers for the
federal government, with immigration being a concurrent power for the federal and
provincial governments. The legislature in Canada is unicameral, however, at the
provisional and territorial levels. The federal Senate is executive appointed and regionally
based. Partisan makeup in Canada is made up of a multiparty system with three to five
significant parties varying across jurisdictions. Australia has two major parties and
various minor ones. Institutionally, Australia is the most formal and Canada traditionally
has had much more informal procedures (Watts 2003).
Levels of party polarization have been low in both Canada and Australia over the
same time period (Dalton 2008). And while party identification and loyalty has been an
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important aspect of American politics, the same cannot be said for politics outside the
U.S. (Harrop and Miller 1987). In Australia, the two major parties are the Labor Party
(the left party) and the right Liberal/National Party. In Canada, the major parties include
the moderate right Progressive Conservative Party, the centrist Liberal Party, and the
moderately socialist New Democratic Party, the Green Party, and the Bloc Quebecois.
In both Canada and Australia, party discipline and disciplined voting has been
extremely high in both legislatures (Depauw and Martin 2009). As we will see, this has
allowed some significant positive and liberal changes to their skilled worker immigration
programs. Yet in the U.S., while party discipline is high particularly in the era of
polarization, institutional constraints have made legislation increasingly more difficult to
pass.
With regard to immigration policy, both Canada and Australia’s immigration
policy is determined by their respective Parliaments, or legislative branches much like in
the United States. Over time, the legislature in Canada has enjoyed tripartisan support
and Australia’s legislature has enjoyed bipartisan support on immigration measures
(Hawkins 1991). In both Canada and Australia (and the U.S. to some degree), major
institutional changes designed to increase migration numbers occurred after World War II
(Walsh 2008). The Australian government founded the Department of Immigration in
1945, and in 1947 the Canadian Prime Minister outlined a new major immigration
program. As a result, immigration increased over ten times in both countries. In both
instances, increased immigration was designed to bolster economic growth. Much like in
the United States, restrictive ethnic immigration policies soon gave way to
nondiscriminatory reforms in 1962 in Canada and 1973 in Australia.
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Canada’s Parliament has a Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower, and
Immigration that exclusively examines relevant annual estimates of immigration, reports,
and proposed policy changes (Hawkins 1991). Australia does not have its own standing
committee on immigration. In the U.S. where the committee structure is more structured,
immigration is typically handled by the House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and
Enforcement and in the Senate in the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
Border Security (both under their respective Committees on the Judiciary) although
legislation could be passed to a different committee at the Speaker or Majority Leader’s
discretion.
A Comparison of United States, Canadian, and Australian Skilled Worker Policy
Canadian Policy
In Canada, both the federal and provincial governments have shared jurisdiction
over immigration and immigration policy pursuant to Section 95 of the Constitution Act,
1867. The Immigration Act of 1967 created the point system currently in place for
adjudicating and granting status as a skilled economic immigrant. Consequently, Canada
was the first country in the world to implement a point based immigrant system, and was
followed shortly after by Australia. Other European states have recently also followed in
Canada’s footsteps. In June 2002, Canada’s Immigration Act of 1967 was updated with
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Since 2002 and pursuant to the Department
of Citizenship and Immigration Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (with the approval of the Governor in Council)
has signed various agreements with the provinces and territories throughout Canada in
order to facilitate the implementation of immigration policy. In 2008, the Citizenship and
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Immigration Canada (CIC) was created to adjudicate applications for noncitizen
admission into Canada.
Due to the point system, Canadian immigration policy differs drastically from
policy in the United States. The Canadian immigration system is divided into temporary
travel for work or study, permanent immigration, and humanitarian asylum. Temporary
travel for work visas can include both skilled and unskilled workers. Permanent
immigration is available for skilled workers/professionals, investors/entrepreneurs/selfemployed, those who have recent work experience in Canada, and those who receive
nominations from one of Canada’s provinces or territories.
As such, skilled workers can obtain authorization to live and work in Canada
either through temporary travel for work visas or by applying as a federal skilled worker.
Applications for temporary travel for work typically require a labor market opinion by
the Human Resources and Social Development Canada 73 that the employer is authorized
to hire a foreign worker for the position. Requirements include evidence of English
language proficiency, and an offer of employment or one year of full time experience
within the past ten years in one of the 29 major high demand occupations as determined
by the Government of Canada. Because these visas area available for both skilled and
nonskilled workers, they will not be analyzed here.
Applications for permanent immigration as a skilled worker/professional are
adjudicated based on a point system. The grid is comprised of various factors within the
six selection factors. Points are awarded for education (up to 25 points), language
73

Some exceptions to this requirement exist: jobs covered under international treaties, workers in specific
occupations as listed in Canadian-Provincial/Territorial Immigration Agreements, entrepreneurs and intracompany transferees, participants in exchange programs, co-op students, spouses/common-law
partners/children of students and/or skilled workers, academics, students, religious workers, and/or
refugees.
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(English and/or French) abilities (up to 24 points), work experience (up to 21 points), age
(up to 10 points), whether the employment has already been secured and arranged (up to
10 points), adaptability (up to 10 points), and financial stability. Points are not necessary
in all areas in order to achieve the minimum score for approval. Citizenship and
Immigration Canada is responsible for setting the “pass” score and adjudicating the
applications. As of 2011, the “pass” score is a 67 out of a possible 100, and applicants
with a score of at least 67 are eligible to immigrate as a permanent skilled worker upon a
favorable determination by a Citizenship and Immigration Canada officer. Upon approval
and entry into the country, the applicant (and any immediate family) is eligible for
citizenship in as little as four years.
Canada has shown a steady commitment to accepting skilled workers in their
immigration policy. In 1985, the Canadian government increased the number of visas
available to skilled workers by including work experience and employment related
factors to the point system. In 1990, a five year Immigration Plan through 1995 was
passed in an attempt to double immigration, and more specifically increase skilled
matches to areas experiencing regional/national labor shortages.
In 2008, Budget Bill C-50 was passed to slow the backlog of immigration
applications from 6 years to only 6 to 12 months. Additionally, it was intended to align
Canadian labor shortages with immigration applicants in order to provide employment
opportunities for applicants wanting to immigrate to Canada, as well as fill labor
shortages in the Canadian labor market. As an example, the government has developed
occupation shortage lists that are updated every six months to make sure that immigrants
are being utilized in sectors that Canadian nationals are not filling.
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Additionally in 2008, Canada’s Parliament granted their immigration minister a
special regulatory tool called a “Ministerial Instruction” that allows him to make
adjustments to immigration policies without having to consult with Parliament.
According to a study by The Partnership for a New American Economy and the
Partnership for New York City, this Ministerial Instruction has already been used by
Minister Jason Kennedy to prioritize skilled workers. Specifically, he has recently
requested that immigration agents evaluate immigration petitions submitted by those with
skills in higher demand and leave the low skilled and low demand applications
unprocessed. Recall that in the U.S., Congress maintains exclusive control over all
immigration policy making and has not ceded this authority to any outside agency or
individual.
Additionally, on June 26, 2010, the Government of Canada passed legislation that
dramatically changed the skilled worker program. Legislation implemented a cap of
20,000 or 1,000 per occupation available per year for skilled workers. Exemptions to this
cap, however, are available for applicants who have arranged their own employment and
have a job offer with an employer in Canada. Therefore, in practice, it is not expected to
hinder employment of foreign national to any great extent.
Australian Policy
Australia’s immigration system is a hybrid of the systems in place in Canada and
the United States. As mentioned above, in 1979, Australia followed in the steps of
Canada by implementing the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS), a
point based system based on individual economic contributions. It divided potential
immigrants into three classes: skilled, family, and humanitarian (much like in the U.S.).
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In 2010, however, they changed the point system to an economic needs based system
called SkillSelect74. The program allows prospective immigrants to apply online and
obtain an overall point score. Immigration officials review these online applications and
invite those who best meet employment needs to file formal visa applications. As
mentioned above, Canada has also adopted a similar needs based process.
While Australia follows a version of Canada’s point system, the immigration
process is similar to that in the United States. Like Canada, Australia has both a
nonimmigrant and immigration visa process, but unlike Canada the nonimmigrant visa is
the most common method for entering the country initially (much like the U.S.).
The most common nonimmigrant process exclusively for skilled workers is the
Subclass 457. Employer sponsored workers can enter the country through a Temporary
Business (Long Stay) Standard Business Sponsorship, also known as Subclass 457. It
requires employer sponsorship by either an Australian business or an overseas business
operating in Australia. Applications for Subclass 457 must be for a skilled position that is
specified by the government on a skilled occupation list that is based on the ASCO
system, indicating national and regional labor needs75. The list was changed most
recently in 2010 to use the ANZSCO classification system, and the occupation list itself
was changed only slightly. The visa allows employers to employ foreign workers for any
period up to four years. Additionally, employers must pay equivalent market salary rates
to foreign employees (much like the prevailing wage in the U.S.) and the visa is employer
specific.
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http://www.deccanherald.com/content/51465/australia-cancel-20000-visa-applications.html
http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/_pdf/sol-schedule1.pdf
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Subclass 457 bears many similarities to the H-1B. Both are temporary visas, valid
for up to three years in the U.S. and four in Australia, require employer sponsorship, and
have a minimum wage requirement. There are several noteworthy differences, however.
The U.S. has an annual cap on these visas while Subclass 457 does not. Additionally,
while the U.S. has a multitude of nonimmigrant visas available, the majority of all long
term immigrants to Australia are on Subclass 457, or approximately four out of five
immigrants76.
Unlike the U.S., Australia also has a program (the General Skilled Migration
Program or GSM) for professionals and other skilled migrants who do not have employer
sponsorship but whose skills are in demand. Because Australia (like most countries) has a
documented shortage of physicians and nurses, they have a system in place that
essentially allows doctors and nurses to register with a government agency, find
employment, and obtain either a Subclass 457 visa or go through the permanent visa
process. This is vastly different from the U.S. process where permanent residence for
even the most highly skilled and in the fields with the greatest shortages (i.e. healthcare)
can take at least a couple of years at the very minimum in the very best case scenario to
over a decade in the worst case.
As with Canada, Australia has been successful in making positive changes to their
skilled worker program in the late 2000s when their U.S. counterpart completely halted
any legislative efforts. In 2011, for example, Australia’s Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship announced a new Migration Plan that would reform their immigration policy
in order to increase the number of skilled immigrants and make the process for skilled
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http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/australian-government-overhaul-ofvisa-scheme?autoplay=423328
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immigrants more efficient and effective 77. Through these reforms, the federal government
will allocate immigrant visas for specific regional areas. Additionally, a fast track process
green card process was be implemented in 2012 for those on a temporary business visa
(Subclass 457) whose employers agree to sponsor them for an additional two years.
Comparing the U.S., Canada, and Australia
While Canada and Australia have attempted to increase their share of skilled
workers, the U.S. has experienced a decrease, due likely to stagnant immigration policies.
Between 2001 and 2011, for example, employment based immigration decreased from 17
percent to 13 percent. Additionally, the U.S. allocates approximately 7 percent of its
permanent visas to employment categories, compared to 25 percent in Canada and 42
percent in Australia78.
In the United States, positive policy on skilled workers halted after 2004. In
Canada, however, policymakers passed a positive immigration bill in 2008, in the midst
of a worldwide economic recession, to reduce the application backlog and fill labor
shortages in the Canadian labor market. Two years later, however, as the economic
recession continued with no end in sight, Canadian policymakers passed a law to cap the
number of skilled workers admitted each year, for the first time mirroring U.S. policy.
Yet even with the cap, applications are granted based on labor needs and those regions
with substantiated labor needs are still able to obtain skilled foreign workers.
Additionally, Canada is actively trying to improve their immigration system by
attempting to decrease backlogs and granting the Immigration Minister carte blanche
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http://www.embraceaustralia.com/australian-migration-thinks-local-9475.htm
Orrenius, Pia and Madeline Zavodny, From Brawn to Brains: How Immigration Works for America,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas: 2010 Annual Report, p. 15. Available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/fed/annual/2010/ar10b.pdf
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authority to fix the system. The same is true in Australia where recent legislation has
been passed to make the green card process for skilled workers faster and more efficient.
While the percentage of high skilled immigrants as a percentage of all immigrants
has increased in both Canada and Australia in each 10 year period since 1991, the
percentage has steadily decreased in the United States over the past 20 years. Table 9.2
shows a staggering difference between actual immigration numbers among these three
countries. Between 1991 and 2011, the percentage of skilled immigrants jumped from 37
percent to 67 percent in Australia and from 18 percent to 67 percent in Canada. In the
U.S., however, the percentage fell from 18 percent in 1991 to 13 percent in 2011.

Table 9.2 High Skilled Immigrants as a Percentage of All Immigrants
Year
1991
2001
2011

U.S.
18
17
13

Canada
18
55
67

Australia
37
60
67

Source: "Not Coming to America: Why the U.S. is Falling Behind in the
Global Race for Talent"

Comparing the Annual Cap Restriction in Canada and the U.S.
In Canada, exemptions from the annual cap exist for applicants who have secured
a job offer with a Canadian employer. In the United States, exemptions from the annual
cap exist only for institutions of higher education as defined by section 101(a) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), nonprofit entities related to or
affiliated with a nonprofit educational entity as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), nonprofit or governmental research
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organizations as defined by 8 CFR 214(h)(19)(iii)(C), for physicians who have obtained a
waiver of their home residency requirement and agreed to work in a federally designated
medical shortage area for a period of at least three years, and for applicants who have
obtained a Master’s Degree in a United States educational institution.
Examining the cap exemptions only on their face, the Canadian cap is clearly
much less restrictive than the United States cap. Normalizing the percentage of the
American and Canadian populations that are skilled workers and examining the
percentage of that population that are skilled workers can shed some light on the
regulations that have been implemented. As Table 9.3 below indicates, the total
population of skilled workers in the United States is more than ten times the total
population of skilled workers in Canada. However, upon examining the percentage of the
total population with a Bachelor’s Degree, the numbers are extremely close, indicating
that a comparable share of the Canadian and American populations is comprised of
skilled workers.
In contrast, however, the percentage of the skilled worker population that has a
skilled visa in Canada is almost double the percentage of skilled workers with a skilled
worker visa in the United States, indicating that Canada approves much more skilled
foreign workers as a share of their population than the United States. Considering the fact
that the United States labor market is much larger than the Canadian market, with
shortages in many fields, it is interesting that Canada approves double the percentage of
skilled workers than the United States.
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Table 9.3 U.S. and Canadian Skilled Worker Populations (Foreign and Domestic)

U.S.
Canada

Total
Total
Population
Year Population
with B.A.
2006 299,398,485 33,496,187
2006 32,576,100 2,981,465

%
Population
with B.A.
11.5
9.2

Total #
with
Skilled
Visa
270,981
44,161

% Skilled
Population
with
Skilled
Visa
0.8
1.5

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 2006 American Community Survey
USCIS Annual Report, 2006, Statistics Canada
CANSIM, Statistics Canada Census of Population 2006

Additionally, data from West’s (2011) Brookings Policy Brief Series indicates
that 26 percent of all Canadian immigrant visas are in the skilled worker category while
only 6.5 percent of immigrant visas issued in the United States are for skilled workers. It
is unclear whether West is referring to workers in the actual immigrant category (where
they have received approval for legal permanent residence) or if he is simply using the
colloquial definition of immigrant to refer to all foreign nationals admitted. Regardless,
the data shows the extremely different results from two very different policies.
Comparing Actual Skilled Immigrant Flows
A 2006 study indicated that over the past decade, the greatest percentage of high
skilled immigration to Canada came from China (18%), India (11%), Philippines (7%),
Pakistan (4%) and Romania (4%). In Australia, the greatest percentage came from the
United Kingdom/Ireland (25%), India (13%), China (11%), South Africa (5%), and
Malaysia (5%)79. Comparatively, in the United States, according to USCIS80 between
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http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/labourmarket.pdf
The earliest H-1B data made public by USCIS is the 2004 Fiscal Year data, which includes data from
2003 as well.
80
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2003 and 2006, the greatest percentage of H-1B visa holders came from India (43.5%),
China (9.4%), Canada (4.2), Philippines (3.9), Korea (3.3%), and the United Kingdom
(2.5%).
The greatest percentages of Indian immigrants are clearly coming to the United
States while a greater percentage of Chinese immigrants are going to Canada. In
Australia, however, the labor pool appears to rely more on United Kingdom/Ireland
immigration flows. Regardless of the exact percentage, however, it does appear that the
greatest number of skilled immigrants globally is coming from India, China, Philippines,
and the United Kingdom. Immigrants from these countries make up the bulk of the
skilled immigrants in at least two of these countries (which are also the three largest
immigrant accepting countries in the world).
Therefore, our three countries appear to be competing largely for the same labor
pool. The consequence of this is that the country (or countries) with the most favorable
policy or policies will likely win this race in the long run, assuming other market
conditions are comparable. Therefore, policy on skilled workers will increasingly become
more important for the United States if employers will continue to need the same skilled
immigrant flows in the future. Thus far, this flow has not slowed.
The Spillover Effect and an Explanation
While there is no cohesive explanation in the literature as to why policies among
these three countries diverge, scholars have been able to make some important findings.
Walsh (2008) argues that by the 1990s, ethnocentric fears began growing in both Canada
and Australia, resulting in some anti-immigrant sentiment. In Australia, for example, the
presence of “boat people” from Asia in both Australia and to a lesser extent Canada

151

became a new political issue (Walsh 2008: 802). Additionally, public opinion,
particularly in Canada over time has not been positive towards immigration generally
(Reitz 2004).
Yet immigration policies in both Canada and Australia have tended to be more
open than public opinion in these countries would have preferred (much like in the U.S.).
In both Canada and Australia, business interests mobilized in opposition to restrictive
immigration policies (Reitz 2004; Skeldon 1995) and as a result, Walsh (2008) argued
that both governments placed more emphasis on skilled workers in order to appease both
constituencies. As a result, after 1996 in both countries the number of skilled workers
admitted outpaced the number of family and refugee immigrants. This trend has
continued to date. This has allowed both countries to maintain high levels of public
approval (Walsh 2008).
These experiences in Canada and Australia are a major departure from the
experience in the United States. In the U.S., polarization has majorly divided the parties
to the extent where policy has been made very difficult to pass. This has not happened in
either Canada or Australia (Dalton 2008). Additionally, the spillover effect from the
“easy” issue of immigration (border security and the issue of undocumented Mexican
immigration) has resulted in a public very averse to increasing immigration generally.
Rather than switching gears and making immigration an economic issue, Congress, as
opposed to its counterparts in Australia and Canada, remains focused on “solving” the
issue of undocumented immigration where the Australian and Canadian Parliaments
managed to distract their publics while their economies benefitted and individual
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members benefitted from the support of both their base and their business constituents.
Congress may have much to learn.
Conclusion
While both Canada and Australia have been able to pass positive legislation on
skilled immigrants during the same period when the U.S. has failed to pass any, they have
also managed to pass significant positive changes to their general respective immigration
policies as well while the U.S. has also failed.
Australia has recently adopted policies to keep international students who studied
in Australia within the country81. The Skilled Graduate Temporary Visa program allows
highly qualified international students who fail to qualify for permanent residence
through the point system to stay for up to 18 months after they graduate in order to gain
the skills and job sponsorship they need in order to raise their score.
Similarly, three policy changes in 2008 in Canada made significant changes to
allow international students who study in Canada to remain and work82. One policy grants
additional points for the permanent residence points system through the Canadian
Experience Class program. Another program grants up to 1,000 international students
who have completed at least two years of a Ph.D. program in a STEM field permanent
resident status. Those who still do not qualify for permanent residence can still qualify to
stay and work for up to three years after graduating from a Canadian college or
university.
Both of these policies diverge sharply from U.S. policy. There are currently no
programs in place for a direct path for permanent residence for international students.
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http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled-migration/485/
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2011/2011-11-02.asp.
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Additionally, the process can take many years for those that are able to obtain an H-1B
visa. More puzzling still is the fact that roughly 40 percent of these international students
receive federal funding in the form of grants and scholarships within the U.S83.
This chapter has examined the various skilled immigration policies of the United
States, Canada, and Australia tracing their historical transformations over the years. It has
attempted to provide a comparison of the policies, the changes to these policies over time,
as well as the results of these policies.
As has been shown, both Canada’s and Australia’s policies have been much less
restrictive and more receptive to using foreign skilled workers to alleviate domestic labor
shortages. This has been done with support of both the voters and business constituents as
their Parliaments have been able to distract voters from domestic issues of relatively high
refugee numbers by increasing skilled workers and showing a link to relatively steady
economic growth. In the United States, however, skilled worker immigration policy has
been much more restrictive with annual caps and employer sponsorship requirements.
Additionally, spillover effects from the high levels of undocumented immigrations in the
U.S. has resulted in negative public opinion on immigration generally, and a Congress
risk averse to doing anything at all about skilled worker immigration.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I began this project wanting to understand why in the years when H-1B numbers
were in greatest demand Congress suddenly changed its tune and halted any real attempt
at passing positive legislation to increase the cap in one way or another. My major
finding was that the increase in polarization combined with a variety of changes in the
macro environment resulted in a Congress risk averse to any immigration related
legislation.
This work deviated from prior studies on skilled worker immigration in that these
prior studies focused their scope on the immigrant visa category because it grants
permanent resident status. Because the majority of immigrants to the United States enter
the country on a nonimmigrant visa first and then go through the process of permanent
residence, I found those studies premature. Therefore, this study attempted to fill that gap
in the literature in order to understand congressional behavior on one particular
nonimmigrant visa, the H-1B visa.
The H-1B visa is the only nonimmigrant visa available exclusively to skilled
workers. This study attempted to explain congressional behavior on the H-1B visa in
order to understand why Congress was proactive on the issue from the 1990s through
2004 and then refused to touch the issue regardless of constituent demands for change.
In a relatively short period of time, the same policy went from being relatively
noncontroversial with bipartisan support to completely stalemated. This analysis
attempted to explain what changed. One major shift over time and during our time period
has been the increase in polarization both in the broader political environment and within
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Congress as well, which resulted from ideological sorting coupled with economic and
social changes. What we were left with is legislation that was once routine can now only
be passed through unorthodox methods until eventually members become too risk averse
to passing anything.
My analysis examined H-1B policymaking within the context of these broader
trends in American politics. And while the timeframe is short, the forces shaping the
internal and external environment accelerated a great deal during this period. As a result,
a variety of congressional models needed to be used. These included pivotal politics,
party models, unorthodox lawmaking, and stalemate game theory models in order to
explain policymaking (or the lack thereof) on the H-1B visa and answer the following
research questions:
1) What factors explain congressional policy making within the context of skilled
worker (H-1B) immigration?
2) Why did Congress stop using alternative methods (i.e. riders) to pass positive
H-1B legislation?
3) Why did even minor changes to the H-1B program that were successful as
stand-alone pieces of legislation pre-2004 fail after 2004?
4) Is the U.S. experience unique? How does it compare to legislation in Canada
and Australia?
The bulk of the analysis consisted of a four part longitudinal study that examined
policy making using four different congressional theories to explain the following periods
of passage and failure: (1) the creation of the H-1B skilled worker visa in 1990; (2)
passage of legislation from 1998-2004 largely as individual pieces of legislation; (3)
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passage of legislation through the use of riders from 1998-2004; and (4) failure of
legislation from 2006-2008, followed by a lack of legislation introduced to date. My
findings are as follows.
Findings
In chapter two, I provided a general history of immigration policymaking, as well
as an overview of the H-1B visa in order to set the stage for the analysis. Chapter three
outlined the relevant literature and congressional models used in the analysis, including
Krehbiel’s pivotal politics (1998), Cox and McCubbins’ party models (2005; 2007),
Sinclair’s (2007) unorthodox lawmaking, and Gilmour’s (1995) strategic disagreement.
In chapter four, I outlined my research design. Specifically, this study has been a
longitudinal qualitative analysis using the four congressional models just listed to explain
four key periods of H-1B legislation: (1) the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990; (2)
passage of stand-alone legislation from 1998 through 2002; (3) passage of legislation
through the use of riders from 1998 through 2002: and (4) complete stalemate after 2004.
Chapters five through eight were the bulk of the analysis, where I examined the
effect polarization had on legislation on the H-1B visa in order to ascertain the shift in
congressional behavior. Finally, chapter nine compared similar polices in Canada and
Australia. The following sections summarize my main findings.
Polarization: Causes and Consequences
Since the 1970s, the parties have increasingly polarized and members have
become more ideologically homogenous. This has resulted in two consecutive polarizing
phenomena: vanishing moderates and the clustering of the two parties as conservatives or
liberals.
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While Congress is a well-bound institution, it is still a permeable institution and is
often affected by external events and forces. Polarization has changed congressional
behavior by increasing gridlock, and making major legislation successful less frequently.
In the Senate, polarization has made overcoming the filibuster very difficult, and has
made Democrats unwavering in their reluctance to pass H-1B related legislation without
a comprehensive immigration reform package attached. Polarization also explains why
members stopped attempting to use riders to attach legislation onto larger, must pass
legislation, and why the introduction of any H-1B related legislation stopped altogether
after 2008.
Institutional Arrangements Matter
Many of the most well known studies on Congress focus on only the Senate or the
House. Yet in order for legislation to pass, it has to get through both chambers in
identical fashion. As a result, I showed that institutional arrangements in both chambers
can and do hinder the ability of members to get legislation passed.
In the Senate, the cloture rule is one of the more recent institutional changes that
has greatly impacted the success or failure of a piece of legislation. Since the 1970s,
passing legislation in the Senate requires a supermajority of 60 votes in order for to
overcome the filibuster and pass legislation. As neither party has been able to reach 60,
reaching cloture instead requires the presence of moderate members. Combined with
increased polarization and the clustering around the conservative and liberal poles,
moderate members have all but disappeared and getting legislation passed has been
rendered very difficult over time.
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In the House, changes in the committee process combined with increased
polarization have resulted in a much more divided chamber. In effect, legislation without
partisan support dies before it makes it to committee or shortly after.
As a result of these institutional hindrances, the rider has become a tool for
members to manipulate the institutions in order to get their goals’ realized. For a number
of years, members were unable to get H-1B legislation passed on its own and were
successful in using riders in order to get their desired outcomes.
Conversely, however, in recent years a sharply divided electorate has rendered it
nearly impossible for a party to make it to 60 members in the Senate or to obtain as much
partisan support in the House for legislation to pass. Combined with increasing reelection
fears and the permanent campaign members are engaged in, members are increasingly
engaged in uptake, or adjusting their legislative agenda based on criticisms of their own
legislative history from their prior election challenger, out of fear of their own base.
Essentially, if an incumbent is criticized by his opponent for his stance on immigration in
a previous term, he will adjust his voting record in the future in order to keep that critique
at bay during the next election. Combined with a more hostile political and economic
climate towards immigration generally, we have more gridlock than ever before. Now
combine that with a Democratic Party that is dead set on passing comprehensive reform
and you have stalemate.
Changes in the Macro Political Environment Affect Policymaking
Polarization has dramatically changed policymaking over the past thirty years.
During this time, Congress created a new nonimmigrant visa category for foreign skilled
workers and debated and passed a number of bills throughout the late 1990s and early
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2000s to alter that visa category in a positive manner. As time went on, the scope of this
legislation grew smaller and smaller until legislation became completely unsuccessful
beginning in the mid 2000s.
While the issue of foreign skilled workers has remained the same during this time,
the politics both within and outside of Congress have changed dramatically in the past 20
years. As we have seen, the one major political change that occurred during this period
was the ideological sorting of the electorate and increased polarization within Congress
which resulted in stalemate on this type of policy.
Additionally, a number of macro-level political and economic changes have also
affected the ability of Congress to pass this type of legislation. First, the recent addition
of Latino voters has shifted the balance of power in Congress. Democrats have largely
been the winners of the Latino vote and as a result, have been successful at blaming
Republicans when immigration related immigration fails, thus garnering greater support
from the Latino base.
Second, I argue that the introduction and failure of comprehensive immigration
reform was the tipping point for this failure in 2006. Desperate for reform (and to fully
secure the Latino vote to boot), Democrats were content to sacrifice their half of the loaf,
which consists of increasing H-1B numbers (pre economic recession) in an attempt to get
the entire loaf of comprehensive reform. Yet Republicans have not budged on the issue
and as a result, the H-1B visa, countless businesses, and foreign skilled workers have
suffered.
Finally, the recent economic recession can explain the post 2008 moratorium on
the introduction of any H-1B legislation. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) tell us that
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immigration is not a salient issue to the public until the economy is so bad that people
begin to blame immigrants. While the argument that H-1B skilled workers are not taking
jobs away from U.S. workers may have merit, in reality the high unemployment levels in
the late 2000s makes increasing immigrant numbers a dangerous stance for any legislator
to take, particularly as public opinion for immigration generally was low during this
period. As a result, members increasingly become more risk averse over time as the
economy continues to slump and their concerns for reelection increase.
A Dysfunctional Congress
In addition to illustrating how polarization has impacted the success of H-1B
legislation, this study also highlights the general dysfunction that exists in Congress. This
theme is not unique to immigration policymaking but rather on policymaking within the
institution as a whole.
Polarization has rendered it near impossible for members to deliberate and
compromise. Instead, each party has its own policy agenda and is content on sacrificing
legislation in the short run in the hopes of garnering enough party support in a later
election. What the framers envisioned for the legislative branch, a majoritarian institution
that would deliberate and compromise, has instead transformed into their worst
nightmare, an institution rife with stalemate and gridlock.
The Unique U.S. Experience
Additionally, I sought to ascertain whether legislatures in Australia and Canada
had similar experiences during this time throughout the 2000s. Canada, Australia, and the
U.S. share similar colonial histories and relied to a large extent on immigration to
populate their countries at one point. As such, Canada, Australia and the U.S. have

161

historically been the largest immigrant receiving countries in the world and a number of
studies illustrate the similarities in their policies. Yet some important differences in the
immigration policies of these three countries exist.
In looking at similar policies in Canada’s and Australia, we see that they have
been much less restrictive and more receptive to using foreign skilled workers to alleviate
domestic labor shortages. While public opinion throughout the 1990s was negative
towards immigration policy, the Parliaments in these countries were able to shift the
public’s negative focus on Asian refugees to passing legislation to increase the number of
skilled workers. This has resulted in relatively steady economic growth and made public
opinion on immigration more positive.
In the United States, however, skilled worker immigration policy has been much
more restrictive with annual caps and employer sponsorship requirements. This can be
attributed to a number of political phenomena that have been unique to the United States,
largely: (1) party polarization has over time made it more difficult for this type of
legislation to pass; (2) the increase in the Latino voting population has changed the
dynamics of legislative politics on the subject of immigration generally; and (3) changes
at the macro-level over time have resulted in less congressional support for the H-1B
program and the 2006 failure of comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) was the
tipping point for this shift in policy.
As can be seen, while polarization may have been unique to the U.S., Canada and
Australia were able to turn the tide of public opinion in their favor by using skilled
foreign immigration to improve the general economy. Had Congress employed a similar
tactic prior to the recession, legislation on the H-1B may have taken a different course. I
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am not optimistic, however, that a similar policy would be successful in the United States
today with the state of the economy, the perception84 that undocumented immigrant level
are high, and the spillover effects that have made members risk averse.
Recommendations for Future Research
As I stated in the introduction, research on congressional behavior on
nonimmigrant visas is nonexistent within the literature. This study focused on the change
in congressional support for skilled worker nonimmigrant visas since its creation to date.
As such, this study is simply a beginning to the study of congressional behavior on
skilled workers.
Looking at the legislation that was introduced and/or passed, there does not
appear to be much of a pattern among the members sponsoring H-1B related bills. Across
the board, they do not appear to have much in common politically, institutionally, or
geographically. The Brookings Institution is currently working on putting together a data
set of where H-1B visa holders have resided over time. Therefore, future studies into
these members’ constituencies may provide a better understanding of their motivations
and perhaps a pattern may emerge among sponsors.
Additionally, as we have seen, in each year since 1997, the H-1B cap has been hit
prior to the end of the fiscal year. In 2006, 2007, and 2008, the cap was hit either on the
first day applications were accepted or within just a few weeks. Yet in those years,
Congress failed to pass any positive legislation.
The pattern in Congress thus far has been successful legislation from 1998 to
2004 (either as stand-alone legislation or attached as riders), the introduction of stand-
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While in recent years, the number of undocumented immigrants (particularly Mexicans) has decreased,
both the actual numbers and the perception that numbers are high remain.
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alone legislation but no passage from 2006 to 2008, and then no movement at all despite
constituent demands for positive change. This is likely not the end of the line for
congressional behavior on the H-1B visa, particularly since the 2013 fiscal year H-1B cap
was hit in June 2012, more than five months ahead of the 2012 fiscal year and closer to
cap dates in the mid 2000s, indicating that demand for foreign skilled workers is up
again. As such, further notice of congressional behavior will be necessary to ascertain
whether Congress continues on a trajectory of non-action or if and how they attempt to
address the lack of cap numbers each year.
Additionally, this study focused exclusively on positive changes to the H-1B
program. To date, very little movement has been made within either chamber to
negatively impact the program. If negative economic conditions continue, future research
may be warranted to determine whether a spillover effect occurs on the basis of the
“easy” versus “hard” issue distinction between immigration generally and skilled worker
immigration to either bolster or refute the findings here.
Policy Recommendations and the Future of Policymaking
In the wake of the recent economic recession, many argue that the United States
will need to open and liberalize its immigration policies to the more highly skilled
workers in order to remain competitive in the global economic market, especially as
many of the developed European Union states have already enacted more aggressive
policies in an attempt to attract highly skilled immigrants. It remains to be seen how
Congress will deal with this issue in the future, but if past policies predict the future, the
future of skilled immigration to the United States appears grim indeed.
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Politically, Congress will likely continue to face the same obstacles to H-1B
legislation as in previous years. Politics in Congress have certainly changed. With the
increase of polarization, change in the electorate resulting in Republicans increasingly
becoming more fearful of their own base, the increased presence of freshmen Senators
(43 after the 2010 election, compared with 30 in the 2004 election), and the
disappearance of the old Senate “giants” like Ted Kennedy who could “carry 10 votes
with his mere presence”, members are much more concerned with the permanent
campaign and fearful of losing their seats than ever before (Milbank 2012). As a result,
gridlock is more likely to continue in greater numbers.
As H-1B cap numbers are being hit earlier and earlier again, I estimate that in a
matter of years Congress will seriously have to face increasing cap numbers again. In
order to be successful, however, Republicans will have to disentangle H-1B legislation
from broader comprehensive reform and Democrats will have to sacrifice reform in the
short run. Depending on the partisan makeup and where the pivot falls, this may have to
occur with a package deal including the DREAM Act or some other type of concession
on the part of Republicans that falls somewhere in between the status quo and the liberal
right.
In concert with increasing cap numbers, a common recommendation has been to
improve higher education in the United States so that employers do not have to import
highly skilled workers. Some efforts have been attempted on this front, including some
H-1B government filing fees earmarked for higher education and minority education, yet
they do not appear to have been very successful. A more preferable policy would be to
assess the industries that currently have major shortages, including health care and IT, for
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example, and provide additional training opportunities in those fields. As outlined in the
analysis, a number of bills have been introduced proposing a cap exemption for
employers who create scholarships for U.S. students in U.S. institutions of higher
education. As we have seen, however, thus far these have been unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, throughout the world, emigration of skilled workers has risen steadily
since 1970, with the greatest numbers from developing states Philippines and India,
Mexico, China, North and South Korea, Vietnam, and Poland (Legrain 2006:183-184). In
the United States, population decline in the highly educated and skilled sector has already
begun and is projected to continue. This decline should result in an increased demand for
foreign skilled workers. This supply will likely come from developing states with the
institutions to educate and produce skilled workers but not the infrastructure to employ
them.
Skilled migrants, however, will likely favor states with economic opportunities
and immigration incentives such as Canada and throughout the European Union. As is,
immigration to the United States is relatively difficult with visa opportunities limited and
overly narrow. Following the hypotheses of Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005) and
Schachar (2006), in order to remain competitive in the global market, the United States
will need to create policies to attract the more educated and skilled migrants to the United
States. A good economy and the promise of a better life alone are unlikely to continue to
attract higher skilled migrants as other economically sound states such as Canada,
Australia, and even states through the European Union provide actual tangible incentives
for skilled immigrants. In the years ahead, congressional members will need to examine
the policies created by states gaining speed on skilled immigrants in an attempt to either
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provide similar or better incentives to attract the highly skilled immigrants to the United
States.
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